

Hegel, Love and Forgiveness

Liz Disley



HEGEL, LOVE AND FORGIVENESS:
POSITIVE RECOGNITION IN GERMAN
IDEALISM

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BY

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Liz Disley
St Andrews, September 2014

ABBREVIATIONS

- EN G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, ed. F. Nicolini and O. Poggeler (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1959)
- FL G. W. F. Hegel, 'Fragment on Love', *Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox, with introduction and fragments trans. R. Koner (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1948)
- GPR G. W. F. Hegel, 'Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts', *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 7
- PhG G. W. F. Hegel, 'Phänomenologie des Geistes', *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 3
- Werke G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71)

INTRODUCTION

I begin by outlining briefly the main thesis of the monograph: love and forgiveness are both examples of positive recognition that can serve as ethical norms of human interaction, grounded in a monistic ontological framework that succeeds in allowing for the intersubjectivity necessary to make an ethics of the social world meaningful. This argument is important for Hegel studies, the study of German Idealism more generally, in areas of ethics and politics concerned with recognition and the social world, in the emergent field of social ontology and in metaphysical/meta-ethical discussions about the relationship between metaphysics and ethics. It is also particularly relevant to the philosophy of religion, since both the concepts of love and of recognition have theological aspects – particularly in the concept of *metanoia* – which have not been taken into account in work on recognition thus far. An idealist monist ontology has itself important theological aspects. I discuss this in more detail in Chapters Two, Five and Six.

I follow this with a brief account of the existing two main approaches to the question of recognition and, more generally, the social self in Hegel's work. I call these the 'deflationary' and 'antiquarian' approaches. With the use of prominent examples, I show how the first approach is deficient in that it does not account for any metaphysical, ontological or epistemological underpinning for concepts in practical philosophy, leading the ethical or political aspects of the analysis towards an unwarranted pragmatism. Moreover, it leads to a serious neglect of the theological aspect of Hegel's social philosophy, which I outline very briefly here (the broken middle, *metanoia* and freedom). The 'antiquarian' approach sees Hegel's concept of recognition as so tightly bound up with his metaphysical system that it can have no application beyond that. I outline the kind of application to contemporary social and political philosophy that the concept of recognition, seen in the context of Hegel's social philosophy and German idealism in general, might be expected to have. I also briefly introduce the meaning of 'positive' recognition.

This work aims to answer questions about love, forgiveness and recognition, whilst at the same time providing an insight into a number of more general questions about theoretical and practical philosophy and the role of theology in social philosophy. How is a meaningful intersubjectivity possible, and what must be the

case about the way the world is in order for this to be so? In a world of imperfect autonomy and epistemic deficiencies, how can we meaningfully ascribe moral responsibility, much less forgive? What can an interpretation of Hegel's concept of love/forgiveness contribute to contemporary discussions in moral philosophy? How is Hegel's concept of love/forgiveness rooted in German Idealism and its heirs? How does it contribute to contemporary discussions of forgiveness?

These, and more, questions are dealt with over the course of these six chapters. Hegel is not presented as the philosopher who has all of the answers, much less all of the correct answers, but as someone who serves as the originator of the most promising kind of approach, and as a central historical focus. The mixture of phenomenological method and aiming towards ontological conclusions, as well as inevitable consequences for practical philosophy (that is, ethics and social and political theory), was central to German Idealism and picked up in many places in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. As I argue over the course of this work, it is, often silently, at the centre of many contemporary debates in social philosophy. In this way, whatever the judgement of Hegel's own political philosophy, his work is an obvious historical and theoretical starting-point.

What is positive recognition? The term as I use it has at least two facets. 'Positive' refers to a particular kind of ethical norm or judgement, a way of behaving or a principle to guide action that is held to be a positive example. At the same time, however, recognition is not something that could be used single-handedly to ground an ethical system, let alone be used in a utilitarian way as something to be maximised. Rather, it can be characterised as an approach to others that leads to the formation of ethical relationships which lead to people treating each other well. Recognitive relationships are, on the kind of account I am proposing, the context in which positive ethical behaviour will take place. They are not ethical relationships themselves, much less a guarantee of morally correct action.

A thread that runs through this work is the idea of recognition as re-cognition, as a rethinking of one's relation to the other. The level on which this is done raises interesting questions about the relation between epistemology and ethics. Re-cognition does not simply involve looking at the other person anew or with fresh eyes, and does not focus on individual facts about that person. It does not, in the way I am using the term in this work, mean treating people as equals regardless of such factors as sex or race. Rather, it involves a new understanding of the status of those with whom we come into contact, and our status with relation to them in the world. This re-thinking is thus comprehensive – a new concept of the self-other relation, the self-self relation, and the self-world relation. This epistemological framework then forms the basis for positive ethical treatment of each other. In this way, the use of the term 'recognition' differs from the way it might be used in the philosophy of race, for example. Receptions of Hegel's concept of recognition in the English-speaking world have focussed

more strongly on the directly political and less on the concept of recognition as a part of Hegel's system in general, that is, less, if at all, on the ontological and epistemological aspects of the concept. One focus of this kind of interest in recognition is what Nancy Fraser calls the 'identity model', whose proponents

transpose the Hegelian recognition schema on to the cultural and political terrain [and] contend that to belong to a group that is devalued by the dominant culture is to be misrecognized, to suffer a distortion in one's relation to one's self.¹

This is one locus of the continued feminist interest in Hegel's theory of recognition, particularly combined with Miranda Fricker's recent work on epistemic injustice,² although Simone de Beauvoir's more ontologically-inclined analysis has remained influential, and the target of much criticism. The political debate on recognition has been truly international, and has crossed traditional disciplinary and sub-disciplinary borders. An excellent example of this crossing can be seen in the 2003 volume, *Redistribution or Recognition?*, co-authored by Fraser and Honneth.³ Whilst the question of whether a Hegelian concept like recognition can be divorced from its ontological and dialectical scheme remains a question which divides analytical and Continental philosophers, it would not be true to say that there are two separate and unconnected discussions taking place.⁴

Metaphysics and Ontology – Self and World

The reason for the centrality of Hegel to the concept of recognition as it is being discussed here comes from precisely this kind of integration of the ethical into the epistemological, with that epistemology being closely factored into a metaphysical and ontological understanding of oneself and the other and the self-self, self-other and self-world relation. I do not start in this work from a clearly fixed and fully detailed self-world account with areas of study allocated to metaphysics and ontology; it is partly the phenomenological observation that goes alongside a reading of Hegel's account of human interaction, and that of German Idealism more generally, that can help to determine precisely how these terms ought to be used. However, a working definition is necessary from the outset, and since these terms are used in such different ways across and within the various subfields of philosophy and cognate studies, I attempt to set out my usage of these terms here.

Metaphysics, to put it as simply as possible, asks what the world is like at the most fundamental level. Ontology, to put it as simply as possible, asks what *we* are like at our most fundamental level, and about other beings in the world. These statements are so broad as to be meaningless, yet at the same time assume more than they are entitled to. Already, the separation of self, or other minded or non-minded objects, and world is built in, a distinction which, for many idealists, is entirely unwarranted. One of the most prominent developments regarding metaphysics in the twentieth century was its rejection: the 'rejection

of metaphysics' generally referring to a refusal to accept that there is or could be a series of foundational truths about a stable world outside the mind. This is the sense in which Hegel rejects metaphysics, and one can draw a line through from Hegel to post-structuralists and post-modernists through early twentieth century philosophers such as Heidegger. To suggest that metaphysics and ontology are a similar approach to different subject matter is to beg the question against the metaphysical or ontological monist. Similarly, to suggest that ontology is a sub-branch of metaphysics, with metaphysics the overarching study of what there is in the world and ontology the more specific study of being or what can be said to exist, involves a substantive metaphysical/ontological claim that there is more to metaphysics than the study of the being or existence of minded or non-minded objects. This claim would only hold true if there were more to the world than the things in it, and if there were theoretical-philosophical questions (as opposed to practical questions in moral/political philosophy) about the world which did not pertain to the being of things in it. To suggest that this might not be the case is not to reject metaphysics from the outset, but to raise a note of caution about accepting the idea of ontology as a sub-branch or sub-field of metaphysics.

On the other hand, to treat metaphysics and ontology as synonyms whilst simultaneously accepting the very broad ideas of metaphysics as the study of the world and ontology as the study of being is to beg the question against the dualist or metaphysical realist. This claim would amount to saying that there is nothing more to the study of the world but the study of beings. This is precisely what a phenomenologist of a Heideggerian kind would want to do, and this rejection of metaphysics reduces that discipline to ontology, rendering it redundant. When using the terms 'metaphysics' and 'ontology', it is not possible to be entirely agnostic about the relation of appearance and reality, or of things in the world to that world, unless one adopts some completely arbitrary pattern of use. This problem is exacerbated when discussing an ontology of the human world, as the temptation is to use the term 'metaphysics' to refer to the non-human/non-minded world of objects, and 'ontology' to refer to the being of minded objects. This seems particularly unhelpful when there is not thought to be a difference in approach to the two methods of enquiry – the human subject is simply assumed to be transcendental and worldless, metaphysics simply neglected or ignored as less interesting, or even having some lesser kind of being. Where phenomenology lies at the heart of a philosophical approach, this kind of separation of metaphysics and ontology as philosophical areas of study seems less problematic in terms of suitability for purpose; observations about the being of human or other minded beings that develop from an experiential point of view will clearly be of a different nature from such 'metaphysical' observations that are coherent or valid. The difference here between metaphysics and ontology is here one of method as well as subject matter. Again, however, to assume this distinction is to assume from the outset that one's methodological approach is correct.

The best approach to use from the outset of an enquiry like mine, where the method is primarily phenomenological and the fundamental concern is with the social world, is to assume that metaphysics and ontology differ in their core methods of enquiry and their core subject matter, but that the study of the human subject in the physical social world can be a matter for both metaphysics and ontology. It is worth keeping at the forefront of the enquiry that the choice as to whether a particular question or problem is a matter for metaphysics or ontology is not devoid of substantial philosophical assumptions. In particular, a preference for ontology will often suggest a bias towards idealism, as the being of the human subject, rather than the metaphysics of the surrounding world, becomes the important field of study. This should be acknowledged from the outset: the historical context of my enquiry is deeply rooted in idealism. This does not, however, involve an assumption that metaphysics is a field of study without validity or utility.

In this work, then, I use the terms 'metaphysics' and 'ontology' in an overlapping sense in terms of subject matter, and remaining agnostic from the outset as to whether the methods of both should be the same. Quine, in his seminal 'On What There Is', makes the point that the use of a term in an ontological statement does not presuppose its existence.⁵ The same is also true of metaphysics, understood in a certain way. Statements about the world external to the mind (any mind) do not presuppose that there is a mind-independent reality any more than talking about a Pegasus means that there must be one. It does not make sense, then, even for the thoroughgoing idealist to reject metaphysics as an area of study, although the idealism of the philosopher will mean that they accord a different status to the conclusions of metaphysical enquiry. The idealist monist will not see metaphysical claims as being *about* a mind-independent reality, and metaphysics will therefore be a subordinate discipline to an ontology which asks about the being of the monistic entity. None of this requires a protracted 'rejection of metaphysics' before any ontological and phenomenological enquiry has even taken place.

Broadly, then, I am using the term 'metaphysics' to mean 'the study of the world and its contents', in the hope that it is not necessary to detail how this differs from the work of the physical and natural sciences. 'Ontology' is then the study of being and beings, that is, minded and non-minded objects, although of course the focus of my enquiry here is minded objects. Ontological study from a phenomenological point of view is not a subclass of metaphysics, but a discipline with different methods. Ontology in the traditional sense that Quine intends it could be thus regarded.

Ontology is also a name for a sort of meta-metaphysical investigation, of 'the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways.'⁶ This is very much part of my concern in this work, as it is a central question for anyone interested in philosophical idealism and the status of ontological claims from within and outside this tradition. In this sense too, ontology is not a sub-branch of meta-

physics but an overarching field of study. This kind of endeavour leaves open the possibility that there is no valid or interesting study to be done under the general heading of traditional metaphysics, perhaps because there is no mind-independent reality. Importantly, it does not assume it from the outset.

We thus have at least three kinds of ontology, or three ways in which that word is used: ontology as the study of beings (a), ontology as the phenomenological study of (minded) beings (b), and ontology as meta-metaphysics (c). Much of the confusion and cross-purposes discussion of ontology and metaphysics conflates at least the first and third of these senses, and historically-based discussion also fails to distinguish the second sense. Distinguishing these three senses also helps to illustrate what is involved in the rejection of metaphysics. A rejection of metaphysics might be a simple function of a conviction that (a) is the only worthwhile or interesting subclass of metaphysics (in which case, of course, it is only a partial rejection of metaphysics as ontology in this sense is a part of metaphysics and not an entirely separate endeavour). It might be a more complete rejection of metaphysics if the sense in which ontology is understood is as in (b) above. If the study of human experience as a way into the study of their being is seen as the correct approach to the study of what there is (or ontology in sense (a)), then the 'rest' of metaphysics is clearly devoid of utility. Specifically, foundationalist metaphysics which argues that some part of reality grounds a system of knowledge (a metaphysical presupposition of an epistemological claim, as foundationalism is generally an epistemological position), is strongly at odds with an ontology that employs the phenomenological method.⁷ The idea of a metaphysical system grounding an epistemology in this way is something that the post-modernists, with their roots in idealism, clearly want to overcome.⁸

The third sense (c), which sees ontology as meta-metaphysics, does not involve a rejection of metaphysics but relegates it in terms of status. A stable ontology is required to be able to assess and ground any metaphysics. Metaphysics will not be the primary or fundamental discipline but is still a valid and interesting field of study. Idealism and realism are both positions in this kind of meta-metaphysics or ontology. To be an idealist in this sense is to relegate metaphysics from the outset, but not necessarily to reject it. If metaphysics is seen as the foundational discipline by definition, this kind of ontological position could, in itself, be seen as a rejection of metaphysics.

When I discuss ontology in this work, I mean it in each of the three senses I have detailed. Where it is not clear from the context which one is currently in play, I will point out which one is relevant. When I discuss the second sense of ontology (b), this will be in the context of others' accounts and studies, since I do not assume this kind of account from the outset. It often seems as if Hegel does, but in fact this view is most uncontroversially associated with twentieth century phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Husserl. As John Caputo puts

it, 'Heidegger wants to affirm reality while at the same time giving an account of the subjective life in which reality is reached'.⁹ Heidegger is not denying the possibility of any metaphysics, but does not see it as the primary task of philosophy – this is the task of ontology, which is approached through phenomenology. No sense in which I use the term 'ontology', therefore, involves the rejection of metaphysics: each of the senses is compatible with some place for this kind of study.

A monistic ontology as I outline in Chapter Three is therefore a position in meta-metaphysics as well as an answer to the question of what there is or what beings there are. It is therefore an ontology in senses (a) and (c) above. It might be the case that this ontology is arrived at via ontological investigation of type (b), although it is not necessarily that case that the monistic ontology is an ontology of type (b). In my discussion in Chapter Three, where I provide a detailed account of ontology as meta-metaphysics, I discuss a conception of ontology as 'our world' that comes from the work of Rolf-Peter Horstmann. This is an example of ontological study in sense (b) that leads to a conception of ontology in sense (c). This kind of approach obviates the need for a metaphysics outside or beyond ontology, and is thus a rejection of metaphysics of sorts.

Monistic Ontology and Social Ontology – Transcendental Arguments

The account I wish to present argues for a monistic ontology that grounds a social ontology of meaningful intersubjectivity. In many ways, these two goals seem incompatible – if there is no ontological (in sense c) distinction between self and world, self and other, then how can there be human interaction at all rather than the mysterious world-spirit interacting with itself? This is the challenge facing Hegel's account, those inspired by him and German Idealism more generally, and, even more acutely, those who do wish to find some positive ethical example in Hegel's practical and theoretical philosophy. I do not propose to answer this objection or potential problem in the introduction to this work, but rather to sketch out the structures that such a response could adopt. The most obvious and crude form of the 'failure of intersubjectivity' argument, as I term it, is already contained within the distinction between different senses of ontology, as detailed above. There is a difference between ontology as a meta-metaphysical position on how things relate to each other metaphysically in the most general ways – that is, taking an *ontological position* on how things relate to each other metaphysically in the most general ways, which is what monistic ontology as I outline it is – and ontology as the pure study of beings and what there is in the world. The key question here is which kind of ontology is the framework for intersubjectivity. I discuss intersubjectivity more generally in Chapter Two, but make some remarks here to set out my usage of terminology.¹⁰

Intersubjectivity, on one level, is the philosophical study of human interaction. In as far as it is concerned with beings and their being, it is an ontological

field of study in sense (a) above. In so far as the methods involved in studying these beings is phenomenological in the broadest sense of the word, that is, proceeding from human experience without a pre-existing metaphysical framework, it is also an ontological field of study in sense (b) above. Intersubjectivity differs from, and underlies, psychology or other social sciences in the same way as metaphysics differs from and underlies physics – it provides the philosophical frameworks necessary for the examination of the objects and world containing those objects. In so far as an account of intersubjectivity might be grounded in a philosophical account of the world and its contents which involves certain commitments about the nature of ontology, it is closely bound up with ontology in sense (c).

Intersubjectivity as an ontological field of study in all three senses (a) (b) and (c) examines questions such as the following: what are the ontological structures that allow (human) subjects to perceive each other, act together, encounter each other? As I discuss in Chapter Two, whenever one discusses intersubjectivity there is an important ‘intersubjectivity of what’ question. Intersubjectivity as a field of study does not involve studying human subjects in isolation, but as they appear and act together and in the world together. (In this latter sense, intersubjectivity is a field of study that involves metaphysics, even if it is an ontological field in itself). We cannot ask what subjects are like together without being clear on what it is they are doing together – watching each other? Communicating? Competing for scarce resources? Attempting to fulfil some common goal? In Chapter Two, I argue for an intersubjectivity of action, since action is the context in which subjects’ relationships to one another are most readily revealed.¹¹

Intersubjectivity, then, by its very nature, demands a phenomenological approach even if there will ultimately be found to be some detailed metaphysics behind the scenes of the arena of human interaction and experience. But what if this metaphysics, or ontology in the sense of meta-metaphysics, is such that there is, on the most fundamental level, no difference between human subjects? Does this render the phenomenological analysis useless, as it does not relate to truly separate entities and therefore no genuine inter-relation between subjects is possible? This is one objection which I discuss in Chapter Three.¹² There, I sketch out a way to understand intersubjectivity combined with a monistic ontology that does not involve subsuming the self and the Other, rendering genuine intersubjectivity impossible.

The part of this work which deals with ontology in the third sense (c), argues from social premises to ontological (in the sense of meta-metaphysical) conclusions. This takes the form of a transcendental argument; given that our experiences of interacting with others take a certain form, what must be the case about the way the world is, in the most fundamental sense, that allows this to take place? Specifically, with regard to this case, given that we do have encounters and interactions with each other that allow for progress in social, developmental and moral terms, and given that it also seems possible for us to have the kind of ‘re-

cognition' with relation to ourselves and to others that I discuss in this work, what must be true about reality and ourselves on the most basic and fundamental level?

Whether or not these kinds of transcendental arguments are acceptable - that is, whether or not metaphysical and/or ontological enquiry can or should be guided by concerns from 'practical', i.e. moral, political or social, philosophy - is something of a metaphilosophical question far beyond the scope of this work. It has clear historical adherents in German Idealism and deeply rooted in German Idealism. Most obviously, Levinas' concept of ethics as first philosophy is the most famous and emphatic of all such arguments.¹³ But one does not have to go as far as he does to use a transcendental argument of this nature. The whole Hegelian scheme is particularly germane to such a scheme. The famous *Doppelsatz*, the actual is the rational and the rational is the actual, can be regarded as a kind of transcendental argument.¹⁴ Often, most famously by Karl Popper, regarded as a fundamentally conservative and quietist statement which simply sanctions the (political) status quo ante,¹⁵ it has also been defended by those who point to the technical sense of *Wirklichkeit* which means that reality can always be made more 'wirklich'.¹⁶ Robert Stern offers a kind of intermediate position when he claims that

Hegel identifies what is actual and what is rational in the *Doppelsatz* not in order to say that the actual is right or good (to 'legitimate' or 'sanctify' the actual, as it is sometimes put), but to remind his readers that philosophy has a basic commitment to reason as the proper way to engage with the world at a fundamental level (the level of what is actual); it is this that makes the identity of what is actual with what is rational a 'point of departure' for philosophy.¹⁷

Whilst agreeing with this fundamental assessment of that role of rationality, I would also suggest that Hegel's *Doppelsatz* reminds us that the concerns of practical philosophy run alongside those of theoretical philosophy. Rationality is the correct approach to practical-philosophical and theoretical-philosophical questions; there is no gap, in the most basic sense, in how the questions are approached. Most importantly of all, practical philosophy is not something to be inserted into the framework of theoretical philosophy; one does not create a metaphysical, ontological and epistemological structure for an ethics and political philosophy, with the former defining the latter. Reality in the sense of *Wirklichkeit* can be further actualised, as the proponents of the critical reading of the *Doppelsatz* claim - something might have to be brought to fruition that thus far has not, and it should do so precisely because we *can* be led in this way by the concerns of practical philosophy.

Hegel, then is the perfect example of someone whose major premises take the form of a transcendental argument, an argumentative form crucial to the kind of account I am proposing here. Following this phenomenological method,

over the six chapters that follow I will be considering examples at the level of everyday human interaction, and situating them in the wider context of theoretical-philosophical concerns.

Metaphysical and Non-Metaphysical, Deflationary and Non-Deflationary – Current Hegel Scholarship

What bearing can Hegel truly have on contemporary debates? Sebastian Gardner makes a distinction between historical and deflationary accounts of German Idealism the development of German Idealism out of the work of Kant, through Hegel, Schelling, Fichte and others. Their main aim is to discuss the development of the philosophy of that period, and also to see whether the criticisms various philosophers in this movement had of each others' work are convincing. Certainly, such approaches can yield philosophical conclusions that can be utilised today, particularly given the wide-ranging legacy of these philosophers (especially of Kant) on both sides of the analytical/Continental philosophical divide. However, this is unlikely to be their main concern.

The second type of interpretation of German Idealism Gardner terms 'deflationary' – elsewhere, this kind of approach has sometimes been called 'non-metaphysical'. Such approaches examine Hegel's work and sometimes that of his contemporaries with an eye to preserving aspects that can be deemed useful to modern philosophical debates, but try not to commit one to the speculative metaphysical baggage many find entirely implausible. In a 2008 article, Simon Lumsden sketches out the historical development of Hegelian studies with regard to this point.¹⁸ Lumsden sees Charles Taylor's seminal 1975 work as being the culmination of the metaphysical Hegel, and pinpoints the 1980s as the beginning of the emergence of the 'non-metaphysical' Hegel.¹⁹ The non-metaphysical Hegel, for Lumsden, is a post-Kantian Hegel, interested in pursuing the Kantian project of critically examining the presuppositions of any normative claim. Lumsden also speaks of a 'Sellarsian legacy' running through the Hegel scholarship of the last twenty years or so, seeing Hegel as fundamentally rejecting the Myth of the Given.²⁰ This is a position which he sees as uniting people on either side of the division he posits between Hegel scholars (e.g. Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard) and analytical philosophers (he mentions John McDowell and Robert Brandom).²¹ Closely bound up with the rejection of the Myth of the Given is the idea of self-grounding rationality. Lumsden credits Klaus Hartmann as an early advocate of a non-metaphysical view of Hegel, replacing the idea of Hegel as seeing his central concepts such as Spirit and the Idea as expressions of a mysterious, quasi-divine intelligence or totality with one of a self-grounding rationality and self-determining though which does not appeal to a transcendent realm of objects and norms.²²

On Lumsden's assessment, then, there could be non-deflationary non-metaphysical accounts of Hegel's thought. That is to say, there could be accounts of Hegel which divest him of his 'speculative metaphysical baggage', as Gardner puts it, but nevertheless accepts the importance of Hegel's metaphysics as a grounding for any normative principles which emerge. The crucial question is what the 'speculative metaphysical baggage' consists of. If it is indeed this 'quasi-divine intelligence', then one can argue that removing this, if it were ever present in the first place, does not 'deflate' Hegel. If it is the very idea of a monological, self-determining view of thought and being, then a removal of this would seem to rob Hegel's thought of something central. At the same time, there is a limit to how far the second description of Hegel's thought can be seen as 'speculative metaphysical baggage' at all.²³

The question which a Hegel scholar like Hartmann, or any other scholar who agrees with his particular non-metaphysical reading, is left with concerns the legitimization of these claims to self-determining and self-grounding. Hartmann rejects the view of Hegel which sees him as having some grandiose metaphysical system, with reason as the expression of monistic Spirit. To argue for this claim, Hartmann focuses on Hegel's *Logic*, arguing that the categories set out there do not appeal to a Myth of the Given, but are set down as being justified by reason alone. In this sense, Hegel's project is fundamentally post-Kantian.²⁴

In this way, the dividing lines between the deflationary/non-deflationary and metaphysical/non-metaphysical axes are redefined. Taylor's account, for example, is a metaphysical one, but in a sense it is deflationary in that he rejects large parts of Hegel's metaphysics whilst wishing to preserve others. It is metaphysical because he seems to accept the view that Spirit, the Idea and other such concepts are expressions of a quasi-divine intelligent, and deflationary as this is precisely the aspect of Hegel's 'metaphysics' which he wishes to reject, or which he sees as being incompatible with the modern world.²⁵

I do not wish to argue for a deflationary account of Hegel, since this would run entirely contrary to the view that Hegel has a positive concept of recognition, or a concept of recognition that can be expressed in a positive manner, that is grounded in some way in his ontology or metaphysics. Whilst it might indeed be a useful project to examine how a broadly Hegelian concept of recognition could be separated from all metaphysical and ontological baggage, this project would tell us much more about the field in which such a concept could potentially be used than about Hegel or Hegel scholarship proper. Moreover, by divorcing the concept of recognition from the concept of intersubjectivity which grounds it, one would be left with a fairly minimal concept. As I argue later in this work, intersubjectivity is crucial to the idea of self-grounding reason, as well as to the overcoming of the subject/object dichotomy.²⁶ Separating the concepts of intersubjectivity and recognition would therefore be essential to a deflationary account of this part of Hegel's philosophy, and this would rob the

concept of recognition of much of its function as well as content. Recognition is the 'how' of intersubjectivity, and therefore has a crucial place in Hegel's ontology. Without an ontologically-grounded intersubjectivity, the concept becomes little more than a basic attempt to answer the epistemological problem of other minds. It is difficult to imagine what potential ethical applications a conception with this latter character could have.

At the same time, I recognise that the critics of monism, whether they are motivated by a desire for a genuine intersubjectivity which they see as impossible in Hegel's system or by an inherent objection to a monistic ontology in the grounds of coherence or plausibility, have to be answered. I am thinking here of Michael Theunissen and Emmanuel Levinas, who both fall into the former category.²⁷ Accepting Hartmann's 'non-metaphysical' but at the same time non-deflationary account of Hegel's philosophy neutralizes some of the possible criticisms of Hegel's monism, but not the criticism that his intersubjectivity is inadequate in the sense of not being fit for the purpose. Indeed, if one accepts Hartmann's interpretation involving self-grounding reason, an account of intersubjectivity that is inadequate in the sense of subsuming the subject and object into a monological subject will mean that the entire philosophical system fails.

Therefore, what I aim for in this work is a non-deflationary account of Hegel's discussions of self-consciousness, intersubjectivity and recognition that can at the same time address the most important criticisms of what I shall, for the sake of brevity, refer to as the 'anti-monists'. My strategy, as stated, will be to develop a full account of how interpersonal relationships work in the context of self-consciousness, intersubjectivity and recognition. If the level of action of recognition can be shown to be that of individual human subjects together, this can disarm the critics who claim that Hegel's intersubjectivity is not genuine.

Recognition and Reconciliation

It is a central claim of this work that theology is a great neglected element in current work on recognition and social ontology. In the account of Hegel's work and the general German Idealist, and post-Idealist, contexts, I propose a particular way in which recognition has to be understood together with forgiveness and *metanoia* in a way that fundamentally involves the theological. I provide a more detailed discussion of forgiveness in the current philosophy of religion in Chapter Five.²⁸ In this introductory section, I wish to make some general remarks on, and give some initial definitions of, reconciliation and *metanoia* in the place of this study, before going on to outline the general argument about their importance for positive recognition.

Reconciliation has a number of related, but distinct meanings in the theological and philosophical, as well as everyday, sense. In the most obvious everyday sense, it simply means 'coming together again' – a re-joining, like the re-thinking of recognition. The emphasis on the side of reconciliation is therefore on

movement and action, and not the thinking – although, as I shall argue, recognition itself is strongly based on action and interaction. In more than one sense in which the word is used, reconciliation means adopting a new position with regard to something, and in this sense there is a clear connection to recognition, which requires the same. In an everyday sense, we talk about being ‘reconciled’ to some state of affairs or reality, broadly in the sense of making one’s peace with it. Instead of trying to resist or change the reality, the reconciled person accepts it and tries to integrate it with his own goals and way of life as much as possible (or tries to organise her life around it). There is a direct connection between this and the concept of ambiguity which I discuss at length in Chapter Four.²⁹ In recognising the Other as a subject rather than just an object, and thereby recognising oneself as subject and object simultaneously, the human subject or self learns that it is not the only subject filling the world and arranging it according to its will. In this sense, the self becomes reconciled to the Other, re-arranges itself around the Other. This reconciliation involves a recognition. The Other in this respect should not, however, be seen as a restriction on the self and its freedom, for the self can be free only in the other.³⁰ The reconciliation involved in recognition in this sense is not something negative, a recognition of external boundaries, but a growth and development. (This is part of the idea of ‘positive’ recognition rather than a negative concept of being restrained by the Other.)

Reconciliation also has other senses in which it is understood. One theological understanding of reconciliation is as between man and God – reconciliation, on this view, is the coming together of man with God after the estrangement caused by sin. This could be sin in an original sense, and the reconciliation of God and man being the result of man’s salvation. This is as a result of atonement. As Vincent Brümmer points out, atonement literally means at-one-ment.³¹ It is thus defined in terms of reconciliation – atonement is the precondition for reconciliation. Atonement theory is a major area of theological study and thus far beyond the scope of this work.³² One major theory within this area is moral influence theory as originally advanced by Abelard, which sees the decisive moment for man’s atonement as the Incarnation, and Jesus Christ serving as a moral leader, bringing positive moral change to humanity. This is also Kant’s view, and it clearly appeals to a particular kind of broadly liberal German Idealism.³³ There is a clear connection between this and John Milbank’s argument I discuss in Chapter Five, which says that forgiveness is only possible through God and the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.³⁴ Forgiveness, so such an argument runs, can only truly be granted via the Incarnation and sacrifice; secular accounts of forgiveness are lacking in that they do not require a confrontation of the offence and subsequent moral progress, but simply ignoring or forgetting wrongs that have been done (this is ‘negative’ forgiveness in Milbank’s terms). True forgiveness, and true atonement, and therefore true reconciliation, requires a kind of mediation,

whether it is moral mediation as in the moral influence theory, or the ontological mediation of the Incarnation, as in some theological accounts of forgiveness.

In terms of a Hegelian account of forgiveness and reconciliation, how can we understand a general statement about mankind in general in relation to statements about individuals and how they might be forgiven and reconciled? This is of the same form as the general discussion about the status of the master-slave dialectic, which I discuss at some length in Chapter One.³⁵ Is the transformative process that involves the encounter with the Other to be understood on an individual or supra-individual level? For there to be a meaningful account of positive recognition and intersubjectivity, and indeed forgiveness as relevant to these concepts and in the way we generally understand it, there must be a way for the process to work on an individual level. In Chapters One and Three, I provide an account of how a monistic ontology in general, and something like Hegel's account in particular, can nevertheless preserve a meaningful intersubjectivity. However, even if one accepts that this is true in principle, there is still a further question of how narratives of recognition and forgiveness that function on the macro-level can be translated down to the micro-level (and, of course, narratives that function on the macro-level do not necessarily presume a monistic ontology, although they do work at the level of the supra-individual).

The theological dimension of Hegelian recognition has received little critical attention, but one scholar who has concerned himself with it in the context of contemporary social ontology is Paul Redding, who states the following:

Relying on an analogy between the human mind and the Trinity traceable to the church fathers, Hegel could take the triune structure of the Christian God as a symbolically articulated model for the recognitive constitution of the finite mind (subjective spirit). As the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be cashed out in any substance-based metaphysics...so too does Hegel's conception of the recognitively constituted finite mind resist being understood as any type of *substance* – spiritual or material. The free individual subject, as Hegel puts it, confounding any substantialist conception of the self, is 'at home with itself' (*bei sich*) only when 'in another' (*im Anderen*).³⁶

Hegel can use Christianity, and specifically the concept of the Trinity, as a sort of extended metaphor and metaphysical analogy explaining how the human subject is essentially social. But why, asks Redding, does Hegel need to commit himself to the entire metaphysical baggage of Christianity where others (presumably Kant) have cast off such shackles?³⁷ Redding's answer seems to be that Hegel embraces contradictions and antinomies rather than wanting to resolve them immediately – his dialectical method involves a breaking and re-making.³⁸ However, it is one thing to wish to resolve contradictions only at the most fundamental level rather than pursuing Enlightenment rationality from the outset, and quite another to want to adopt metaphysical baggage inimical to one's own philosophical scheme. As I hope to demonstrate at various points in this work, the relationship between recognition and theology goes much deeper than that.

Metanoia – The Hegelian Dialectic and the Broken Middle

My analysis of Hegelian recognition places not just a re-thinking (re-cognition) of one's own position, but also a re-positioning of oneself with regard to world and Other. As I shall explore in the upcoming chapters, recognition involves a mixture of epistemic and practical factors, and is about both thought and action. It is not a purely intellectual exercise, as also the German 'erkennen' of 'Anerkennen' might suggest, but also of how one practically responds to the other. There is an interplay of thought and action at work in recognitive relationships – the way one sees oneself, and the Other, influences the way one responds and interacts, which then influences once more the way one sees oneself and the Other (and so the process continues) In this way, recognition has much in common with *metanoia* as a theological concept.

Metanoia is often translated as 'repentance', but, as a great number of scholars have argued over the decades, this is a mistranslation.³⁹ *Metanoia* has none of the sense of sorrow or regret that is implied in the English 'repentance' – rather, it is something like a transmutation of consciousness, a change in both thought and action.⁴⁰ There is the same sense of remaking and renewal that is associated with the English 'repentance', but, crucially, there is not the sense of being sorry, or even of adopting some kind of disavowing attitude to one's former actions, that English 'repentance' implies. It is therefore particularly interesting to consider the concept of *metanoia* in combination with forgiveness. As I state in my discussion of the term in Chapter Five, forgiveness involves a particular positioning of oneself in relation to one's former actions (that is, the offence), but accounting in any systematic way for the emotional aspect of seeking forgiveness is much more difficult. Is one more deserving of forgiveness if one feels emotional regret more keenly?⁴¹

Metanoia, properly understood and translated, can be more easily removed from the emotional states that are attached to the concept of forgiveness than the concept of repentance in its theological and everyday senses. I do not wish to argue that the emotional aspects of forgiveness or positive recognition are not important or philosophically interesting – indeed, quite the opposite. It is instructive for exploratory purposes, however, to isolate the aspects of forgiveness that are not, or might not be, intrinsically bound up with the emotions.

Attempts to properly translate and explain the term *metanoia* in its theological sense (it also has a meaning in psychology which is related, that is, the process of mental breakdown and subsequent recovery and rebuilding of one's life) have come up with broadly the following: 'a transformative change of heart; *especially*: a spiritual conversion.'⁴² Etymologically, *metanoia* simply means 'a change of mind' (from *meta*, change, and *nous*, mind), but not, of course, in the English idiomatic sense of a superficial alteration in opinion. It is perhaps more instructive to look at how the term is used in the Bible. The most famous use is probably from Matthew 4:17, where Jesus called on people to 'repent (*metanoēō*): for the

kingdom of heaven is at hand'. Baptism is also described in terms of *metanoia* in Mark's gospel: 'John did baptize in the wilderness, and preach the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins' (KJV). Both uses refer to past wrongdoings and are clearly bound up with the idea of forgiveness. However, it is also clear from these usages that *metanoia* is not simply the disavowal of one's former offences, that is, a disavowal or regretful attitude that would be a pre-requisite for forgiveness. It is a general change of attitude or of one's entire approach to life rather than a particular attitude to one of one's deeds.

What is distinctly theological about this 'change of mind'? The answer, to someone who accepts such a narrative, is about mediation and ontological monism. According to one account that stretches from mid-20th century Orthodox theology to radical orthodoxy, *metanoia* is a constant state of permanent revelation and revolution, a perpetual remaking of man through communal and continuous forgiveness.⁴³ This forgiveness itself is possible only through God incarnate. This is an account on the ontological macro-level (or the level of the supra-individual) which nevertheless has applications on the individual level. 'Metanoia is a questioning beyond the stasis of self', state two scholars working in this tradition.⁴⁴ Thus, *metanoia* as a theological concept is also a philosophical one; *metanoia* is a breaking and re-making. There is a clear connection here to the classical three-stage Hegelian dialectic and *Aufhebung* – a making, breaking and re-making.

The idea of what Gillian Rose, in a hugely influential account, calls the 'broken middle', is highly relevant to the discussion of recognition and *metanoia*. One of the main features of her discussion of this concept is idea of constant change and anxiety. Rose sees Hegel as a thinker of the broken middle, of that space between thesis and anti-thesis that is constantly being remade. This space, the broken middle, is a place of anxiety because it is always in some way in error.⁴⁵ As Vincent Lloyd puts it:

[P]hilosophy tends to obfuscate th[e] middle, it tends to posit certain concepts as transcendence so that they cannot be further investigated: they are absolute. The middle is broken because it is always in error: institutions and practices are always imperfect; they always do some amount of harm. In the absence of an absolute, the way we react to what is left, to the 'broken middle', is with anxiety.⁴⁶

This sense of imperfection has great resonance and importance for the account of recognition, love and forgiveness which I am presenting in this work. Recognition, love and forgiveness (and love and forgiveness as types of recognition) are never something which is 'done', finished, satisfactorily completed. This is the major difficulty of the study of them as positive ethical models – what is it we can aspire to? Something that is constantly changing. To recognise the Other in the right way does not mean having a fixed picture and concept of her in one's mind, but to accept that she is the kind of being that remakes herself, that has

the autonomy to do so. Love, in the sense of partnership in particular, is also not fixed or completed, but constantly remaking itself (a central theme of Rose's *Broken Middle* is that love must always be violent – this is the case not least because love is not the interaction of two fixed and completed subjects who are equal and autonomous. I discuss this further in Chapter Six.⁴⁷) Forgiveness involves not only 'violence' in Rose's non-negative sense between forgiver and forgiven/candidate for forgiveness, but also a violent relationship in this sense with one's own past (and this goes for forgiver and forgiven), the taking of a position with regard to acts which have been performed by an earlier version of oneself. In this sense, forgiveness itself involves being in error, but this is not necessarily an argument against its utility as a concept in ethics. As Rowan Williams puts it when discussing Rose and Hegel:

[E]very moment of recognition is also a new moment of salutary error to the extent that it is the taking of a *position*.⁴⁸

To take a position within the broken middle will always be to be in error. This is an important way of thinking about recognition in general. Recognising the other in the sense that I am discussing in this work is not recognising him as some other fixed thing with his own established characteristics, but as the sort of thing that has the power to shift and change, and that *does* shift and change. The ambiguity which I discuss at length in Chapter Four, where one recognises self and other as subject and object simultaneously, involves this realisation, for it is part of being a subject and an object that one is not fixed. Taking into consideration Rose's concept of the broken middle thus allows us to understand the non-empirical level on which positive recognition can take place.

Studying recognition (and love and forgiveness as examples of that positive recognition) with an eye on the concepts of metanoia and the broken middle gives us a new perspective from a practical philosophy point of view, and can point the way to an answer to some perennial questions in recognition studies. Can a general, phenomenological (in the Hegelian sense) account of recognition in particular and interaction in general provide us with any insight at all on the level of the individual? Yes, if the individual subject is understood to be in a constant state of flux and not a fixed Other that can be precisely pinned down in its finitude. Does ontological monism automatically mean that there can be no meaningful intersubjectivity? No, because individuals are changing component parts of a world and its contents that is itself always changing. To define the Other and alienate it from that which does not belong to it is an error, but an inevitable error (which is itself part of recognition). Once we accept that human subjectivity is not fixed and immutable, a grammatical subject (or object) to which properties, adjectives and so on can be ascribed, there is much less difficulty in accepting an intersubjectivity in the context of a monistic ontology.

What about the more analytical side of this enquiry, the side that is based in traditional moral philosophy? If I hope to demonstrate how recognition could function as a positive ethical concept, is this not undermined entirely by a view of human subjectivity (an ontological view in sense (a)) which resists permanence and thus makes the ascription of moral responsibility problematic at best (and surely this is a problem for forgiveness in particular)?

Judith Butler, in her recent *Giving an Account of Oneself*, tackles this problem head-on by exploring how people can be moral agents even without being completely autonomous subjects. This is a continuation, in many ways, of the work she has done on Hegel beginning with her doctoral thesis, *Subjects of Desire*. There, she states:

As it becomes clear that the same truths hold true of the Other's relationship to the self, the Other is also viewed as the author of the subject. Desire here loses its character as a purely consumptive activity, and becomes characterised by the ambiguity of an exchange in which two self-consciousnesses affirm their respective autonomy (independence) and alienation (otherness).⁴⁹

Recognition, for Butler, has the character of an exchange between self and Other that involves each one establishing themselves as both subject and object. Put this way, it becomes clearer how it is precisely this ambiguity that means autonomy is restricted, and also why the self is not a fixed quantity (and recognition therefore always involves some kind of error).

Butler's insight and main line of argument in *Giving an Account of Oneself* is that the self does not have to be truly autonomous for moral responsibility to be possible.⁵⁰ The fact that we are socially constituted is not a barrier to being a free, in some sense, ethical agent. The decisive move is to contrast once more the phenomenon of recognition with the epistemological practice of judgement. Traditional moral responsibility sees the subject as accountable for its actions, but Butler wishes to extend the practice of 'accounting' to include the narrative of the subject and the sense in which the subject is socially constituted. A judgement, to be valid, must always consider the consequences of its address. Rather than being a barrier to the possibility of moral responsibility, recognising the extent to which the self is socially constituted during the narrative of its life is a pre-condition for honest moral judgement.

This picture of the moral agent and human subject fits well into the general picture of recognition, love and forgiveness which is my starting-point in this analysis. It also fits particularly well into the ontological (in sense (c) above) picture which I am presenting, that is, a monistic ontology where the sense in which subjects can be autonomous in, for example, a Kantian sense, is limited. It is this picture of the human subject that forms the starting point for my enquiry – mutable but demanding to be treated as a subject and not mere object, non-autonomous but fully capable of moral responsibility, and, perhaps most importantly of all, capable of change at the most fundamental level.

1 THE SOCIAL SELF AND THE MASTER-SLAVE DIALECTIC

Hegel's concept of recognition, in the context of his account of self-consciousness, offers the clearest possibilities for an account of positive recognition in the social world and how this fits into a theoretical philosophical framework. The master-slave passages in the *Phenomenology*, coupled with the French reception which focused strongly on political and social aspects, is therefore an important starting point for a discussion of positive recognition. I argue throughout the monograph, however, that Hegel is a case study rather than the main historical focus of my argument. Here, and in Chapter Two, I show how positive recognition goes far beyond Hegel. In the first part of Chapter One, I examine what approach to social philosophy might be needed for a concept of positive recognition: ought one to start with looking at social structures, at individual human interaction, or even at the conflicting areas of an individual psyche? How ought one to move from philosophical abstraction to the foundation for ethical norms, and, conversely, work intersubjective relationships into a theoretical analysis?

Using Hegel's *Phenomenology*, and particularly the master-slave dialectic, as a case study, the rest of the chapter examines how this might work in practice. I briefly review some influential twentieth-century (particularly early to mid-twentieth century French) and more recent discussions about the status of the master-slave dialectic in Hegel's *Phenomenology*. I discuss the lack of common ground between these interpretations of Hegel's enigmatic but crucial passages, the reasons for this, and what I see as the importance of the master-slave dialectic for a broader conception of the social world. I bring this right up to date with reference to how the essential conflict brought to the fore in the master-slave dialectic relates to contemporary social ontology, a line of enquiry that has emerged in the last couple of decades, and which also explores the metaphysical and particularly epistemological background of ethical concepts. I suggest that the influential early twentieth-century critics of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, such as Alexandre Kojève, were right to focus on the master's and slave's reaction to, and relationship with, their (social) environments as key to the understanding of these passages and their modern influence. I discuss how positive recognition

could and should therefore function not only as a model of human interaction on an individual level, but as a contribution to social life in general. I make reference throughout the chapter to the status of the master-slave dialectic and the *Phenomenology's* role in Hegel's philosophy, and German Idealism, in general, but the main focus is on contemporary relevance.

Social Philosophy and Positive Recognition

What kind of an approach to social philosophy would be needed for there to be a worthwhile concept of 'positive' recognition, as detailed in the Introduction to this work? One that is descriptive and based on the way our social moral lives actually work, but also one that is prescriptive in that it realises that there are better and worse, from a moral point of view, ways for people to interact with each other. In particular, an account of recognition rooted, as it must be, in the social world, must make room for and include a meaningful account of misrecognition, and a categorization of that phenomenon. In particular, it must ask whether misrecognition is some kind of moral failure and, if so, who is to blame for this failure. This will have a direct bearing on questions of forgiveness, particularly the idea of forgiveness as a sort of restoration – if what is to be forgiven is a failure to recognise, then forgiveness as a form of positive recognition cancels out or makes good the past failure as well as restoring the situation to the way it ought to have been. Thus the situation would differ from someone who had committed some offence in the past that could not, at the time of his asking for forgiveness, be made good and restored in this way (for example, someone who had destroyed property).

At this point, it is worth taking a step back and outlining what social philosophy is intended to cover. In this work, I am adopting a broad definition. One branch of social philosophy is the philosophy of social science, which aims to answer two questions: what are social facts, and how are they to be understood? These are the questions that Martin Hollis' seminal 'Philosophy of Social Science' are intended to answer.¹ The nature of social facts is an ontological issue in sense (c) as I understand it in the Introduction to this work – it is an overarching question that goes beyond narrower definitions of ontology and metaphysics. This question is certainly part of my concern in this work, and is one that goes far beyond how we ought to do social sciences. In the final chapter of his work, Hollis discusses value neutrality in relation to social philosophy. He remains doubtful as to whether studying the social world in the way that social scientists (or social philosophers) do can be compatible with value-neutrality: it is very difficult to speak, say, of poverty, without making the value judgement that it is bad to be poor, that poverty should be prevented, and so on. In social philosophy as I understand it, and as distinct from the social sciences, one would not strive to be value-neutral but would be working from an early stage with concepts that

are already shaped by values. Social philosophy can be an analysis of the social world that is already shaped by moral values at the most basic level – not that a particular political or moral ideology is the correct one, but that more fundamental and uncontroversial propositions such as that it is desirable for people to live and work together in a way that fosters self-respect and self-esteem, that goals such as freedom and human flourishing are valuable, and that suffering is to be avoided and harm minimised where possible.

The question remains, however, of the relative priority of theoretical and practical aspects in the analysis. How ought one to move from theoretical-philosophical abstraction to the foundation for ethical norms, and, conversely, work intersubjective relationships into a theoretical analysis? This work does not start with a fixed analysis, but rather with a willingness to take transcendental arguments seriously and, where appropriate, to allow those elements that might traditionally be thought of as theoretical philosophy to be shaped by concerns from practical philosophy. I return to this topic in the fourth section of the next chapter.² Certainly, there seems to be no reason to assume that practical philosophical concerns from the world of social philosophy should have to slot into a metaphysical and epistemological framework that has already been formed. Hegel, this book's main historical focus, would certainly agree, and it is to his work that I now turn.

Hegel's Master–Slave Dialectic

What are the reasons for selecting the master-slave dialectic as the key historical example in this work? The master-slave dialectic in Hegel's *Phenomenology* shaped all that came after it, and is the paradigm example of a confrontation as I describe it in Chapter Five.³ It is also the source of great debate and discussion as to its status, and this is true on a number of levels. What is the status of the master and the slave? What do they represent? More broadly and as a question in the history of philosophy, what is the status of the *Phenomenology*? Answering the former question will help to pin down the usefulness of the dialectic in the current debates in social philosophy, whilst asking the second will show how central (or otherwise) those most famous passages of Hegel's *Phenomenology* are to his work in general, to German Idealism and to the current discussion.

The Place of the Phenomenology

The *Phenomenology* is regarded by many scholars of Hegel as a problematic text. Walter Kaufmann sums up one particular group of objections and general criticisms of the text when he says:

[T]he *Phenomenology* is certainly *unwissenschaftlich*, undisciplined, arbitrary, full of digressions, not a monument to the austerity of the intellectual conscience and to carefulness and precision but a wild, bold, unprecedented book.⁴

As Jon Stewart has pointed out, it is the disunity of the text that creates the greatest problems in the minds of many critics.⁵ In his words, it is seen as 'an eclectic and at times bizarre collection of atomic analyses on sundry topics'.⁶ This leads some scholars, such as Pöggeler, to suggest we might treat the work in an 'episodic' manner, as Stewart puts it – that is, to state that it belongs to a particular point in Hegel's philosophical development. Stewart correctly points out that the main problem with such an approach is that Hegel himself insisted on the value of philosophy as a system, even going so far as to claim in the *Encyclopedia* that philosophical truths are meaningless other than in a philosophical system of interdependence and organic union.⁷ Most famously of all, Hegel claims that 'the truth is the whole'.⁸ There can be no truth without system. It is not possible to isolate a part from the whole, and nor should we attempt this with the *Phenomenology*.

It is at this point we can see a clear division in Hegel scholarship, and one which divides quite sharply down geographical lines.⁹ Stewart lists several works which place the same emphasis as he does on the unity and holism of the Hegelian system, with such scholars including L. Bruno Puntel,¹⁰ Frederic Escaraffel,¹¹ and Gerd Kimmerle.¹² This contrasts quite sharply with recent work on Hegel's work which emphasises aspects of his system in isolation from the system as a whole or develops aspects of his system in ways that directly contradict statements made in other works. In many ways, the division maps on to the division between 'deflationary' and 'non-deflationary' accounts of Hegelian philosophy as mentioned in the Introduction to this work. In very broad terms, a desire for the holist view of Hegel that Stewart is advocating seems to be far more prevalent in the world of Continental philosophy, particularly in the 1960s and 70s but also, as Stewart's 1995 work shows, beyond, whereas those accounts that place less emphasis on holism or deny its necessity altogether are more commonly found in the English-speaking world. In many ways, as mentioned in the Introduction to this work, Charles Taylor's 1975 work might also be considered as fitting into this category.¹³

The way to answer criticisms which see the *Phenomenology* as hopelessly piecemeal and working in conflict with other Hegel texts is to examine the unity of the system as a whole. The *Phenomenology* is, entirely explicitly, a science of the experience of consciousness. In this sense, it is not so surprising that there are parts of it that, seen from the point of view of the modern task of constructing ontological and metaphysical systems, seem irrelevant to that concern. Whilst, as J. A. Leighton points out as early as 1896, it is not the case that Hegel tries to create the real world out of abstract thought, there is no starting point for his *Phenomenology* than the experience of consciousness.¹⁴

At this point, it is possible to make two distinctions; firstly, between 'holist' accounts such as those of Puntel, Escaraffel and Kimmerle and 'non-holist' accounts which deny the importance of system, and 'metaphysical' and 'non-metaphysical' accounts as mentioned in the Introduction to this work.

A metaphysical account, as defined by Pippin, is one which sees Hegel as having substantive metaphysical commitments, that is, that Hegel is engaged in a metaphysical project concerned with *a priori* knowledge of substance.¹⁵ In this way, ‘metaphysics’ is being used in the same way as in the Introduction to this work.¹⁶ A non-metaphysical account could take a number of forms – either that of the work of Pippin himself, who argues for what he calls an ‘idealist’ reading of Hegel, a view of his work as ‘a continuation of the properly critical theme of transcendental apperception in Kant’.¹⁷ Such an approach would not have to be a holist approach – indeed, it would presumably involve placing far less emphasis on those aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that are not concerned with the development of the transcendental apperception. There would be no need to spill much (or any) ink on Hegel’s work on, for example, physiognomy and phrenology.

At the extreme non-metaphysical, non-holist end of the spectrum we find work such as that of Arash Abizadeh, who focuses on the possible political consequences of aspects of Hegel’s thought, often his ontology and epistemology, without linking this clearly to his own remarks, for example from the *Philosophy of Right*.¹⁸ Much of the recent work on Hegel and feminism also fits into this category, with many feminist writers arguing that Hegel does have some promising ontological and epistemological concepts in his earlier philosophy whilst acknowledging the illiberal nature of many of his statements on women in the 1821 *Philosophy of Right*. A typical set of questions runs as follows:

If the difference between men and women is, according to Hegel, essentially physiological, why do women fare so much better in comparison with men in the *Phenomenology* than the *Philosophy of Right*, in Greek society than in the modern European state? Can this difference be explained simply because it is an older, perhaps more conservative Hegel who writes the latter?¹⁹

For a true holist, this question could only be asked by one who fallaciously assumes that Hegel could have more than one system, or one system and some other free-floating beliefs that are not part of this system.

Such ‘deflationary’ accounts of Hegel demonstrate that the question of holism is actually two questions, that is, the question of the internal unity of each work and the question of unity between works.²⁰ Almost as a corollary of the latter question is the particular status of the *Phenomenology*, which I will discuss below. The question of unity between works seems easier to answer, or the problem easier to solve, than the question of the unity of the *Phenomenology* itself. It is possible to provide a simple and practical threefold answer which runs something like the following: 1. Hegel’s thought did, of course, develop throughout the years of his active philosophical work. Even a strong emphasis on philosophical system does not entail that a systematic work should represent the final comment on a particular concept, that is, that it cannot be revised at all. 2. It seems a simple

error to say, as Jon Stewart does, that we must give up on Hegel if we give up on the idea of system.²¹ Simply because Hegel had a particular view of how philosophy should be done, does not mean we have to share this meta-philosophical (or ontological, in sense (c) of the Introduction) view if we want to appreciate any aspect of his ontology or epistemology. 3. Perhaps the most convincing argument runs as follows: the different statuses of Hegel's various works are often not taken into account. Only the 1807 *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic*, written in 1812–16, were ever published during Hegel's lifetime as substantial philosophical works in the straightforward sense. *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* and the *Philosophy of Right* were both originally intended as a kind of student handbook for those attending his lectures in Heidelberg. Any discussion of contradiction and disunity must surely take these facts into account.

Despite the broad analytical/Continental divide as regards holistic/non-holistic and metaphysical/non-metaphysical accounts of Hegel's work, there are some prominent examples of English-speaking philosophers who chart something of a middle course. Here I am thinking particularly of a 2000 article by Pippin in which he puts forward a view of the concept of recognition that aspires to holism as far as this particular concept is concerned.²² Pippin points out that the standard view of recognition in Hegel's philosophy, and indeed his view of self and world as a whole, runs as follows:

A widely accepted view had it that while Hegel was originally interested in accounting for the nature and authority of social institutions by appeal to a basic inter-subjective encounter and the 'realisation' of such inter-subjective links, he came later to abandon that view about inter-subjectivity, and believed instead that human social and political existence was best understood and legitimated as a manifestation of a grand metaphysical process, an Absolute Subject's manifestation itself, or a Divine Mind's coming to self-consciousness.²³

This is the 'repression work' expounded, in slightly different versions, by Theunissen, Honneth and Habermas.²⁴ Such a work supposes that there is an important shift of function and priorities, in this case even within one work, namely the *Phenomenology*. Pippin, on the other hand, sees the description of *Sittlichkeit*, the ethical life, in the *Encyclopedia* and the *Philosophy of Right* as an extension and development of the Jena period concept of recognition. I claim that this represents a middle course between holism and non-holism because such a view does not necessarily claim that the ethical life and the concept of recognition are part of the same, complete system, but only that the former is not inconsistent with the latter and that it follows on from it in some important respects.

Recognition and Self-Consciousness

The importance of recognition for self-consciousness underlies all of the senses in which it can be understood. For this reason, I start my analysis with a descrip-

tion of the importance of the Other for self-consciousness. I argue that Hegel's concept of recognition is what ultimately enables Hegel to produce a convincing and useful answer to the question of self-consciousness: that is, the question of how it is possible for us to be self-conscious. Ernst Tugendhat suggested in 1974 that traditional attempts to examine the phenomenon of self-consciousness have gone awry.²⁵ Either the question is framed in 'subject-object' terms, understanding self-consciousness as the presentation of the self to itself as an object, or it is epistemological, involving privileged cognitive access to the self. In as far as knowledge is propositional, the idea of a subject apprehending itself qua object is *prima facie* misguided. Moreover, epistemological theories necessarily involve the incorrect identification of a 'self' which leads to the interpretation of self-consciousness as an essentially solipsistic relation.

Like Heidegger's *Dasein*, Hegel's self-conscious subject is intended to elucidate fundamental ontological truths rather than providing a psychological or biological account of how the self appears to itself. This is what is meant by 'phenomenology' in this context. If his account is to achieve this aim, two conditions must be fulfilled: it must be ontologically as well as empirically convincing.

Several critics have pointed out that Hegel's account of recognition and self-consciousness appears to be circular.²⁶ Recognition seems in some sense to be a precondition for self-consciousness, but at the same time it is necessary for a recognising and recognised subject to be self-conscious. The above elucidation of how loving recognition differs from that relation to another subject that is necessary for self-consciousness can help us to find a way out of this circularity. For self-consciousness, it is necessary to recognise the Other as an intentional subject. However, recognising the other as an intentional subject does not constitute recognition in anything other than a limited sense. It is only in love that I encounter desires that do not originate with me that nevertheless motivate me as desires (I have called them 'proxy' desires).²⁷ This is recognition in its purest sense.

Robert Sinnerbrink sees a possible resolution of the circularity of self-consciousness and recognition in the distinction between ontological and normative conceptions of recognition. Redding argues that the circularity can be circumvented if we introduce a concept not unlike Heideggerian *Gelassenheit*. This mutual 'releasement', Redding argues, is most obviously seen in the Hegelian concepts of love and religious forgiveness.²⁸ He considers also that this concept comes into play in the struggle for recognition. Those involved in the master/slave struggle are ultimately forced to realise that their subjective viewpoints in the world are not absolute, that they share the world with others and, crucially, that they must recognise the other as an intentional subject for which it (the original subject) is an object. There is therefore, as Sinnerbrink terms it, a 'genuine dialogical intersubjectivity' in Hegel's thought.²⁹ Even in the 'deficient or unequal'³⁰ (perhaps non-mutual) recognitive relationship there is an underlying current of implicit mutual recognition at play – an implicit mutual releasement.

Hegel's claim that self-consciousness is desire in general³¹ seems like a striking move given that the decisive factor up until this point has been cognitive capacity. It is difficult to see how this is related to sense-certainty. The confusion is not helped by the fact that it is difficult to find a clear statement of what Hegel means by desire (*Begierde*). Desire is always intentional in that it must have an object. A subject whose relation to its objects is one of immediate desire views this object as a negative element – that is, a subject-dependent entity. Such a subject experiences self-certainty by consuming the object of its desire. In the *Philosophy of Right*, however, Hegel often combines desires, drives and inclinations.

There are different interpretations of Hegel's concept of desire in the modern critical literature. According to Pippin and Pinkard, self-consciousness in Hegel should be regarded as an epistemological standpoint, one that he sketches through an account of the self-determination present in desire. This denies that Hegel is interested in the phenomenon of self-consciousness, as examined by Kant and Fichte, thus avoiding the problematic claim that desire is self-consciousness. I want to argue that the identity statement (that self-consciousness is desire in general) absolutely should be taken seriously, if not completely literally. Judith Butler attempts to avoid these difficulties by arguing that a non-traditional concept of desire is involved in the *Phenomenology*.³² My definition of desire is also non-traditional, but in a different sense. Jenkins argues that the central aim of the self-consciousness chapter only emerges when the identity statement about self-consciousness and desire is taken literally, but his analysis of the role of desire in self-consciousness confuses the conative and cognitive elements. Pippin argues that we must see subjectivity as self-determining, i.e., a non-metaphysical and non-empirical account of the ground of the subject's motional determinations of actuality. The claim is that the only way of understanding objects that remains open to us takes the determinations of those objects to be constituted by us and not merely given in experience. The standpoint of consciousness fails; it is a naïve epistemology that takes claims to knowledge to be justified by virtue of the givenness of the objects of these claims. The move towards desire is a metaphorical rather than a strictly literal one.

Pippin has non-mentalistic, non-reductive reading of reality and idealism. The world is not reducible to mental representations but is constituted by norms produced by rational agents. This kind of normative idealism can also be observed in Sellars' concept of 'spaces of reasons' and Brandom's claim that 'it's norms all the way down'. The topic of desire in Hegel is therefore closely connected to knowledge. The idea of knowledge as passive apprehension does not properly characterise the phenomenon. We must therefore see the cognitive subject as self-constructing and determining. This self-determination means the subject must see the other as an object of one general type or another. The most basic kind of subject-determining determination of an object is that of

desire. In desiring an object, claims Pippin, a subject comprehends the world around it through its relation to its own desires and experiences itself as a desiring subject that understands the world in terms of satisfying (or failing to satisfy) these desires. However, one may ask whether human subjects can really be self-determining to this extent. Generally, a subject just follows whichever desire is strongest at that time. Is the object of the subject determined by desire? Pippin claims that the reason we receive so brief a description of desire is because Hegel is much more interested in desire as self-determination than in the actual details of physical desire.³³ I would argue that this question can be answered by looking again at the sophisticated nature of the desire that is at work here – physical desire is involved in the construction of basic reality but not the kind of desire that is involved in the ethical sense of recognition.

Readings of the Master–Slave Dialectic

One aspect of Schelling's criticism of Hegel concerns the difference between positive and negative philosophy. According to Schelling, a purely positive ontological account which delineates the structures of the finite world cannot properly account for negativity. Such an account can only reveal non-being in relation to its finite positive counterparts, and cannot explain why there should be non-being with respect to the infinite positive Absolute. The positive account cannot make the transition into negativity.

How far this criticism impacts on the matter in hand here depends upon how much credence we are prepared to give an internal reading of Hegel's account of relations between the self and the Other. George Kelly emphasises what he sees as the danger of neglecting the internal psychological aspect of the master/slave dialectic, namely the drives towards domination and servitude within the individual ego. He even goes so far as to suggest there could be an entirely internal reading of the master-slave section of the *Phenomenology*, where the master and the slave are aspects of an individual ego (although he recognises that this would precipitate extreme exegetical difficulties stemming from the apparent disappearance of intersubjectivity within the work, and does not himself appear to be seriously advocating such a view).³⁴

Schelling's criticism of Hegel will have much of its substance removed under my reading of the *Phenomenology*, as it rests on the assumption that there can be a clear qualitative difference between the infinite and the finite. On an internal reading of Hegel's human ontology, such a distinction could indeed be made. Answering Schelling's criticism on its own terms, one could suggest that relative non-Being is itself the Other of the infinite Absolute, so that the two are identical in the identity of identity and difference. The Absolute would therefore be a process in which every finite thing reveals its finitude by its self-cancellation, thereby of necessity leading to the infinite as the inherent Other of itself. The

process of self-cancellation reveals the structures of finitude and infinitude already present in the Absolute. Finite being and non-Being are therefore both necessary for the revealing of infinite being and non-being, i.e., the positive Absolute and its negative Other.

On the interpretation of Hegel's ontology I am suggesting, this answer is indeed a tempting one. Unlike such commentators as Kojève, I do not think that the *Phenomenology* proceeds by logical deduction, but by dialectical progress.³⁵ Hegel does not start with the Absolute and deduce finite structures from it; rather, the Absolute is the final stage which emerges in a stage-by-stage process where each stage results from inherent contradictions in the stage preceding it. This account of the methodology of the *Phenomenology* is compatible with the above account of the finite and the infinite, and being and non-being. Whilst revealing its finite structure, the subject at the same time reveals its relative non-being and then proceeds to the next stage, the final stage being that of the infinite Absolute with its negative as well as positive aspects.

This interpretation could be seen as lending credence to the internal reading of the master/slave dialectic as expounded, if not advocated, by Kelly. If the master/slave dialectic is the story of the struggle between opposing aspects of the individual ego, it is easy to see how it is this struggle that reveals the finite structure of that individual ego. The ego discovers what it is and thereby, by definition, what it is not. The question that remains is how we could then solve Fichte's dilemma, arguably the entire crux of German Idealism – how to sustain the primacy of the I over the not-I. The individual ego can distinguish itself from those things that are not its own thought and being, but it is hard to see how the primacy of its thought and being could be sustained, and indeed how one can argue for the ontological primacy of mind over world at all.³⁶ How, as the 'repression thesis' asks, can we stop the I from being fully subsumed?

This brings us once more to the question of the role of practical philosophy, and the lived experience of our social lives. There is a point in the study of ontology as meta-metaphysics, that is, sense (c) as detailed in the Introduction, at which the subsumption or otherwise of the I becomes a practical, rather than theoretical question. Looking at the twentieth-century reception of Hegel, and particularly one well-known criticism from an existentialist point of view, brings this into sharper focus.

Models of Interaction: The French Reception of Hegel's Social Philosophy

After the materialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was not until the 1930s that the importance of Hegel's analysis in the *Phenomenology* in particular, and specifically his account of human inter-relations, once more

attracted significant attention – and indeed, that interpretation, spearheaded by Alexandre Kojève and his seminars on Hegel, was itself influenced by Marxian materialism. Thanks to Kojève's interpretation, which in turn inspired the influential accounts of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, it is possible to draw a line from Hegel via the materialists to Kojève and the French reception to contemporary debates in social philosophy. I will discuss Sartre and particularly Beauvoir at various points in this work, and here I give brief accounts of each of their Hegel interpretations as it is relevant to my concerns here. In particular, I try to show how Sartre's account of intersubjectivity, whilst indebted to Hegel and German Idealism and working with many of the same concepts, helps to demonstrate what is needed for an account of positive recognition.

For Sartre, the struggle of the master/slave dialectic – which Sartre interprets in a psychological sense as the story of general human interaction – is the story of a struggle for subjecthood. Simply put, the desire of a subject or conscious being at any one time is the desire for subjecthood, and the only way to achieve this subjecthood is to claim it for oneself, and thereby turn the Other into an object. The inequality that inevitably arises in the master/slave story and in human relationships in general is a result of different levels of fortitude, physical or psychological. The full humanity of self-consciousness is the constant struggle for mastery. Those who fail to achieve this full humanity are the victims of someone else's having achieved mastery over them. According to Sartre, Hegel's belief that the master/slave dialectic could be overcome or resolved was the result of a kind of misguided ontological or epistemological optimism. Crucially, nothing, according to his analysis of Hegel, can be a subject and an object at the same time.

This position is a manifestation of a psychological compulsion – the compulsion to perceive the whole self, a 'solid' self, at any particular moment in time, and indeed, a fixed, immutable one that is transparent to itself. This is the core of the phenomenon of ambiguity, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter Four.³⁷ Part of the same psychological phenomenon is a desire for a 'view from nowhere'³⁸ as far as subjectivity and objectivity, or subjecthood and objecthood, are concerned. What does it mean, for Sartre, to *be* a subject? It means to become a master and thereby enslave someone else. Sartre's description seems to suggest that there can be some kind of truth as regards who is a subject and who is an object. It is difficult, given the epistemological premise discussed earlier, to imagine from whose point of view this could be ascertained. The assertion that it is impossible to be a subject and an object at the same time also seems to presuppose a single perspective that has some kind of privileged epistemological status. Moreover, it seems to presuppose a fixed, immutable and transparent self, a self that can set itself outside anything else and live in self-determining isolation.

The only way to become a subject, according to Sartre, is to assert oneself as master over the Other: only by subjecting the Other to objecthood can one make

oneself a subject. Sartre's picture of Hegel in *Being and Nothingness* is a gloomy, violent and unstable one, involving a struggle that can, by definition, never end. The instability comes from the fact that the master/subject can preserve his mastery and subjecthood only by continued fortitude and constant searching for someone to objectify. At any time, one of any number of slaves in the world might break out of their shackles and force the erstwhile master into objecthood. It is often difficult to see whether Sartre's existentialist critique is directed at Hegel himself (or his version of Hegel), or whether it comes unmediated. At times, certainly, he seems to be advancing a version of the 'repression thesis' mentioned above and discussed in Chapter Three.³⁹ What Sartre sees as Hegel's epistemological or even ontological optimism (that the self might proceed beyond pure subjecthood to recognition) is in fact more accurately characterised as psychological optimism if one accepts that there is the theoretical possibility of transcending subjecthood, but that this is simply psychologically difficult.⁴⁰

There are several reasons to reject this analysis of Sartre's. The first is circumstantial, and therefore not watertight: it is unclear to what extent Sartre was actually familiar with Hegel's work. It can be said with certainty that Sartre had not read the *Phenomenology* until *Being and Nothingness* was almost complete: the story of the writing and genesis of that work of Sartre's spreads over the decade from 1933–1943, and as late as July 1940, during the period in which Sartre was a prisoner of war in Germany, we find a letter from Beauvoir expressing her enthusiasm for Hegel and eagerness to expound him to Sartre.⁴¹ It can also be said with complete certainty that both Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir belonged to the vast majority of Paris intellectuals at the time who had no experience of Hegel prior to Kojève's extremely influential analysis.⁴² Kojève himself, as Robert Williams points out, 'fails to make a careful analysis of recognition while developing his own view of heroic individualism'.⁴³ At the same time, however, Beauvoir and Hegel both seem to adopt a far more psychological and less historical view of Hegel's master/slave dialectic than Kojève does. Kojève seems to interpret the dialectic more as a historical narrative, whereas the two others see it not as a stage of history, but as a constant state of humanity. Whilst Kojève must be seen as something of a refracting lens, he certainly does not completely dominate the interpretations of Sartre and Beauvoir.

The second, more convincing reason to reject Sartre's analysis of Hegel's master-slave dialectic is suggested by Majid Yar. He expresses it succinctly in the introduction to his article:

In the phenomenologies of Sartre and Levinas I discern an unwarranted 'pathologization' of the dynamic of Hegel's formulation, which in both readings results in the equation of recognition with an annihilative intersubjective hostility.⁴⁴

Sartre's analysis leaves no room for any kind of normatively positive relationships between conscious or self-conscious beings – no possibility at all, that is, of positive

recognition. Epistemological intersubjectivity becomes impossible, as does recognition in any humanly useful sense.⁴⁵ 'Recognition', which is of course no recognition at all, is reduced to the object-slave's fearful regarding of the subject-master. The latter objection does not emerge solely from my explicitly-stated wish to expound a concept of recognition that is 'postive' in a broad sense, but from a major premise of the master-slave dialectic itself: how can the recognition that emerges from the slave be any kind of recognition worthy of the name? To recognise, one must surely be a subject and not, as Sartre sees the object-slave, a mere thing.

We must also enquire as to the status of this annihilation in the context of the life-and-death struggle. Is objectifying the same as negating or 'killing'? If killing is to become the literal annihilation of the bodily subject, Sartre's analysis is empirically unconvincing as it is not a historical account: the conflict continues throughout the story of human existence and the master-slave struggle is the only way humans can relate to each other at all. Whilst Sartre did live in violent times, in the Paris of the 1930s and 40s not everyone was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with everyone else. If killing is to be the same as objectification, and the master 'kills' the slave, the slave's recognition becomes completely worthless. The slave is then not capable of bestowing subjecthood on the master.

The third objection is also of an empirical character. It is difficult to see what basis Sartre has when saying that no-one can be a subject and an object at the same time. To ascertain whether this is true, we must ask which points of view are here in use. It is easy to construct a situation where a conscious, embodied being is at the same time both subject and object. We could think of a life model at an art school, who is an object for the art students who concentrate on the lines of her body, but at the same time a perceiving and thinking subject. From her point of view at least, she is a subject, whereas from the point of view of the students she is an object. There is no inconsistency here at all.

This cannot really be what Sartre means. For one thing, the object-slave is still a thinking being, otherwise the possibility of it ceasing to be a slave, casting off its shackles, would not exist. The object-slave is still a subject from its own point of view, at least in some sense. Even if the object-slave is not conscious of itself as being a thinking being and therefore a subject, it can still conceive of itself as overthrowing the master, otherwise, again, this possibility would not exist. How could the slave conceive of mastery if it sees itself as pure object? The slave would be permanently enslaved, and it is difficult to see how it is therefore to be seen as human at all.

More convincing would be an interpretation that sees the crucial point of view as that of the Other. To be a subject, one must be a subject for the Other, must be recognised *qua* subject. The slave is a slave because he recognises the master as a subject, but fails to make the master see him as a subject. In this case, the smallest of psychological adjustments would be necessary in order to move oneself from the status of object to that of subject. Whilst the slave might have

little influence over how the master views him, he has full control over how he views the master. He could cease to see the master as a subject, and the master would therefore cease to *be* a subject, as it is the point of view of the slave as Other that is crucial. The struggle thereby becomes internal – it is merely a question of how one sees the Other, and that opinion could always be changed if the psychological strength is there.

The whole element of interaction seems to be submerged. Is being a slave simply the same as suffering from bad faith? Bauer offers the following interpretation in the context of Sartre's famous keyhole example:

His crouching behind the doorway is a result of a frictionless momentum toward the door, produced by the spontaneous admixture of his unreflective (in this case jealous) consciousness and the simple objective fact that (there are signs that) something is happening on the other side of the door. The only thing that could counteract this momentum would be a change in his consciousness. In principle, Sartre insists, a human being is ontologically capable at any time and under any circumstances of willing such a change in consciousness; that is, such changes can occur without any change in the 'simple objective facts'. But in reality, he suggests, human beings often pretend to themselves that they are the helpless victims of these facts, thereby exhibiting what Sartre famously calls 'bad faith'.⁴⁶

Sartre here, at least according to Bauer's interpretation, seems to be approximating something that comes rather closer to Nietzsche's slave than Hegel's: the slave is thrown into circumstances he cannot change (or, more precisely, is unwilling to change) and therefore is forced in some way to come to terms with these circumstances.⁴⁷ The difference between the master and the slave, on this interpretation, is that the slave is more prone to this kind of bad faith, and is less willing or able to make the mental step, which takes place entirely internally, of asserting his own subjecthood.

The difficulty in the interpretation arises because the discussion of *being* an object and of *being* a subject will always require further clarification in terms of which perspective this is from. Neither Sartre nor Hegel wishes to argue that there is such a thing as a view from nowhere, or, as Nietzsche would put it, 'an eye turned in no particular direction'.⁴⁸ Asserting that no-one can be a subject and an object simultaneously will either be straightforwardly false on empirical grounds, or will lead one to the assertion that all the slave need to in order to escape his shackles is to put mind over matter, in the everyday sense of this phrase. In either case, the idea of partially re-enchanted nature and the socialised transcendent subject is not possible on Sartre's terms. Being fully human in the specific sense that is at issue here is, for Sartre, going to involve de-socialising oneself, or resisting socialisation, in order to achieve mastery in the sense of subjecthood. There is no room at all for partial re-enchantment in McDowell's sense. If anything, it seems that Sartre's conscious being falls into the psycho-

logical trap of wanting a view from nowhere as regards the self, and wanting that view from nowhere to be one's own view – the desire is to be the 'I' that fills the world. Indeed, this is only consistent with the analysis of subjecthood and objecthood expounded by Sartre – Sartre himself is struggling for subjecthood and mastery, which precludes the possibility of seeing himself as other. For this reason, it is little wonder that, at the end of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre doubts the possibility of any ethics at all given his existential analysis.⁴⁹

Gardner argues for a convergence between Sartre and non-Hegelian German Idealism, admitting at the same time that such a conclusion has a vital piece of evidence to speak against it, namely Sartre's complete lack of familiarity or engagement with German Idealism beyond Hegel. Gardner's statement on this history of these philosophical figures is as follows:

In the course of deconstructing Hegel's 'ontological optimism,' Sartre reconstructs Schelling, Hegel's great antagonist: Sartre's philosophy is as it were a partial reconstruction of Schelling's employing different materials and not brought to completion.⁵⁰

As Gardner points out, Sartre might be thought in this sense to be a lapsed Hegelian, albeit lapsed in a way that is in fact positive and that can lead to coherence in his own philosophy. The key criticism of Hegel, which Gardner ascribes to both Schelling and Sartre, is the assumption of the symmetry in concepts of being and nothingness, whereas in fact their symmetry is extra-conceptual.⁵¹

Sartre's fundamental objection to Hegel's 'metaphysics', as Gardner calls it, is certainly an objection to Hegel's conceptual framework as discussed above. Sartre claims that Hegel sees non-being as the opposite of being, whereas in fact it is its contradiction. Being is logically prior to non-being, since non-being supposes an 'irreducible mental act'.⁵² In this way, Sartre fundamentally objects to Hegel's account of negativity and negation, and their accounts are metaphysically at odds with one another.

Although Sartre and Hegel cannot be reconciled on a metaphysical level, Gardner suggests that an ontological adjustment, that is, adopting an onto-theology, can solve central problems in Sartre's account. Whilst Gardner's account focuses on Schelling, it is clear that Hegel's ontology is also an onto-theology in the sense which Gardner is describing. In Gardner's account, in fact, it is onto-theology that opens up the possibility of intersubjectivity in the Hegelian sense, even though Gardner himself does not describe it in these terms. Gardner sees the problem of Sartre's account as being the fact that he cannot make the transition from affirming personal freedom to affirming freedom in general, and thus has no genuine way of affirming the freedom of others.⁵³ All Sartre can say is that 'I stand under an obligation to value the freedom of others, because my being as a for-itself is essentially that of a revelation of being'.⁵⁴ He does not even have an account of reason such as that of Kant which would allow the individual to construct practi-

cal laws based on maximum objectivity and autonomy. What would be necessary is some way of the individual tracing back its point of origin to some pre-individual being, which is what Gardner sees as a kind of onto-theological turn.

It seems possible that the term 'freedom' could perhaps be replaced by 'consciousness' in an account of Hegelian intersubjectivity. An argument could be constructed that an affirmation of consciousness in general, and therefore the consciousness of others, could be reliant on such an onto-theological turn. Gardner's point about Sartre lacking a broadly Kantian conception of reason does not, of course, hold true for Hegel: an affirmation of freedom could be made through a conception of shared rationality. However, this would not be adequate for an account of intersubjectivity.

Simone de Beauvoir, whose interest in Hegel and the problem of self-consciousness in this specific regard predates that of Sartre, rejected the idea that one cannot be both subject and object simultaneously, arguing that in fact this ambiguity is an inherent part of the flourishing of self-consciousness as full humanity. According to Beauvoir, our attempt to negotiate and reconcile ourselves to this inherent ambiguity of situation is a necessary precondition of the moral life – I would extend this and tie it to the conditions of possibility of an existence that is distinctively human, and therefore include the kind of epistemological conditions that were discussed in the previous chapter. Beauvoir ties these insights closely to the established concept of women as objects and men as subjects. This view, she argues, should be superseded in the light of the fact that all conscious beings are both subject and object.⁵⁵

If the idea that the desire for subjecthood is symptomatic of a wider desire for a self and world that can be seen from no particular perspective is a useful one, Beauvoir's comments in this respect can be extended. Allowing the thought that one is object as well as subject is tantamount to acknowledging the necessity of one's own situatedness, and therefore the impossibility of a view from nowhere. The inherent problem of ambiguity can now be restated – one must find one's own view whilst simultaneously acknowledging that this view is not a view from nowhere, as it would be if one were ever to achieve absolute subjecthood. Nor, indeed, is it a view from everywhere, giving one a view of the reality that is constructed intersubjectively. One is part of this intersubjectivity whether or not one is aware of this. The desire for subjecthood is the desire to be the only one that creates reality. The first part of the equation is as important as the first – whilst one can never fill the world with an I as the only subject, one is at the same time a subject as well as an object. The message therefore becomes one of liberation as well as resignation, not just a coming-to-terms, but some relief from the existential fear Sartre correctly characterized as belonging to the thought that one could be *just* an object. If this analysis, and that of Beauvoir, is correct, one cannot be enslaved in the Sartrean sense of being made an object. We

might return to Hegel and now see how it is that the slave is never permanently enslaved. The slave remains a subject as he interacts with the world, thereby finding himself in the position of a subject. He is not merely used, but also uses objects he finds around him.

The idea that ambiguity is a tool for the rejection of the view from nowhere can be closely linked to the arguments of the previous chapter. In some ways it could be seen to mediate between the naturalist and transcendentalist interpretations of the *Phenomenology*, and is certainly useful in the consideration of the McDowellian concept of the partly re-enchanted nature.⁵⁶ The enchantment, in this sense, is the realisation that the bald naturalism of scientism tied to a view from nowhere (the two seem to entail each other to some extent) is impossible, and that the human being can never be an asocial creature. The socialised transcendental subjects that constitute reality are a clear reason to reject the possibility of the view from nowhere – there is nothing (at least nothing epistemologically relevant) that one could find by getting outside the human point of view. The fact that the psychologically appealing view of objecthood and subjecthood – the view that there can be a view from nowhere with respect to ourselves – causes an ontological or even existential worry for the conscious being does not mean that such a view is actually possible, any more than the fact that bald naturalism or scientism is psychologically appealing or comforting is a strong argument for that view.

Given Sartre's account of recognition and subjectivity, it is no surprise at all that he cannot provide a satisfying and positive concept of forgiveness, and cannot see forgiveness as recognition. His engagement with the theme of forgiveness is most obviously literary than philosophical, but, as with his literary works in general, demonstrates his philosophical worldview. His *The Flies* is a re-writing of the *Oresteia*, Aeschylus' tragedy that centres around the question of justice and revenge, during the German occupation of France. He takes on the classical view wholesale, associating forgiveness strongly with the feminine and objectified, and revenge with the masculine subject. Certainly, the view of forgiveness is a 'negative' one in John Milbank's definition as discussed in Chapters Two and Five.⁵⁷ Forgiveness means to negate the fault and the offence; there is no progress or moral development. Revenge, order and rationality are all associated with the male and paternal, and the more humanised, forgiving aspects with the female and maternal. Sartre does not side with one aspect or the other, which partly explains why the message of the play is still a matter for debate, and seen as 'morally ambiguous'.⁵⁸ It would be to misunderstand Sartre in general to expect him to be morally didactic in his literary works, but his *The Flies* shows precisely what kind of forgiveness could be expected in a world without ambiguity or recognition.

The examples of Sartre and Beauvoir, perhaps precisely because they are *not* steeped in a knowledge of and familiarity with Hegel that spans many decades,

help to illuminate precisely how, for better or worse, a concept of recognition might work in our actual social lives. As I argue in Chapter Four, it is possible to draw a line from these existential and social, feminist and political critiques of Hegelian recognition to contemporary debates and discussions of recognition, many of which focus on the political and the practical. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to examining how questions of recognition fit in to the contemporary discourse on social ontology.

Positive Recognition and Contemporary Social Ontology

When recognition as a concept in ethical theory is strongly bound up with the idea of an autonomous, fixed and immutable moral agent or subject, this presents a challenge not only to the sort of account I am presenting here, but also to social ontology in general. Of course, one could (and perhaps more traditionally would) present this quite differently from another point of view and worry that both contemporary social ontology and the kind of account of recognition I am providing here present a challenge to the idea of the moral agent or subject as autonomous, fixed and immutable.

Here in the background lies another transcendental argument: given that we do seem to be able to ascribe moral responsibility and make judgements about ethical character based on past deeds as well as current intentions and actions despite the fact that moral agents and human subjects are not autonomous, fixed and immutable (and given that, as I argue in Chapter Five, forgiveness and the taking of a position with regard to past states of affairs are central to our moral lives despite the fact that we are not entirely autonomous, fixed and immutable), what must be the case about our social reality, and ontology viewed from a social point of view?⁵⁹ To return to the distinction made in the Introduction to this work, social ontology in the sense that I am describing it is ontology in senses (a) and (c).⁶⁰ It is an enquiry into social modes of being (and thus ontology in sense (a)) and also a meta-metaphysical enquiry into the most general sorts of relationships (and thus ontology in sense (c)). Often, of course, it is approached from a phenomenological point of view, and thus is ontology in sense (b).

Whilst recognition studies and enquiries into social ontology have intersected in the last couple of years,⁶¹ questions of autonomy and immutability (and, closely related, freedom) have not generally been considered at the foreground of such research. Some very recent work, however, has framed the question in these terms. With the focus strongly on recognition, Axel Honneth's most recent work on this topic has engaged directly with questions of autonomy, and argued that social forms and institutions do not present a worrying challenge to individual autonomy, but rather that crucial (in the sense of personally, rather than definitionally, crucial) aspects of the person such as self-respect and self-esteem depend on the shared

social values that are part of recognition, and thus that, as Hegel himself puts it, the I is possible only in the We.⁶² This, too, can be framed as a kind of transcendental argument – given that we operate as human subjects and moral agents with the help of features such as self-esteem and self-respect, and given that self-respect and self-esteem are dependent on social forms of recognition, what must be the case about our autonomy as human selves and moral agents? Honneth does not frame the question thus, but it is nevertheless germane to his enquiry. Certainly, his approach is broadly phenomenological in that it focusses on the practical as a way into theoretical questions about matters such as subject autonomy.

This part of recognition studies, then, comes closest to the questions I am considering in this chapter and work, even if the starting-point is not quite the same. Honneth's basic point about moral autonomy can be considered in connection with some concepts from social ontology. One major area of research in social ontology at the moment is the concept of collective intentions. The main question runs as follows: is there a sense in which we can intend to do something that goes over and above you intending to do something and me intending to do something? John Searle uses the example of Hollandaise sauce – I can intend to stir and you can intend to pour, but can we together intend to make the sauce? Intention, here, is functioning in its meaning in ordinary language but also in a somewhat broader sense, as denoting a mental state. Can mental states such as intentions be shared? If they can, what are the implications for moral philosophy? This is not a new question, but it is one that has not required as much attention as one might imagine it would warrant. One of the best accounts of it is by Margaret Gilbert, who also makes an important distinction between backward-looking moral responsibility (who is responsible for some past action having been taken) and forward-looking moral responsibility (who is responsible for responding to some future-related state of affairs, e.g. who will be morally responsible for cleaning up after some event).⁶³ Questions about moral responsibility and collective intentionality will focus largely on backward-looking moral claims and the extent to which individual moral agents are responsible for some particular state of affairs having come about, but the idea of forward-looking moral responsibility is far from irrelevant to a discussion of positive recognition, forgiveness and the social world.

Gilbert provides a detailed account of how individuals might be committed to some joint action. This is an epistemic account taking account of factors like individuals' knowledge of a collective's joint commitment. It is a fairly broad and unrestricted view of what a commitment might involve, and what a collective might consist in (for example, the members do not, on her account, have to be personally acquainted) She then proceeds from this account to a definition of collective intention:

Persons X, Y, and so on (or, alternatively, those persons with feature F) collectively intend to perform action A [...] if and only if X, Y, et al. are jointly committed to intend as a body to perform A.⁶⁴

It is the 'intend as a body' that is doing a lot of work in this definition and, in many ways, is the kernel of the question: this involves '*together to constitute, as far as is possible, a single body that intends to do that thing*'.⁶⁵ So, a commitment to tidy up the beach as a group does not mean that each member of the group has a commitment to tidy up the beach individually, it means that each member belongs to a group whose intention is to tidy up the beach (although, of course, the individual intention might also be present). Being part of a group with this intention does not even involve clearing up the beach.

Accounts like Gilbert's and that of Joel Feinberg,⁶⁶ who also deals with the moral consequences of collective intentions, provide us with a useful way into questions of autonomy and moral responsibility, although, at least on the most obvious reading, they each provide accounts that leave moral autonomy undisturbed. Gilbert's reading places emphasis on the epistemic factors involved in the joint nature of joint intentions – did the person joining the group know precisely what the commitment to action was and what it involved? If this is the key factor, it leaves autonomy intact, as the decision-making process allows the moral agent to be a law entirely to themselves. There is nothing that is being imposed from without; the choice to enter the group is freely made, and even after this decision comes into force the member can leave at any time so does not sacrifice any autonomy.

Gilbert's account is, in fact, somewhat more nuanced than this picture of group intentions, which does not seem to reflect any real-life situation. Joint and collective action and intentions as detailed above, preserving autonomy completely, are quite easy to understand when one is discussing small groups who have all been personally known to each other when various intentions have been formed. They are much more difficult to understand when we are discussing large populations and group members who do not know each other. Gilbert is happy to accept intentions as joint even when not everyone in the group knows everyone else in the group, thus stretching the boundaries of what might count as agreement.

If we accept that autonomy as moral agents cannot be fully preserved in the case of a lot of joint intentions and collective actions, we are left with a number of options. Firstly, we might decide that, whilst there can be joint-ness of action and intention, we cannot regard these actions as some kind of model for how social life should operate. This is an objection from a moral philosophy point of view. Secondly, there might be a metaphysical objection: we might decide that there *are* no collective actions and joint intentions in the sense that is being described here, but rather actions and intentions involving a group of people that involves the over-riding of individual autonomy but not really joint-ness of action or intention. Joint-ness of intention and action therefore presents no particular problem, other than as an example of how personal autonomy can be

over-ridden, with negative practical consequences. Both of these objections are to miss the practical point that a lot of action and intention in our social lives simply *does* have this joint character. Again, a transcendental argument can easily be formed. Given the way our social lives seem to work, what must be true of the way that the intentions and actions that are part of these social lives, forming the backbone of morally relevant action, are developed and played out? A certain degree of joint-ness seems to be present.

If we accept that there are such things as joint intentions and collective actions, and that these phenomena simply do have an effect on autonomy as applied to the moral sphere, one obvious move is to approach moral social life in a Hegelian, rather than a Kantian, manner. It is something of an oversimplification to suggest that Kant treats the moral subject as if it exists in a vacuum, a self-legislating subject over and above the social world and Hegel, on the other hand, sees the self as free only in the Other, so that we can observe a Kantian and a Hegelian pole as far as autonomy and freedom is concerned. Kant does have an account of the social world, and nowhere is this more evident than in his account of forgiveness, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter Five.⁶⁷ Indeed, he has a notion of moral development and progress which proceeds at the societal level, so we certainly are not atoms separated entirely from one another in the moral sphere for Kant. It is true to say, though, that Hegel goes much further in describing the extent to which our freedom is bound up with the Other, and therefore quite natural that an account which sees the restrictions on autonomy as a vital part of moral agenthood, rather than a barrier to it, arises from the Hegelian tradition. For Judith Butler, this is the case. She describes and argues for a narrative view of moral agenthood which takes into account limited autonomy, not as a restriction on autonomy and freedom, but in some ways as a condition of it. Autonomy presupposes a kind of self-knowledge that Butler does not think is available to us – for her, the self is in some respects opaque to the self. The key quote is to be found here:

[W]e must recognise that ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of unknowingness, when what forms us diverges from what lies before us, when our willingness to come undone in relation to others constitutes our chance of becoming human. To be undone by another is a primary necessity, an anguish, to be sure, but also a chance – to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be moved, prompted to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the self-sufficient I as a form of possession.⁶⁸

Whilst there might be something aporetic about an account of ourselves from this place, it is what we have. Our ethical selves and the narrative of our ethical lives are fundamentally determined by our relationships with the Other, and this is not a relationship which can be continued whilst remaining completely opaque to the self and completely autonomous.

What is the relationship between opacity to oneself and autonomy? Is there a relationship here with the subconscious? Certainly, Hegel sets a very high bar for self-knowledge, but does not have the same focus on autonomy apart from the Other as, for example, Kant does. For Hegel, true self-knowledge is not possible without having gone through a process of encounter with the Other that makes clear the lack of autonomy, or at least the limits of autonomy, of the human subject. Striving for complete self-knowledge and transparency is, in some ways, to strive for subjecthood without objecthood.⁶⁹ If the human subject is to be completely known to itself, this neglects or ignores that aspect of the self which is determined by the Other. The self is not only subject, determining the world around it, but also object, determined by its interactions with the Other. These interactions are, to some extent at least, outside its control. Moreover, and as I argue in Chapter Three, intersubjectivity, properly understood, is intersubjectivity of action. Self-knowledge is not pure contemplation, as Kierkegaard (through the Judge) points out:

The phrase *gnothi seauton* is repeated often enough and one has seen in it the aim of all human striving. Quite right, too, but it is equally certain that it cannot be the goal if it is not also the beginning. The ethical individual knows himself, but this knowledge is not mere contemplation, for then the individual would be specified in terms of his necessity; it is a reflection on himself which is itself an action, and that is why I have been careful to use the expression 'to choose oneself' instead of 'to know oneself'.⁷⁰

For Kierkegaard, as for Hegel, and as for the account which I am presenting here, recognition is 're-cognition', a rethinking of oneself which is not silent contemplation but very much action-based, involving encounters and confrontations. That access to oneself which is knowledge is gained through encounters which are outside our control. If we are not the creators and authors of ourselves that would be required for complete transparency, that we cannot be perfectly self-regulating, either.

What are the specific consequences for forgiveness and love of this insight? Our understanding of forgiveness is strongly transformed, because underlying notions of blame and responsibility are also challenged, tapping into a wider debate about free will and culpability. The 'could have acted otherwise' criterion for moral responsibility – that is, the rule that someone is morally responsible for some action only if they could have performed a different action, or none at all – is inadequate once we bring in questions of jointness of intention or collective actions, and certainly once we have a picture of a partly opaque subject whose autonomy is restricted. As I will argue in Chapter Five, forgiveness involves both the potential forgiver and the candidate for forgiveness standing in a particular relation to the offence.⁷¹ How can this be usefully assessed, much less achieved, when questions of responsibilities are complicated?

One potential response to this is to say that it can be accounted for in the relationship which the potential forgiver or candidate for forgiveness has with the offence. Both are relevant, as the potential forgiver also has to understand the relation in which he or she stands to the offence (or perceived offence) – lack of total autonomy, as traditionally understood, and lack of total transparency of the self to itself, also affects this relationship, as it means that the self is not fixed and immutable. If the self is not, in some important way, the same self as the one at the time when the offence was committed, is it appropriate for the present self to forgive? The precise same question, of course, can be asked of the candidate for forgiveness. We can account for the fluidity of the self in both the person of the candidate for forgiveness and the potential forgiver if we accept this picture of the self and use it as a reason to regard forgiveness as a social phenomenon.

In this chapter, I have attempted to sketch out the historical and contemporary parameters of the concept of recognition as outlined in the Introduction. I have attempted to show where the discussion originates, but much more importantly, what is at stake from the point of view of contemporary philosophy. In the next chapter, I return first of all again to Hegel and the German Idealist context to look more closely at the concept of intersubjectivity and the particular relationship between the ontological, theological and ethical that is brought into focus by this discussion.

2 THE SELF OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: ETHICAL CONCEPTS, METAPHYSICAL FRAMEWORKS

In this chapter, I demonstrate how those features of Hegel's account of intersubjectivity which make it an important case study for this analysis are rooted in a general German Idealist account of metaphysics, and the relationship between metaphysics and ethics. The decisive move is there already when Kant makes his Copernican turn, moving the human subject into the centre of the world, as participator, the centre of experience, rather than observer or perceiver. The metaphysical focus thus moves from the relationship between the individual and the external world to the relationship between individuals. Ethics becomes essentially social, for the context of all action becomes social, conditioned by others in the environment and not an unchanging, passive external world of objects. Moreover, freedom becomes an interface between ethics and metaphysics, a fact of human existence as well as something that demands to be recognised before intersubjectivity is possible. As Levinas says in *Totality and Infinity*, 'To welcome the Other is to put in question my freedom'. The encounter with the Other is therefore the central ethical and metaphysical experience of a world which is essentially social, not the fixed and unyielding external world of the Rationalists. It is this insight, which is adopted from its German Idealist roots by a huge range of subsequent philosophical traditions, that makes a positive concept of recognition as an ethical norm possible. Starting from this central thesis, this chapter examines the philosophical and theological roots of social philosophy as related to concepts of positive recognition.

The rest of the chapter is structured around dichotomies and concept pairs which shaped the thought of the German Idealists, their twentieth century critics and modern discussions about the relationship between metaphysical framework and ethical concept. These pairs are as follows: Reflexivity/non-reflexivity; concept/intuition and subject/object. I pick up the last one of these in more detail in Chapter Four.

The central concept considered in this chapter is that of self-consciousness and how much content there is, for Hegel and for us, in the idea of the self.

The chapter asks the following questions: how does the self have to be rooted, ontologically or metaphysically, in its social surroundings and external reality, for positive forms of inter-relations to be possible or understood? What is the relationship to the body? To what extent do ethical concepts or ideals have to be rooted in a metaphysical or ontological framework, and to what extent can ethical concepts guide such an enquiry? What role is played here by epistemology, and what are the consequences for theology? The various concept pairings listed address these questions from a variety of different angles, ranging from practical to meta-philosophical. Against this background, I discuss Hegel's particularly well-developed concept of self-consciousness and the extremely high requirements he sets for the achievement of this state.

Hegelian Intersubjectivity and German Idealist Metaphysics

Hegel's account of intersubjectivity, or at least those features of his account which prepare the ground for an account of positive recognition, are strongly rooted in German Idealism in general. Essential to Hegel's account is his picture of self-consciousness. In this section, I examine with the aid of a series of concept pairs how Hegel's accounts of intersubjectivity and self-consciousness are rooted in German Idealism and also shape the subsequent discussion. These pairs are as follows: Reflexivity/non-reflexivity; concept/intuition; subject/object; ethics/epistemology theoretical/practical reason; Spirit/nature. The central concept being considered in this chapter is that of self-consciousness and how much content there is, for Hegel and for us, in the idea of the self. The chapter asks the following questions: how does the self have to be rooted, ontologically or metaphysically, in its social surroundings and external reality, for positive forms of inter-relations to be possible or understood?

Reflexivity/Non-Reflexivity

For an initial characterisation of the issue with which I am here concerned, I will first of all characterise two types of models of self-consciousness. one of which has been unduly neglected in the world of analytical philosophy.

The first model of self-consciousness began, in the form I will be discussing here, with Heidegger and has been extremely influential in analytical, post-analytical and Continental thought (especially existentialism) over the last 80 years. The model conceives self-consciousness as a non-reflexive, in many ways non-epistemological phenomenon. The (human) subject is 'always already' in the situation it is, and thought about this position is only ever a *revealing* about certain ontological facts of the subject's existence. The avoidance of certain dualisms means that there can be no question of a meaningful separation of subject, the apprehender, and object, that which is apprehended. Levinas, as mentioned

in the Introduction and as discussed in the next chapter, falls squarely into this category. Self-consciousness involves the self being revealed to the self as it already is, and always has been. There can be no process of *becoming* self-conscious, though there can be a process of the self being revealed to the self. Strictly speaking, however, this cannot be a journey to self-consciousness in the detailed sense in which Hegel describes that process. This model of self-consciousness is typified by the Heideggerian concept of *Befindlichkeit*, of how one finds oneself in the world, the facts of one's particular situation. For the discussion that follows, I will refer to this model of self-consciousness as the non-reflexive model.

The second model of self-consciousness is the reflexive model. The great majority of concepts in the discussion of self-consciousness in the traditional sense fall into this broad category. What these concepts all have in common is the idea that one *becomes* self-conscious by means of a process that is at least partially epistemological in character. Under this heading fit accounts of self-consciousness as foundational to the discipline as that of Descartes, with his idea of incontrovertible and undeniable cognitive access to oneself. Whilst I might not have unfettered and sceptic-proof cognitive access to the *contents* of my thoughts, I know *that* I think, and to deny this certainty would be a simple logical error.

This kind of self-consciousness is clearly fairly minimal in terms of what one knows about oneself – what, in other words, one is conscious *of*, being a fairly simple immaterialist conception of the self. It is, however, an exemplification of a reflexive self-consciousness. One examines oneself as an object about which one can predicate certain things – in this case, the fact that one thinks. That is, of course, all that one can say about the self with this kind of certainty. Reflexive concepts of self-consciousness do not, of course, have to be so minimalistic, and nor do they necessarily involve the attempt to consider oneself dispassionately as an object amongst others. Crucial to this argument will be the neo-Kantian idea, expounded recently by philosophers such as P.F. Strawson and Quassim Cassam, that one cannot, *qua* subject, consider oneself as an object. This insight goes back to the Kantian thought that, as Cassam puts it:

A self-conscious subject is one who is at least capable of consciousness of its own identity as the subject of different representations, but self-consciousness is not and cannot be a matter of one's being perceptually or 'intuitively' aware of the subject of one's representations as an *object*.¹

Rather, Kant's concept of self-consciousness involves consciousness of the identity of the representation 'I' which accompanies all representations in the mind of the subject. There can be no representation to which the subject cannot attach the representation 'I think'. Nor can it be a matter of intuition – essentially, it is always one of propositional knowledge.² The subject, then, cannot be an object for itself in this particular sense. This proposition is one I take to be fundamentally correct, and will be discussed later in this chapter and in the next.

These two briefly-sketched examples can illustrate the distinction made by Ernst Tugendhat in 1979 with his re-examination of the concept of self-consciousness.³ Tugendhat distinguishes between two models of self-consciousness, namely the subject-object model and the perhaps somewhat misleadingly-named epistemological model. The subject-object model is characterised by the description of consciousness as the relation to an object. Self-consciousness is a particular kind of relation to an object in which the object is identical with consciousness. One appears, as it were, before oneself. Descartes as characterised above would be an excellent example of what is meant by this type of concept of self-consciousness.

The epistemological model, according to Tugendhat, is the idea of a special kind of cognitive access or 'inner gaze' – one turns in on oneself to observe oneself. In some ways, the Kantian and neo-Kantian models might fit into this category. Certainly, for the Kantians and some neo-Kantians,⁴ there can be no question of a special intuition, but knowledge of oneself is for them the same kind of knowledge as one has of other objects, only that this knowledge is always present to the self in all its representations.

According to Tugendhat, both of these models are examples of the kind of thinking about self-consciousness that has lead the contemporary discussion astray. Both of these accounts are reflexive in the sense I began to describe above – they involve, in other words, the turning in of oneself into some private sphere in order to apprehend oneself. Tugendhat's main objection to this kind of picture of self-consciousness is that it is simply too solipsistic – for Tugendhat, self-consciousness can never be a private matter in this way, as this neglects the social character of all that is important to the human subject. We simply cannot make any sense of the first-person ascription of self-conscious states outside of this intersubjective framework. There is also an ascription problem with reflexive models⁵ according to Tugendhat. In the attempted first-person ascription of conscious states, what is in fact being achieved is merely the misguided identification of some part of the self with the self as a whole, and this part of the self then serves as a third person to which predicates standing for conscious states are then ascribed from the perspective, as it were, of an observer. This reflexive model of self-observation breaks down when we look at how we practically relate to ourselves as agents in the world. The most overarching objection brought by Tugendhat is that of the nature of self-knowledge as opposed to knowledge of external objects. He maintains that the knowledge we have of ourselves is not knowledge in the ordinary sense, but propositional knowledge. One is brought to knowledge of oneself by predicating something of oneself. In expressing, say, a feeling of sadness, one would not say 'I know I' or even 'I know sadness', but would say 'I know that I am sad'. One relates to oneself practically rather than relating epistemologically to whatever it is one equates with the self.

These objections to the epistemological and reflexive model overlap in many ways – certainly the second and third objections as described above seem fairly

similar. Tugendhat's objections to such models of self-consciousness can be briefly summarised thus – by identifying the self with some feature or object to be found within it and treating that 'self' as an ordinary object, such models ultimately create a concept of self-consciousness that is hopelessly solipsistic and removed from the practical. It is the reflexive aspect of all of these approaches that leads to these problems.

Many of Tugendhat's fundamental objections to modern conceptions of self-consciousness are extremely pertinent.⁶ Although I do not agree entirely with his objection to reflexive accounts of self-consciousness, I think his point about agency and practical self – and other-relations does constitute an important challenge to accounts of self-consciousness.

It is worth pointing out here that the question of what we actually want from a concept of self-consciousness is just as relevant, if not more so, than any logical or structural problems with these existing models of self-consciousness. This is an assertion Tugendhat would probably not deny. As mentioned above, Descartes' account of self-consciousness is sufficient only to establish one's existence as *res cogitans*, a thing that thinks. The Kantian and neo-Kantian view is much more sophisticated and substantial, involving various observations about the relationship of mind to body, and the body as the centre of self-ascription. It makes claims about the structure of our knowledge of ourselves, namely as the transcendental unity of apperception, the 'I' that accompanies all my representations. Thus, for Kant, the concept of self-consciousness can serve as a basis for substantive observations about such diverse topics as freedom and reason.

Hegel, however, wants to go much further with his concept of self-consciousness, and for him it is the basis for his entire concept of the self and of knowledge. More than that, it is the basis for his concept of the human world. What Hegel is describing when he describes the development of self-consciousness is the development of the pre-self-conscious subject into a subject that has the capacity for knowledge. Hegel's concept of self-consciousness is extremely demanding in that it is so substantive. Far more than just requiring some kind of cognitive access to one's mental states in the sense of Tugendhat's reflexive, Hegel's concept of self-consciousness has an ontological (in sense (a) as described in the Introduction) and perhaps even a practical component.

I will go on to examine the various possibilities of conditions that must be met, for Hegel, before self-consciousness can be said to have been reached. These include the possibility that one must first be recognised by another self-conscious subject and the possibility that one must be involved in a situation where mutual recognition in this special sense is achieved. It is thus clear that the concept of self-consciousness in Hegel does, or is intended to do, a lot of work in forming the general picture not just of the human subject, but also of the human in relation to the world. This is necessary if a Hegelian concept of self-consciousness

is to be used as a basis for a way of mediating between a transcendentalist and a naturalist view of the self and the world. This idea is rooted in the Hegelian conception of self-consciousness (indeed, all knowledge proper) as being essentially intersubjective. In this sense, it is difficult to see how Hegel's project in his analysis of self-consciousness could possibly be regarded as solipsistic.

Tugendhat has a simple answer to this objection, which runs as follows:

Self-consciousness becomes the guiding principle of rational praxis. Hegel took this on, but also overcame it. He showed that a relation of the self to the self is only possible when one recognises, and is recognised by, another self-consciousness. In Hegelian terms: the 'truth' [Wahrheit] of self-consciousness is 'spirit' [Geist]. Thus the concept of self-consciousness loses its status as the foremost practical principle.⁷

This is in many ways a rather puzzling assessment of the role of self-consciousness in Hegel's philosophy. Self-consciousness is no longer the supreme practical principle, as it has now been interpreted as having its ultimate truth in Spirit, argues Tugendhat – so really, we are no longer talking about self-consciousness in the traditional sense at all. It is now something deeper and more underlying, and no longer a practical principle (it is unclear, in the passage above, how much work the word 'practical' is really doing).

I only attempt the briefest of responses Tugendhat's criticism in this chapter. Tugendhat clearly attaches much importance to the practical nature of self-consciousness, and for this very reason sees the deepening of the significance of self-consciousness as a turn away from the development of a truly intersubjective model. The truth of self-consciousness is Spirit – self-consciousness is now an ontological, rather than an epistemological, concept. Getting to the bottom of self-consciousness can be nothing less than getting to the bottom of Spirit, and self-consciousness is therefore no longer a practical principle in any meaningful sense.

Tugendhat wants self-consciousness to be the way we relate, as practical agents, to ourselves. As Paul Stern puts it in his Introduction to the English translation of Tugendhat's work:

For precisely what is inconceivable on this model [the epistemological model] is the sense in which our relation to ourselves as agents is constituted not in a contemplative perception of our inner self or personality, but in a volitional choice of what we are going to do with our lives and hence 'who' we are going to be.⁸

The idea of personality is certainly one that poses something of a problem for us when we consider Hegel's analysis of self-consciousness. One way of framing Tugendhat's objection is to point out that, if self-consciousness has its ultimate truth in Spirit, the development of the individual personality will inevitably be of secondary importance. If the story of the development of self-consciousness is the story of the development of spirit, what role can there be for an understanding of how an individual relates to herself in the sense Tugendhat sees as

important? How can Hegel's concept of self-consciousness explain how we decide who we are going to be? Hegel's concern can never be practical in this sense; the concern is with Spirit, and not spirits.

It is Tugendhat's intention to find an intermediate position on the question of autonomy between Kant's conception of rational autonomy and Heideggerian *Eigentlichkeit* (authenticity).⁹ The latter concept is closely related to *Befindlichkeit*. Autonomy is a central concern of an account of self-consciousness as substantial as that of Hegel, so this idea is extremely interesting from the point of view of this project. One point on which Kant's and Heidegger's accounts of self-consciousness differ is that of the role of conception and intuition – Kant is interested in how the self thinks of itself, and Heidegger starts from the point of view of the self's experience of the self.¹⁰ This dichotomy will be the concern of the next subsection.

Concept/Intuition

Cassam's central thesis in *Self and World* is that it is not possible to give an adequate account of self-consciousness without acknowledging the importance of bodily self-awareness. At the same time, however, it is not possible for the subject, *qua* subject, to be conscious of itself as an object. Nevertheless, he defends a materialist account of self-consciousness. The materialist account is basically the argument that we are aware of ourselves or conceive of ourselves as corporeal objects among corporeal objects. Essentially, this is an empiricist argument: Michael Ayers, for example, states that 'our experience of ourselves as being a material object amongst others essentially permeates our sensory experience of things in general'.¹¹

As Cassam points out, it is often argued that materialism about self-consciousness is equivalent in some way to materialism about the self. If the self is a physical object, then no more is needed to argue for the proposition that consciousness of that self is necessarily consciousness of it *qua* physical object. The converse, of course, is not true – it is entirely possible to be an immaterialist about the self such as Descartes and not be committed to saying that thinking subjects do not *appear* to themselves as physical. Cassam points to Shoemaker's argument in support of the view that materialism about the self does not entail materialism about self-consciousness:

[W]hen one is introspectively aware of one's thoughts, feelings, beliefs and desires, one is not presented to oneself as a flesh and blood person, and does not seem to be presented to oneself as an object at all.¹²

Simply put, there is no difficulty in believing that the self is presented to the self as other than it actually is. As Shoemaker and Cassam both point out, if we say that there is a contradiction or difficulty here, we would have to say that someone who is a materialist about the self and thinks that subjects are bodies (or some part of the body) would have to regard looking in the mirror as a form of introspective awareness.¹³

Here, we come to an important distinction between models of self-consciousness that will be particularly pertinent to Tugendhat's concerns. This is the distinction between conceiving of the self as being a certain thing, and being intuitively aware of the self as a certain thing – this is the difference between *thinking* of something as a certain type of thing, and *experiencing* something as a certain type of thing. When Tugendhat talks about identifying the self as something within that self and treating the perceived self as an object before one, this would seem to be far more of a danger for an account that falls into what Cassam calls a 'concept version' of self-consciousness than for an account that sees the self as *intuited* in self-consciousness.¹⁴ A concept version would not inevitably be guilty of falling into this particular fallacy – it is possible that the self which is conceived of is precisely what the self actually is – but the intuition version would seem to be less susceptible. Of course, it is entirely possible that one could be intuitively aware only of some *part* of what actually constitutes the self, but the picture of this part of the self being observed as something apparently outside the self seems not to apply. However, the advocate of an intuition version of self-consciousness seems already to have headed down the road of the epistemological model, 'inner gaze' equally rejected by Tugendhat.

Many neo-Kantian, analytical accounts that are materialist about self-consciousness have been 'concept versions', influenced as they are by the Strawsonian tradition. Writers in the Continental tradition such as Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have, in contrast, have adopted an intuition version. However, as Cassam points out, these philosophers have fallen into a Schopenhauerian dualism, making a distinction between the 'objective' body and the 'phenomenal' body (this terminology is from Merleau-Ponty.)¹⁵ One can have an intuitive awareness of oneself as a physical thing without simultaneously being aware of oneself *qua* subject as a physical object amongst physical objects in the sense Strawson demands.

The problem with this subject/object dualism of Schopenhauer's is that 'there is a conflict between awareness of something *qua* subject and awareness of it as an object among others.'¹⁶ This statement is clearly correct. However, it will be a central claim of this work (particularly in Chapter Four) that there is no difficulty with this at all, and in fact it is this very dualism or tension that allows a person to become self-conscious in the Hegelian sense in the first place. Phenomenologically, this view of the self is convincing.

It would be difficult to deny that we have different kinds of relations to our bodies at different times – the everyday experience of our bodies as instruments of agency, the experience of pain or illness in part of the body, the simple regarding of some part of it. It seems clear, however, that there will be a particular kind of relation to one's body that is specifically relevant for the development of self-consciousness, and it would seem rather peculiar if this did not coincide with the way the body is for self-consciousness, the conception of the self that under-

lies the account of self-consciousness. This objection comes, of course, from the point of view of an intuition version of an account of self-consciousness. On a concept version, there is no problem at all with conceiving of the self as a particular thing or group of qualities that do not completely, wholly or even partly overlap with the way the self is experienced in daily life – indeed, for a concept version of a *materialist* account of the self and self-consciousness, it is difficult to imagine how self-consciousness could work in any other way if we are to avoid saying that the self can be regarded by looking in the mirror.

What Cassam, and, I will argue, Hegel himself, are advocating is a view of the self as the bodily subject of consciousness. In this way, they agree fundamentally with the most prominent contemporary analytic champion of the importance of Hegel's thought on self-consciousness and the self, namely John McDowell, who has the following to add to the debate:

If we begin with a free-standing notion of an experiential route through objective reality, a temporally extended point of view that might be bodiless so far as the connection between subjectivity and objectivity goes, there seems to be no prospect of building up from there to the notion of a substantial presence in the world. If something starts out conceiving itself as a merely formal referent for 'I...how could it come to appropriate a body...? Perhaps we can pretend to make sense of the idea that such a subject might register a special role played by a particular body in determining the course of its experience. But that would not provide for it to conceive itself, the subject of its experience, as...a bodily presence in the world.¹⁷

McDowell's target here is Kant. His objection is to Kant's bodiless conception of the self as important for self-consciousness. He is entirely correct to say that one cannot move from Kant's idea of the transcendental self to a position where we can conceive of ourselves as bodily presences in the world. Like Jenkins, he appeals to the empirical, the way we actually do experience our bodies in the world. 'How can we work up [from Kant's transcendental self] to the sense of self we *actually have*, as a bodily presence in the world?' he asks.¹⁸ What Kant ends up with from his idea of a subjectively continuous series of states in which conceptual capacities are implicated in sensibility in some *a priori* manner is a slice of life singled out from the whole of it, as McDowell argues. It is not clear how any unity is actually meant to be discerned. Kant, in other words, has scarcely made any real progress further than Hume's bundles of perceptions.

With the Kantian account of self-consciousness, however, we are faced with two problems, and McDowell's focus is only on one of these. He argues for a conception of 'second nature' as the answer to the problem of Kant's transcendental self not being truly located within the life of a living being. McDowell's starting point in *Mind and World* is the idea of spontaneity, as Bubner puts it, 'that specific achievement of subjectivity whose beginning and ground lies not outside, but within itself.'¹⁹ Bubner argues that the object of the middle part of McDowell's

Mind and World is to argue that spontaneity must be independent, yet stand in genuine union with nature. Equipping Kant with the concept of a second nature would allow a connection to be made between self-consciousness and consciousness of the world, a connection that is impossible from the point of view of Kant's transcendental self as it stands. Second nature is a concept originally emerging from Aristotle's ethics, and is defined by McDowell in the following manner:

For Aristotle, the rational demands of ethics are autonomous; we are not to feel compelled to validate them from outside an already ethical way of thinking. But this autonomy does not distance the demand from anything specifically human, as in rampant platonism. They are essentially within reach of human beings. We cannot credit appreciation of them to human nature as it figures in a naturalism of disenchanted nature, because disenchanted nature does not embrace the space of reasons. But human beings are intelligibly initiated into this stretch of the space of reasons by ethical upbringing, which instils the appropriate shape into their lives. The resulting habits of thought and action are second nature.²⁰ This is to be distinguished from naturalised platonism, which is far closer to the position McDowell ultimately advocates.

This, for McDowell, is how one could flesh out a Kantian conception of self and world in order to provide not only an empirically convincing account of self-consciousness, but also a useful account of the relation of the self to the world. The idea of a second nature is, I will argue over the course of this work, crucial to an account of how a Hegelian idea of self-consciousness can help us to develop a picture of a life that is truly human, starting from an epistemological standpoint. Perhaps most importantly, it will help us to show how the ethical can develop seamlessly from the epistemological in the sense McDowell (and I) find interesting.

There remains, however, the problem of concept versus intuition. McDowell's picture focuses clearly on the idea of the self's conception of the self, not about how the self *experiences* the self. Therefore, for reasons discussed above, he will be less able to defend himself from Tugendhat's criticism of the confusion between the third and the first person, of identifying something within the self used then as the self and regarded as one would regard an object. Equally, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile his view with Cassam's requirement that the subject, qua subject, should not see itself as an object. If we take Tugendhat's and Cassam's challenges to accounts of self-consciousness seriously and wish to produce an account of self-consciousness that incorporates these concerns, yet wish to incorporate McDowell's emphasis on second nature in order to provide an epistemological basis for the ethical, it seems the most obvious solution is to find a way to translate some of McDowell's ideas into an intuition-type account of self-consciousness.

However, this presents extremely serious problems for the Hegelian. For Hegel, it is this conception of the self as a certain sort of thing that is absolutely crucial to his account of self-consciousness. In the master/slave dialectic, action

is certainly crucial to the self's becoming self-conscious, but it is the conception of the self as occupying a particular role tied up with this action that is equally crucial. Indeed, it is just this role of action in the development of self-consciousness that can prevent Tugendhat's criticism of misidentifying the self from applying. The self cannot possibly intuit what it is by means of an 'inner gaze' – the language Hegel uses during his discussion of the emergence of self-consciousness is about what the self takes the self to be, e.g., 'his essence and absolute object is the I'.²¹ In some sense, the self *is* an object for itself, even if this is not the whole truth of self-consciousness.

The most obvious reason why it is a conceptual knowledge of the self that is crucial for self-consciousness is the role of the Other, which is made clear at the outset of the master/save dialectic:

Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it *is* only by being acknowledged or 'recognized'.²²

In this sense, Hegel's account of self-consciousness is an intersubjective concept version. The Other does not intuit the self, and the self does not intuit the Other, as having some particular ontological status – considering the model of intuition as an inner gaze, this would not be coherent unless we were prepared to say that the Other has some kind of privileged cognitive access to the self, which seems absurd. Recognition involves conceiving the Other, and being conceived by the Other, as a certain sort of being (in the sense of ontology in sense (a) as described in the Introduction).

Although Hegel has a concept version of the self, this is not to say that intuition does not play a role, and that the question of about phenomenological plausibility cannot be adequately addressed. For an explanation of how this might work, I turn to Kant and to McDowell. The starting thought is as follows:

So the picture is this: the fact that thoughts are not empty, the fact that thoughts have representational content, emerges out of an interplay of concepts and intuitions. 'Content' in Davidson's dualism [of scheme and content] corresponds to intuitions, bits of experiential intake, understood in terms of a dualistic conception of this interplay.²³

The very idea of *any* representational content, says McDowell, requires an interplay between concepts and intuitions as conceived of by Davidson.²⁴ This corresponds with the Kantian thought that empirical knowledge results from a co-operation between receptivity and spontaneity, where receptivity is the mind's ability to receive representations (sensibility), and spontaneity is the mind's power of producing representations from itself (the understanding). Thus, the self cannot be detached, contemplating the Other in a purely intellectual manner, but the direct recipient of the *Anschauung* (Kant's term for intuition). Of course, the Kantian picture, and the extent to which it applies to Hegel, still takes the

form of practical experience of the Other slotted into a theoretical framework. I discuss the shortcomings of this picture in the next chapter.²⁵

These considerations all have an important bearing on the extent to which recognition is an epistemic phenomenon. I first mentioned this idea in the Introduction, and discuss it again in Chapters Three and Four. This question also has an important bearing on whether the picture of the self as less than fully autonomous and fixed is one that is conducive towards positive recognition (or perhaps even necessary for positive recognition). In order to clarify this further, a preliminary examination of the way that the terms 'subject' and 'object' are used is required. I take this question up once more in Chapter Four.²⁶

Subject/Object

Tugendhat's characterisation of the self-relationship as practical could be seen as an adverbial approach to self-consciousness, and it is in this regard that his objection to the self-before-the-self, the self considered as object, can be seen most clearly. One sees oneself not as *being*, but as being *thus or so*. In one respect, it is clear that this can easily be reconciled with an anti-essentialist and indeed even anti-foundationalist approach. There is no thing that is equated with the self to which predicates are subsequently attached. The challenge neo-Kantian accounts of self-consciousness like that of Cassam present is therefore successful in Tugendhat's view – the self, *qua* subject, does not consider itself as an object. What is revealed to this subject is something about itself, not the self itself. What Cassam says that a self-consciousness being is, we might remind ourselves, is the following: one who is capable of consciousness of its own identity as the subject of different representations.

The question is therefore raised as to whether Tugendhat's example of an emotion such as sadness can be treated, conceptually speaking, in the same way as the perception of some representation. Is 'I am sad' of the same kind of relevant conceptual structure as 'I am seeing a rainbow'? Can we treat the perception or, better expressed, the consciousness of oneself as being sad in the same way as the consciousness of oneself as perceiving a rainbow? It is clear that there are differences in epistemological and practical terms between the two examples, but the question is whether or not they are relevant. There is not the same level of uncertainty when we are speaking of the emotion example as when we are speaking of the perceiving-a-rainbow example. I cannot be mistaken about whether or not I am sad, but I can certainly be mistaken about whether or not I am perceiving a real rainbow, that is, that there is a rainbow causing my perception or idea of that rainbow. However, I cannot be mistaken about whether there is a rainbow before my mind's eye, and therefore this distinction does not cause such a problem for this particular argument.

The use of the adverbial structure answers Cassam's challenge as well as that laid down by Hume. The crucial thing for the self as relevant for self-conscious-

ness is going to be the sense in which it accompanies different representations – the self must be perceived by the self not *qua* object but *qua* subject-of-different-representations.

There is an important question as to whether this distinction – that between seeing the self as an object and seeing oneself as the perceiver of various objects (whatever the ontological status of those objects) – is one that is valid. This is an important question that precedes the considerations of Chapter Four and the description of the concept of ambiguity. Is there a genuine epistemic distinction between seeing some essence or other property that one equates with oneself and taking that as an object of perception, and observing that there is something in common with all one's perceptions – an I, as Kant would say, that can accompany all my representations?²⁷ Is the perception of oneself as having been or currently being the active party in something like perception actually a perception of oneself *qua* subject? How is it different from seeing someone else do something or be the active partner in some relationship or action? If I see John kick the ball, I still perceive him as an object, not a subject.

This potential objection demonstrates that it is not a different characterisation of the self in these terms that can establish that self-consciousness is present. As Tugendhat claims, it is a move away from any kind of epistemological/reflexive model that is necessary. Anything that presents the self as coming before the self will fail to meet the criteria that develop out of Kant's and Hume's discussions of the self and self-consciousness. One source of confusion that must be resisted is that of the potential confusion between the *existence* of self-consciousness and the *ascertaining* as to whether a subject is self-conscious. Cassam's statement that a basic requirement (a necessary but perhaps not sufficient condition) for a particular subject to be self-conscious is that the self must be conscious of its identity as the subject of different representations brings this problem into sharp relief – it is difficult to draw a clear distinction as to whether this subject is perceiving or reflecting the existence of a self, or whether such self-consciousness is necessarily reflexive. Could one, on these neo-Kantian terms, be self-conscious but not aware of oneself as self-conscious? In a way this question might seem nonsensical – how can one be aware of something, but not be aware that one is aware of it?

It is at this point that the different aims of various accounts of self-consciousness must be again be mentioned. If we were speaking of a very minimal kind of self-consciousness, then the question above would indeed be nonsensical. This kind of minimal self-consciousness that I mean here would be the mere awareness that a certain number of one's experiences – perhaps all of them – involve some kind of minimal participation that can be seen, on the basis of whatever evidence, as being unified in some subject. This is Kant's transcendental unity of apperception in the most minimal form possible. How does this differ from the kind of phenomenon Tugendhat (and indeed Hegel, to a greater extent)

wants self-consciousness to be? The key, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, is in the term 'participation', which shows how the self-consciousness discussion has moved on from its modern origins in the work of Descartes. What is at stake is not what we should identify as the self – a question that, in any case, Tugendhat quite correctly rejects. The question is which form such participation takes, what kind of 'action' is required in order that we can say a subject is self-conscious. Between those involved in the debate crossing the boundaries between the analytical and Continental worlds, it is the nature of this action that will determine the model of self-consciousness. Beatrice Longuenesse has recently contributed to the debate on Kantian self-consciousness, focussing on whether a radical distinction between self-consciousness 'as a subject' and consciousness of oneself 'as an object' can genuinely be made.²⁸ It is my contention that Hegel's view of self-consciousness is based on this original Kantian distinction, and that only the first kind of knowledge or interaction can be seen as self-consciousness proper (for Hegel as well as for Kant). Longuenesse makes a distinction between an acceptance of the distinction between the two forms of consciousness (which she sees as prevailing in contemporary analytical philosophy) and an acceptance of Kant's radical dichotomy between the two. Longuenesse sees the crucial factor as being how far the various ways Kant believes we are self-conscious beings truly have the property, particularly important to recent neo-Kantians such as Strawson and Cassam, of immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person. It is this immunity that characterises consciousness of oneself *qua* subject.

The second strand of Longuenesse's argument, working in the background of her close analysis of Kant on self-consciousness, concerns the Paralogism of Pure Reason and the Paralogism of Personality, both seen by Kant as rationalist doctrines that proceed by invalid inference. The Paralogism of Pure Reason is the inference from features of the thought 'I' in the assertion 'I think' to features of a thinking substance that is distinguishable and separate from the body. The Paralogism of Personality is the inference from the 'I think' to the ascertaining of personal identity through time. In Longuenesse's view, it is Kant's rejection of the Paralogism of Personality that precipitates the emergence of a subtle and complex model of the human subject. In this sense, she is taking a rather different position on Kant to that of McDowell – unlike him, she thinks that Kant's rejection of this kind of rationalist viewpoint leads to a rich conception of the subject without the need for embodiment in the sense McDowell considers important. Many of Longuenesse's points about how this happens under the auspices of spontaneity and the capacity to judge apply to the kind of Hegelian account of self-consciousness which I am advocating.²⁹

The question remains open, then, as to how radical Kant's dichotomy between consciousness of self as subject and as object is to be, and that question will be of central importance to this project given the importance of the con-

cept of spontaneity. There also remains the question of how this relates to the Schopenhauerian dualism of subject and object, where there is a phenomenal and an objective body. To put it in the simplest terms possible, is there a body and a body-for-self-consciousness? Here, the various dualisms and dichotomies thus far discussed come together. I argue that Hegel's idea of becoming self-consciousness is a matter of charting a path through the internal and external. For this, the Schopenhauerian dualism is necessary, for it is the *objective* body that is essential for this sense of external. I will argue for the importance of the concept of ambiguity, where the human subject comes to terms with the senses in which it is an object (for others and for itself) and in which it is a subject (for others and itself). At the same time, I wish to hold onto the neo-Kantian insight that the subject, *qua* subject, cannot be an object for itself. It is this 'qua subject' that will have to be extremely carefully defined. It is possible that the objective and phenomenal bodies can be one sense of showing how this dualism can work, and how they can save us from the solipsism Tugendhat believes must necessarily infect any reflexive account of self-consciousness. The key thought is this: becoming self-conscious entails a realisation that my body is not the same for me as it is for others. I must be *intuitively* aware of the embodied self as it is relevant for self-consciousness whilst at the same time recognising intellectually that my body – *not* the self, but the objective body – is an object in the world, a corporeal object amongst corporeal objects. A concept version of self-consciousness itself would leave the account too open to Tugendhat's objection that the self is being regarded as a kind of third person. Yet embodiment is not the whole story of how a distinctively human standpoint, a distinctively human form of self-consciousness, is achieved – we can use Longuenesse's account of how Kant achieves a human standpoint to see how important the role of non-bodily factors such as spontaneity and judgement are in the development of self-consciousness.

The embodied self is such a crucial factor in the understanding of the social self that the role played in subjecthood and objecthood by the body will be crucial for positive recognition and the two expressions of that recognition I am arguing for in this work. Whilst it has ontological roots, this area of the field in question is quite practical in terms of how it is to be investigated. In the next section, I examine briefly the practical and political character of a number of recent studies of recognition before moving on to offer a different perspective, that is, a theological one.

The Theological Roots of Positive Recognition

Much of the discussion of recognition as a potential ethical norm in the last three decades has focussed sharply on the secular political aspect of the phenomenon. The seminal work in this regard is Axel Honneth's *Kampf um Anerkennung* (Struggle for Recognition), first published in 1992. In this work, Honneth spends

the main middle section approaching the question of (specifically Hegelian) recognition from the point of view of its empirical basis, which the help of insights from psychology and infant development studies. The concepts which he sees as crucial for recognition refounded (I discuss his criticisms of Hegel in the first part of his work in Chapter Three) are love, rights and solidarity, at least two of which are strongly political concepts. Indeed, at the end of his work, Honneth declares that recognition is no longer a matter for theory, but for social struggle.³⁰

Honneth's account has been hugely influential, inspiring work on recognition from a political point of view that has itself inspired further work. The work of Nancy Fraser, who considers recognition in the context of left-wing politics and other political concepts such as redistribution (including in direct dialogue with Honneth), is an excellent example of such an approach.³¹ The other major figure to mention here is Charles Taylor, who sees the interest in recognition as a political concept as a natural consequence of political change which has replaced the central notion of honour with that of dignity.³² This concept of dignity ties recognition strongly to the ethical and political (and, I would argue, the theological):

[M]isrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need.³³

The current centrality of recognition as a concept in political philosophy is summarised by Simon Thompson thus:

It seems as if every form of political action which is not exclusively economic or redistributive in character, and which involves issues of identity and difference in however indirect a manner, is considered to be a struggle for recognition.³⁴

In contrast to the political aspect, there has been little, if any, discussion of the potential theological aspect of recognition as an ethical norm. With very few exceptions, recent discussion about Hegel and theology and recent discussion about Hegel and politics have not had any obvious points of contact. One interesting exception is Andrew Shank's recent *Hegel's Political Theology*.³⁵ Shanks makes an argument about conscience in Hegel that links together recognition in our moral lives with a theological concept of conscience. This is particularly interesting with regard to the concept of forgiveness. The argument runs as follows: the concept of conscience in Hegel resembles the Honest Consciousness, in allowing or requiring each individual the power to 'decide what is for them *die Sache selbst*'.³⁶ *Die Sache selbst*, in conscience, is for the first time a subject, the project of the Honest Consciousness for the first time becoming a general project, a lifelong commitment to be true to one's own projects. This, Shanks notes, is in one sense inherently and obviously problematic. Adhering to the principle of radical conscience places the responsibility for ethical rules entirely with the individual moral agent, away from any kind of independently observable

principles.³⁷ These principles are particularly important, as our everyday moral dealings with others (social harmony, as Shanks calls it) are based on a mutual recognition of each other's moral integrity. If we are each to determine our own moral rules, how can the principles with others lead their lives by have any standing in our own minds as examples of moral integrity?

Here, the theological and the political might meet, to useful effect. We can translate this kind of dilemma quite directly into the current public sphere in the background of a general principle of subjecthood and objecthood as discussed in the Introduction to this work.³⁸ Social harmony and the running of our everyday moral lives depend upon the recognition of other's moral decision-making principles. One is a moral subject in that one determines for oneself the ethical principles one lives one's life by, but a moral object in the sense that these principles will be drawn from moral sources external to the self. Most obviously, these will be theologically and religiously-based moral sources. The question Shanks, in relation to Hegel, is posing, is the following: how can we live our lives in the right kind moral recognition of each other when our own moral principles cannot be heteronomically determined (we are moral subjects), but we have to recognise the validity in some sense of other's autonomously determined moral principles in order to interact with them in the moral sphere (we are moral objects)? This is a problem in itself, but is more so depending on the objective and subjective basis of our own and the Other's moral principles. Moral principles can be autonomously determined but still make extensive use of heteronomous moral sources, most obviously religious texts. How do we place ourselves in relation to these moral sources when we do not accept their important ourselves?

This is a relevant question beyond the moral sphere, of course, and not a specifically religious question. It has other ramifications in the theological sphere. If recognition is fundamentally about treating oneself and the other as subject and object simultaneously, one's own philosophical worldview will be relevant. If one person in the pair of interlocutors is a fairly radical sort of Berkeleyan subjective idealist, believing that everything exists only in the mind of God, this will naturally affect the extent to which it is possible for them to see oneself and the Other as subject and object simultaneously. There is a fundamentally different concept of subjecthood and objecthood at work here. Need this be a barrier to recognition and the sort of interaction we are discussing here? Again, the question of private discussion versus action comes into play, as Shanks notes. It is one thing accepting in private others' differing motivations, agreeing to disagree and referring, perhaps, to some overarching meta-principle, moral or otherwise, which both parties see as a moral or epistemic source. When action comes into play, however, 'mutual respect for the dictates of one's conscience', as Shanks puts it, becomes a necessary prelude for both social harmony and recognition. Agreeing to disagree is sometimes simply impossible, whether one is aiming at recognition or not.

There is a key connection here to the concept of forgiveness. Agreeing to forgive is not the same as accepting someone's moral principle as valid for oneself – indeed, the very idea of forgiveness requires that one perform whichever action or adopt whichever attitude forgiveness demands despite the fact that the perceived offender has acted against one's own – and likely her own – moral code. However, it might indeed be part of forgiveness, or a precondition for forgiveness in some circumstances, to understand the motivation behind a person's offence, even when they now show remorse for this offence. One might think, for example, of a terrorist who shows remorse for some terrorist act whilst holding fast to the political principles that motivated the action. Charles Griswold discusses the case of Jo Berry, whose father, Sir Anthony Berry, was killed in the IRA 1984 Brighton hotel bombing of the Conservative party conference. The bomber, Patrick Madigan, holds precisely this stance, and Griswold discusses the extent to which Jo Berry can be said to forgive her father's killer.³⁹ Forgiveness would be made more, not less difficult if the potential forgiver believed that the candidate for forgiveness were not acting autonomously, but had been blindly following some kind of heteronomous moral source without incorporating any of his own autonomous reason. In the terrorist example, the terrorist has used a heteronomous moral source, but has freely chosen to follow this movement. In asking for forgiveness, or accepting the same, he does not behave as if it were not him, the autonomous moral agent, who committed the offence. He accepts himself as an autonomous moral agent, stands firm to a greater or lesser extent to his heteronomous moral source, but accepts that he made the wrong choice in his course of action. This is the basis on which the forgiveness is offered. If the terrorist had been completely brainwashed, it would not seem to be appropriate to offer forgiveness, as the person would not stand in the right sort of relation to the offence.⁴⁰ Forgiveness requires a recognition of the other's moral autonomy.

An obvious Christian or theist objection to the very concept of recognition as a moral principle focuses on the extent to which it is content-free. Where Hegel and theology meet, the theist often rejects the Hegelian dialectical narrative ending with freedom in the recognition of each other's autonomy as (in the mildest form of the objection) offering insufficient protection against 'history resuming its sinister inventiveness'.⁴¹ A positive account of recognition, so the argument might go, replaces moral content from religious sources with contentless structures intended to ensure moral treatment of each other, but which will not necessarily do so.

I discuss the idea of the content and structure of moral accounts of the world in more detail in Chapter Five, but just a couple of remarks here in the specifically theological context.⁴² There is a clear connection between this point and the heteronomous/autonomous distinction discussed above. Positive recognition in action in our moral lives does not, as this discussion shows, prevent or even discourage the use of heteronomous moral sources for the making of

autonomous moral decisions. Moreover, far from preventing moral interaction between agents using different moral sources and with different worldviews, it might make such interaction easier and more meaningful. This does not address the theist objection in its entirety. The classical theist would, perhaps, not merely want it to be *possible* for a moral agent to use heteronomous moral sources such as holy works or the laws of a religion in her moral decision-making, but would want such moral sources to be at the very heart of the believer's moral life.

This point is reflected in the general objection to a secular account of forgiveness. It has been argued even by those fundamentally sympathetic to Hegel's political philosophy, such as Milbank, that forgiveness comes only from God, or at least that a truly secular account of forgiveness is impossible, as reconciliation is only possible through God.⁴³ Sketching out a secular account of forgiveness therefore will always remain what Milbank calls 'negative' forgiveness, and fundamentally lacking. A negative account of forgiveness cannot account for what Milbank calls the 'aporia' of forgiveness. One such aporia is how forgiveness might be obtained when no victims can be found, either because none survive or because they cannot be found to take part in what, in Chapter Five, I call a 'confrontation'.⁴⁴ I discuss this kind of case in Chapter Five, and agree that this cannot be forgiveness as an example of positive recognition, just as the converse case, a potential forgiver for an offence whose perpetrator is dead or unknown, cannot be. This particular objection of Milbank's need not worry someone concerned, as I am, with forgiveness as an ethical model of positive recognition rather than an exhaustive taxonomy of types of forgiveness. The charge of 'negative' forgiveness is, however, a more fundamental one. According to Milbank, secular forgiveness is concerned purely with erasing the offence, of making it so that it had never taken place. He refers to the Latin and Greek words for forgiveness, *ignoscere* and *aphesis* respectively, which in turn mean 'not-knowing' and 'letting go', in order to emphasise that forgiveness is a concept which develops only in the Christian world, and as a direct consequence of the God-man, Christ incarnate, taking up his place as the forgiver of man.⁴⁵ For the argument about Christianity as the only possible context for forgiveness to occur to hold weight, one must also consider post-classical non-Christian contexts, particularly monotheistic ones. Judaism and Islam provide the most obvious points of comparison here. Whilst the three Abrahamic religions all regard forgiveness as a virtuous act, and the seeking of forgiveness as an obligation in some respects, all three have entirely different understandings of what forgiveness is and its place in moral life.

Forgiveness in Monotheism

The Muslim concept of forgiveness could be characterised as negative, in that forgiving is seen as God's veiling sins, hiding them and making them disappear. It is different, however, from the classical view of forgiveness (or absence of such), in

that the offence is acknowledged, not ignored. One of the names of God is 'the all-forgiving'. There is a divine process of forgiveness, even if it cannot be regarded as true reconciliation. One of the two main words that might be translated as 'forgiveness', *ghufrān*, refers primarily to this idea of God as forgiver, although it can also refer to man's forgiveness.⁴⁶ This shows that forgiveness in this sense is essentially a divine process. However, there is another concept, *ʿafw* or *tauba*, which, whilst it conceives of forgiveness as annulment or wiping the slate clean, places emphasis on repentance. Islam is prescriptive about the details of repentance, specifically stating that the offender should feel shame for his actions.⁴⁷ In this respect, the concept of forgiveness in Islam is not merely a negative one. Far from stating that the offence should disappear without a trace, Islam requires a certain emotional attitude on the part of the candidate for forgiveness.

Judaism is another clear example of a modern monotheistic context for forgiveness, divine and otherwise. Forgiveness in Judaism requires confrontation, and particularly requires that the candidate for forgiveness asks for that forgiveness. There is a religious requirement to forgive, and to seek forgiveness. In this sense, there is a clearer basis for forgiveness in Judaism than there is in Christianity, which does not lay down an absolute obligation to forgive in such codified terms. Jesus speaks of forgiveness in the Sermon on the Mount, often using the term 'mercy', and it is made clear that forgiveness is morally praiseworthy, something to be bestowed without restriction. However, there is no *absolute requirement* to forgive, no categorical imperative that forgiveness must be bestowed when a certain requirement is fulfilled. For example, in Judaism, someone who sincerely apologises for an offence three times, and, where relevant, attempts to rectify the wrong, is entitled to forgiveness. Also important to consider is the relationship of forgiver to forgiven (or candidate for forgiveness to potential forgiver) in Judaism and Christianity. In Judaism, it is made explicit that forgiveness is to be sought directly from those who have been wronged. God may forgive only those wrongs done to God, and, whilst the penitent may seek forgiveness for religious transgressions, an active confrontation must be sought by the candidate for forgiveness from the potential forgiver, who in these cases must be the one to whom harm has been done. Thus 'proxy' forgiveness, as discussed at some length in Chapter Five, is impossible, as is forgiveness in cases like those mentioned above, where the candidate for forgiveness or potential forgiver is dead.⁴⁸

In Christianity, there is a greater prominence of God as forgiver, and as necessary mediator of forgiveness between wrongs done by man to man. Judaism takes the confrontation element of forgiveness and places it in the centre of the concept, which relates clearly to everyday moral lives. The emphasis, in Judaism, is on action rather than simply on feeling. The word 'sincere' in the term 'sincere apology' is doing a lot of work, but even that cannot produce a full account of repentance, or anything like it. Under the obligations placed on the potential

forgiver, it is for them to assess whether the candidate for forgiveness' apology is sincere. Is it perhaps possible that a candidate could apologise sincerely without repenting? The Jewish account of forgiveness clearly lacks a developed account of the emotional life that goes along with having offended or being offended against (or, more correctly, does not see this emotional aspect as being crucial to the account of forgiveness).⁴⁹

All in all, the argument that forgiveness is possible only in a Christian context appears to beg the question against both a secular model as outlined in parts of this work, a Muslim model casting God as the merciful bestower of forgiveness but with an important emphasis on the emotional attitude of the offender, and a Jewish confrontation – and action-based account. All three accounts seem far more developed and in keeping with our everyday moral experiences than the simple 'ignoscere' or unknowing classical account. This is not to say that the key to a full account of forgiveness does not have a Christological core, but some further work would be needed to establish the role of the Incarnation. What Milbank's account does do is to sketch out the extremely useful concepts of 'positive' and 'negative' forgiveness, which map on well to the use of 'positive' in the way I am using the term 'positive recognition'. Indeed, the way that 'positive' is being used here stretches right back to Isaiah Berlin's use of positive and negative freedom.⁵⁰ The idea is that, just as positive freedom is a freedom that is enabled and brought to flourishing, rather than just a particular space in which the individual is free from interference, and just as positive forgiveness requires active confrontation and engagement between the potential forgiver and the candidate for forgiveness, positive recognition is not just a way for two autonomous moral beings to co-exist, but a way for them to interact together in such a way as to grow as moral agents and *increase* their effective autonomy.

The fundamental objection the theist might have to positive recognition as an ethical concept is that it is an entirely secular model. (Of course, some theists might be perfectly happy with a secular ethical model as long as it allows sufficient respect for a personal, theologically-determined moral code – but Milbank's objection shows that many would be dissatisfied with this). Any ethical model without content will be secular by definition, but, as I hope to show in this chapter, positive recognition offers more space and consideration for theologically-driven moral principles than most secular accounts of ethics.

Mediation and Reconciliation

Part of the key to the theological aspect of recognition is an understanding of what, in general, mediation by God might consist in. What is mediated, and how does this process work? How might it be integrated into our ethical lives? One version of a Christian account of forgiveness insists that God is the necessary mediator of forgiveness, as he is of human interaction in general. This could

be a theological, or more generally metaphysical point, or it could be a more straightforwardly moral point. On one version, humans can ask each other to refrain from resentment or sanction because of some wrong that has been committed, but only God can truly grant forgiveness. This might be the case with some versions of the Muslim view of forgiveness. At this point, the question approaches one of semantics. On any account of forgiveness that originates from an Abrahamic theological point of view, the individual has to answer before God for the sins committed. Asking another person for forgiveness will not fulfil the offender's religious obligations in and of itself, although it might, as in the Jewish account of forgiveness, be a necessary step. The idea that God is necessary for reconciliation is quite a similar one, though with more metaphysical than purely theological roots. If we can come to a better understanding with each other with the help of forgiveness asked for and granted, the idea that true reconciliation is greater, and something that can be achieved only through divine intervention, will have its ultimate origin in a metaphysics that proposes some kind of metaphysical unity. What is at stake here is not the theological or religious question of the forgiveness of sins, but of the fundamental ontological roots of human interaction. It is with this latter question that I am concerned, and the concept of mediation gives us an insight into it.

Something that falls between a purely moral and a fundamentally ontological account of forgiveness would be a reference to the general framework of separation, togetherness and alienation that underpins the German Idealist account of reconciliation. The general argument runs as follows: by being separated from the unity of which he is part, that is, by insisting on his separation, man becomes alienated from himself. In order to become reconciled to himself, he must also become reconciled with that metaphysical unity of which he is a part, that is, on the theistic account, God. In the Other, the self becomes the self once more.

What is the relationship between this kind of reconciliation and the kind of reconciliation that occurs when forgiveness is sought and granted? In both cases, a conflict of sorts is resolved. In reconciliation to oneself, it is the desire to be Other (the desire to be purely object) and the desire to be self (the desire to be purely subject) that is resolved (for Hegel, sublated). In the resolution of tragic conflict, the reconciliation comes with the death/obliteration of whoever has come in the crossfire between the two dominant forces (in Sophocles' *Antigone*, as discussed in the next chapter, it is Antigone herself who fulfils this role). In the reconciliation that comes along with forgiveness sought and granted, the picture seems a little more complex. Both the forgiver and the forgiven have arranged themselves in some way in relation to the offence (for a fuller discussion of this, see Chapter Five). They do not, however, obliterate the offence; this would be a negative form of forgiveness in Milbank's sense. The offence stands, and both forgiver and forgiven are changed by it, remade and broken, in the

sense of *metanoia*. They are reconciled to each other, and to the offence. Just as with the reconciliation that comes with the confrontation with the Other, things do not return to how they were before the confrontation, but move to a new, changed state. This is at least partly because of the proximity in which the subject and object, forgiver and forgiven, stand to each other.

A view like Milbank's is useful to the general sort of account of interaction I am proposing as it reinforces the idea that forgiveness, understood along with its theological dimension, requires confrontation, understood in quite an extended sense to include any kind of interaction, including correspondence.⁵¹ Whilst it would obviously be a serious problem for any truly secular account of forgiveness if God were necessary to mediate forgiveness, the importance of confrontation is something that can function entirely outside the theological sphere. The question remains, then, as to whether recognition and forgiveness need to be mediated – there do not seem to be any other obvious candidates for who or what would mediate the interaction, unless one wanted to argue for a non-divine phenomenon similar to Hegelian Spirit. Thus, the two main options for the mediation of interaction or unity/reconciliation are a divine monological entity, or no mediation at all. I take up the idea of a divine monological entity in the next chapter.

From the preceding sections, then, we can claim the following. Hegelian intersubjectivity, and the kind of intersubjectivity necessary in order to account for, and provide the background for, positive recognition, can be described in the terms of epistemology, ontology (in senses (a) (b) and (c) as discussed in the Introduction) and practical philosophy. The framework required for this intersubjectivity involves a particular understanding of self-consciousness, but also a wider framework of ontology in sense (c). As mentioned at a number of points so far, a lot of the arguments in favour of the view of the self I am putting forward here are transcendental arguments that take as their starting point the way we actually do interact with each other. The political concerns mentioned at the start of this section are therefore key, even if what we wish to end up with is a fully ontologically-rooted account. It is to monistic ontology that I move on to in the next chapter.

3 INTERSUBJECTIVITY, MONISTIC ONTOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL WORLD

This chapter explores the relationship between a monistic ontology and a genuine intersubjectivity. What would the latter look like in practice, and what are the ethical corollaries? To what extent is the former required for the latter? If the former is hard to accept, for ontological, ethical or other reasons, what are the consequences for the latter? In this context, I discuss Levinas and the idea of ethics as first philosophy. I start by exploring different types of intersubjectivity, such as intersubjective cognition, intersubjective consciousness, intersubjective desire, intersubjective action and intersubjective rationality, considering, in the background of the discussion so far, which type most closely accords to the questions about the social world and its metaphysical framework/ontological underpinnings with which I am concerned. I conclude that it is intersubjective action that provides the most useful field for enquiry.

I then move on to consider the ground of intersubjectivity, the main question being whether, for Hegel or for us, genuine intersubjectivity requires an underlying monistic ontology, with an attendant monological conception of the divine. I then discuss whether, if it does, this is a particular problem, for ontological, metaphysical or practical reasons. I discuss some prominent criticisms of Hegelian intersubjectivity (e.g. from Michael Theunissen, Axel Honneth and Jürgen Habermas) which are critical of ontological monism, stating that it cannot found genuine sociality or intersubjectivity, and defend Hegel against such criticisms. I argue that a monistic ontology is necessary to ground the ethical norms under discussion in this monograph, but that this does not mean that genuine intersubjectivity is impossible – indeed, the opposite is true. A monistic ontology is necessary to ground genuine sociality.

Monistic Ontology and Ethics as First Philosophy

A major thread running through this work is the idea of theoretical philosophy being guided by practical philosophy. What are the philosophical and practical implications of accepting this as a legitimate approach? This question, as I have

suggested in the Introduction, is impossible to answer without knowing what it is aiming at, or who or what could legitimise such an approach. These topics fall squarely into the realms of meta-philosophy, and outside the scope of this work. However, that is not all we can say, and there are certainly ways to examine the relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy that do not verge into purely meta-philosophical and questions about the purpose and limits of philosophy.

There is obviously a difference between accepting that we might be able to change the way we frame questions in theoretical philosophy to take account of issues in practical philosophy, and a thoroughgoing concept of ethics as first philosophy. A range of intermediate positions are also possible. An extra dimension is added when one considers how present the Other is for Levinas, but just as much for Hegel. Not only is one only free in the Other (as is the case for both philosophers), in a sense the human subject exists only as social being. As Bernhard Waldenfels puts it:

We are not only too late to begin by ourselves and to fulfil what Kant calls freedom of spontaneity. We are also too late to remember the command in the way we remember what has been possible for us. What Levinas suggests is a redefinition of freedom in terms of beginning oneself, but beginning elsewhere. Without this redefinition things would only be reversed in such a way that my initiative would be exchanged for that of the other whose otherness would finally be abolished itself in want of a counterpart. The passage [*Otherwise than Being*, p. 142] concludes with a kind of résumé, presenting the face not as something or somebody we can grasp, but as a mere way or mode, i.e. as the other's proximity.¹

What Heidegger would call *Mitsein* is a mode of being; one does not emerge into the world fully formed, but is in one's very being, so in sense (a) of ontology as described in the Introduction, being-with. The other is always there in the same way, we do not encounter it in terms of traditional proximity, but as part of ourselves from the beginning. This ontological (in sense (c) as outlined in the Introduction) picture is the starting-point for Levinas and the motivation behind ethics as first philosophy.

Is Ontology Fundamental?

Levinas' original question in an early essay was quite simply 'Is Ontology Fundamental?'² His target here is Heidegger, who employs the term 'ontology' in senses (a) (b) and (c) as described in the introduction. His target is particularly Heidegger's taking of an understanding *of* being to be an understanding *as* being, which he sees as perpetuating the epistemological assumption of knowledge being the assimilation of difference. One knows the Other by becoming like him, by removing difference. *Contra* Heidegger, Levinas argues that a conceptual knowledge of the Other is impossible; one grasps the other as something beyond direct comprehension. The Other signifies that which transcends one's

grasp. The confrontation with the Other is the confrontation with his face, the part that is seen (a connotation lost in the English 'face', as opposed to, for example, the French *visage* or German *Gesicht*), the part that compels ethically and serves in itself as a prohibition on murder:

The face, it is inviolable; these eyes absolutely without protection, the most naked part of the human body, offer, nevertheless, an absolute resistance to possession, an absolute resistance in which the temptation of murder is inscribed: the temptation of an absolute negation. The Other is the sole being that one can be tempted to kill. This temptation of murder and this impossibility of murder constitute the very vision of the face. To see a face is already to hear: 'Thou shalt not kill.'³

It is not a practical philosophy within an existing theoretical framework which obligates, but the very presence of the Other, who is not understood conceptually. Our primary – in terms of temporal priority – mode of interaction with the Other is not a cognitive one. The face of the Other obligates by itself, and therefore ontology is not fundamental.

Hegel is treated even more harshly than Heidegger by Levinas, on the basis that he prioritises an ontology which takes the focus away from the face of the Other, deepening the rupture between ethics and ontology. However, Levinas acknowledges his own debt to the *Phenomenology* in particular. One particular sticking point, however, is the symmetry of (ethical) relations in Hegel's master-slave dialectic (and generally). For Levinas, the ethical relationship with the Other is *not* primarily symmetrical:

In Levinas the ethical relationship is characterised by asymmetry, where the Other appears to me as from a height, making a demand on me which I can never fulfil. I go out to the Other, but there is no return to self and the asymmetry in favour of the Other is maintained.⁴

Must an ethics which functions as first philosophy be grounded on an ethical asymmetry? There is a link between ethical asymmetry and the absence of a fixed and immutable subject, and the discussion of the broken middle in the Introduction to this work.⁵ On the one hand, there is a vision of autonomous, equal individuals with fixed and immutable moral agency determined in some way by epistemological and metaphysical factors – this would be something like the Kantian picture, or at least a caricature of this picture – as mentioned in the Introduction, the picture is actually somewhat more nuanced.⁶ On the other, there is Levinas' picture of the face which compels ethically all by itself – no understanding of the ontological status of the self or the Other is necessary to hear that ethical call. Thus, the idea of a theoretical framework for practical obligations is redundant. Most crucially of all, a Levinasian recognition of the Other would not involve a conceptual understanding of that Other, and thus there is a clear difference between that and Hegelian recognition. This might well be

insurmountable. However, this does not mean that Levinas is right to say that Hegel's Other is always met as the enemy. This view is likely to have been shaped, as so many other views in 1930s and 1940s France and beyond, by his attendance at Kojève's lectures, and the terms in which Levinas talks throughout his scholarship are of murder and struggle to the death.⁷

As I hope to show in this work, this conclusion is entirely unwarranted. Certainly, it does not follow that an Other encountered intellectually or cognitively and *as Other* must be characterised as enemy, and one encountered in a raw state, as something always already present, is confronted as something close, as a friend. Indeed, on one line of argument friendship is something that it is quite difficult to make room for on Levinas' account, since the Other is so present to the self. This is the repression thesis mentioned in the Introduction and discussed in section 3.iii below, or at least a version of it, following the basic objection that human subjects are insufficiently differentiated from one another to enter into meaningful relationships. Here, it is different in a basic respect from when it is levelled by Theunissen et. al against Hegel – it is Hegel's monistic ontology that is seen as preventing genuine intersubjectivity, whereas in Levinas' account it is the basic ethical, the presence of the other which precedes ontology in sense (a) as described in the Introduction, which might stand in the way of inter-relations. Of course, this might still be regarded as an ontological position in sense (c).⁸

If the Other constitutes part of the self, this certainly gives weight to the repression thesis as detailed below, but at the same time has an important link to Judith Butler and Gillian Rose as discussed in the Introduction. For Judith Butler, the ethical subject is not fixed, autonomous and somehow immutable, and for Gillian Rose, touching clearly on a Levinasian theme, love is always violent – although this violence should not be seen in the overwhelmingly negative sense which it generally is, as it is merely a consequence of the fact that the subjects are constantly being remade. The counterpart of this violence is desire, which, as Derrida notes, works in a very different way in Levinas and in Hegel.⁹ What is desire for Hegel is need for Levinas; the latter has a distinction between desire and need which sees desire as, by definition, impossible to fulfil. For both thinkers, however, it is desire which drives on primordial relations with the Other. For both, everything is in a state of flux in some sense, and it is this which inspires Butler and Rose's engagements with Hegel too.

Butler, Rose, and Levinas are not making the same argument – they do not have the same target in mind – but the concern of each is relations with the Other, and it is possible to use observations from all three thinkers to form a way of looking at the social self and connect this to ethics as first philosophy. Imperfect and in some way incomplete (Rose's broken middle), the self in its relation with the Other is ever-changing and being remade (*metanoia*, Hegelian sublation or *Aufhebung*) and is influenced by the Other and the wider commu-

nity to such an extent that we cannot speak of full autonomy, though there is a clear space for ethical responsibility (Judith Butler's self-narrating subject). This ethical self is not ontologically pre-defined, but forms itself in the encounter or confrontation with the Other, who calls the self to ethical action and to the primary direction not to kill (Levinas).

Asymmetry, Reciprocity and Psychology

Where does this leave positive and/or Hegelian recognition? The mutuality or reciprocity aspect, as Bernasconi points out, presents some problems. Levinas, in *Totality and Infinity*, sketches out a stage of the encounter with the Other where the self fears killing the Other more than being killed *by* the Other.¹⁰ The relation is asymmetrical because it is 'a transcendence of the Other with regard to me which, being infinite, does not have the same signification as my transcendence with regard to him.'¹¹ This is related to the concept of ambiguity, which I discuss in the next chapter – the Other, which one fears killing him, becomes the only subject for the self, making the self purely object. On the other hand, however, it is the self-as-agent and therefore as subject that is being feared by the self, so perhaps this asymmetry could be resolved, or at least there is an important discussion to be had about agency and subjecthood.¹² Whatever the correct interpretation of this, the kind of account Levinas is proposing is difficult from a reciprocity point of view, as well as more generally. If interacting with the other does not, even in a paradigm ethical scenario, involve cognition (that is, any understanding of the other), then it is difficult for re-cognition to occur. Reconciliation is also highly problematic for Levinas, as I discuss in Chapter Five.¹³

The key question for this discussion of priority is whether some idea of ethics preceding ontology, or at least not growing out of a theoretical-philosophical framework but being involved in the development of that framework, is possible without cognition being primarily involved in one's interaction with the Other. There is a clear link here between the discussion in contemporary social ontology between theory-theory (TT) and simulation-theory or metal simulation theory (ST) accounts of human interaction. On the first view, interaction and empathy (or, more generally, psychological competence) involve a theory of mind, or at least a tacit 'folk psychology'; that is, in order to interpret and correctly identify the actions of others, the self must have some kind of cognitive theory of what an other mind is (in the sense of the traditional problem of 'other minds') and how it functions, even at the most basic level. On the second, simulation theory or ST, interaction is process-driven rather than theory-driven – we represent the Other's thought processes by mentally stimulating them, that is, by generating similar states in our own mind.¹⁴ Empathy can be said to exist where the human subject can simulate others' thought processes and beliefs without simply reproducing their own (in simple terms, recreating how a person will feel

and think in a particular situation even if it is not how one would feel and think oneself). Of course, this kind of empathising is equally possible on a TT view where the recreation of others' mental states, beliefs and thought processes is based on a 'folk psychology', but the argument of the simulation theorist is that this is not, in fact, how we encounter the other. Indeed, there is a basis in the natural sciences for the simulation theory, in the so-called 'mirror neurons'.¹⁵

Simulation theory and theory-theory are positions in psychology (or even cognitive neuroscience) and not philosophy, but the debate, which continues, has a great impact on philosophical questions that are being considered here, particularly the question of cognition's involvement in recognition and the phenomena with which I am concerned in Chapters Five and Six, forgiveness and love respectively. It is therefore instructive, not only as a way of bringing such contemporary questions to bear on Hegel's work, but also as a way to understand his position, and that of subsequent thinkers such as Leibniz.

Is what Levinas is proposing some kind of simulation theory? Not really, as his account is not based on psychology, which he would also see as being subordinate to the ethical gaze of the Other. That the relationship with the Other is not cognitive is, however, something these accounts from very different times and backgrounds have in common. Does 'non-cognitive' mean 'non-reciprocal'? If one does not understand the position the Other has for the self, then how can one turn this around and understand the position the self has for the Other? It is possible, however, to maintain that that self encounters the Other primarily or first of all in a non-cognitive sense, but also comes to understand the Other or relate to him cognitively in some way. Indeed, in Hegel's master-slave dialectic, the encounter between the two parties, and indeed recognition, happens before the stage of full self-consciousness. Whilst recognition has to be cognitive (particularly recognition as re-cognition as outlined in the Introduction), the initial encounter with the Other does not have to be – but this does mean that this initial encounter would not in itself be an example of (positive) recognition.

As discussed above, Rose's and Butler's ontological (in sense (c) and often (b)) account of human interaction provides us with an intermediate position between a stereotypical account of strictly autonomous subjects encountering each other in a cognitive sense and basing their ethical practices on reason alone (a kind of caricatured Kantian position) and a Levinasian position of the face itself ethically compelling. These two extremes also represent on the one hand a highly developed theoretical philosophy forming the basis for a practical philosophy, and on the other dispensing with ontology (in sense (a) as described in the Introduction) altogether. This kind of intermediate account involves dispensing with complete autonomy of the self and complete opacity of the self to the self. For something to be happening at the pre-cognitive level in encounters with the Other, then some part of Levinas' account of the Other partly constituting the

self in some way must be the case. The repression thesis looms large in the background. It is to questions of monistic ontology and the repression thesis that I turn at the end of the chapter, but before this discussion takes place, it is necessary to examine more thoroughly what intersubjectivity might mean.

Intersubjectivity of What?

What is meant by the term 'intersubjective'? On this question, critics are far from united. In a 2006 article, Allen Wood defines it as 'our conception of the mentality of others and our awareness of it'.¹⁶ From a sociological perspective, Robert Jansen describes the central question of intersubjectivity as

[T]hat of how interacting subjects, with no ability to see through any eyes but their own, are able to take it for granted that they share reciprocal perspectives with one another – to operate as if it can be assumed that how one experiences the world is, more or less, how others experience it.¹⁷

These definitions are quite similar: they see intersubjectivity as an answer to the problem of other minds, to accept and acknowledge the mentality of others. They are quite explicitly definitions of intersubjective *cognition*, which do not completely describe what is meant by intersubjectivity as found in the work of Hegel and Hegel scholars. The problem of other minds as discussed in analytical philosophy is not a problem as such in the philosophy of Hegel, or indeed the work that has been done on recognition and self-consciousness inspired by Hegel. As Beatrice Longuenesse argues, Hegel is not interested in answering the Kantian question of 'how we know what we know'.¹⁸ Indeed, 'cognition' in general is a difficult term to use as applied to Hegel, since cognition as that word is normally understood is separated quite sharply from what he seems to see as the prior concepts, consciousness and self-consciousness. Cognition alone is not sufficient for self-consciousness and is not a function of it. The question must therefore be asked: if not intersubjective cognition, then intersubjective what?

For this purpose, there are a number of possible answers. The options run as follows. There is the possibility that intersubjectivity in the work of Hegel takes the form of intersubjective action of a particular sort, that genuine intersubjectivity goes beyond the purely cognitive into some kind of action together (or at odds with each other). There is also the proposal that intersubjectivity takes the form of intersubjective consciousness. This particular suggestion would, if developed fully, involve arguing that intersubjectivity is not just a precondition for the possibility of self-consciousness, but that consciousness is always linked in some intersubjective manner to the consciousness of another person. There is, additionally, the possibility that the key phenomenon for intersubjectivity is, in fact, desire rather than cognition, consciousness or action. None of these options, however, capture the sense of intersubjectivity as membership of a group of rational legisla-

tors and constitutors of reality, understood as human reality, that is present in the Kantian account and perhaps also the Hegelian account of rationality. We might initially call this kind of intersubjectivity 'intersubjective rationality', although it might be argued that it is not intersubjectivity proper. We are left, then with five possibilities for intersubjectivity: intersubjective cognition, intersubjective consciousness, intersubjective desire, intersubjective action and intersubjective rationality. These possibilities will be assessed over the course of this chapter.

Types of Intersubjectivity

As well as asking the question 'intersubjectivity of what?', there is also the crucial and related question of where the ground of this intersubjectivity might lie. In his 2005 article, Sebastian Gardner makes some fine and precise distinctions between different types of accounts of intersubjectivity, differentiating six potentially overlapping types by means of three distinctions.¹⁹ The first distinction he makes is between theories

that locate the ground of intersubjective cognition (i) by descent from the level of persons as a whole to the sub-personal level of their elements or component parts (ii) by ascent to a supra-personal level, and (iii) exclusively at the level of whole persons.²⁰

The distinction is then between a kind of internal or sub-personal intersubjectivity, a supra-personal intersubjectivity and a whole-person intersubjectivity. This can be viewed as something of a sliding scale, with the supra-personal intersubjectivity associated with German Idealism on the one hand, and on the other a sub-personal subjectivity most obviously associated with naturalism, pointing to some empirical explanation for intersubjectivity such as neural hard-wiring. The 'whole-person' intersubjectivity is regarded by Gardner as something of a middle position. He associates figures as diverse as Sartre and Wittgenstein with a view of this kind.

The second distinction made by Gardner is between naturalistic accounts of intersubjectivity and those accounts which have a 'non-naturalistic', that is, a 'metaphysical' basis. These distinctions map on to the first differentiation into sub-personal, whole-person and supra-personal accounts of intersubjectivity, with the naturalistic accounts forming a more obvious partnership with the sub-personal accounts. It is certainly quite different to imagine what a naturalistic, supra-personal account of intersubjectivity would look like: that is, how one could argue that an intersubjectivity with its ground in some higher being or reality could have its basis in natural or biological fact rather than some structure of reality represented by the loaded term of 'metaphysics'.

The third distinction Gardner makes is between '(i) theories which construe intersubjective cognition as fundamentally dependent on an empirical causal relation, and (ii) theories which deny that any such relation is fundamental to intersubjective cognition.'²¹ At the opposite end of the spectrum to accounts of

intersubjectivity in German Idealism are the kinds of naturalistic, sub-personal accounts that would naturally rely on some kind of empirical causation for intersubjective cognition. An empirical causal relation would seem to imply a naturalist account of intersubjectivity, which in turn would seem to preclude the possibility of a supra-personal or supra-individual basis for the intersubjectivity. At the same time, it seems that one who expounded a naturalist account of intersubjectivity would not necessarily be committed to grounding this on an empirical *causal* relation (although it would certainly have to be grounded on some natural facts about human beings).

Hegelian and Sartrean Intersubjectivity

It seems clear that Hegel's view of intersubjectivity falls in the space Gardner assigns for it: namely, a supra-personal, non-naturalistic account that is not grounded on empirical causal relations. However, whilst it would not be correct to say that Hegel's account of intersubjectivity is based exclusively on the 'whole-person' level, as Gardner puts it, I will argue that much of what is required for intersubjective relationships do indeed take place on this level. Gardner's argument is that Sartre's account of intersubjective relations in *Being and Nothingness* is closer to the German idealist picture than might initially be thought. My argument is the corollary of this, namely that the German idealist picture of intersubjectivity is in some respects closer to the Sartrean picture than might initially be thought, particularly with respect to this issue of whole-person and supra-personal intersubjectivity.

Before proceeding with this analysis, however, I would like to suggest one respect in which Gardner's analysis might be extended and expanded. The first of these concerns ontology. Gardner's distinction is between naturalist and metaphysical accounts of intersubjectivity. It seems quite clear that Hegel's account is not a naturalist one, although there is certainly room for the kind of 'second nature' that has been discussed by critics like Rudiger Bübner.²² The term 'metaphysical' is always problematic when used in relation to Hegel, and of course it depends entirely on what is meant by the term.²³ The way that Gardner uses the term suggests that he means anything to do with the structure of reality that is not a feature of the natural world. Even to make this distinction, of course, implies a non-naturalist position – there is some part of reality that is not constituted by the natural world. In some senses, it might seem more useful to substitute Horstmann's definition of ontology as 'our reality' (this is something like ontology in sense (a) as described in the Introduction) for the term 'metaphysics'.²⁴ This particular sense of ontology seems to describe well what is meant by the structure of reality aside from the natural world. In this sense, Hegel's account of intersubjectivity can be described as an 'ontological' one, which gives a good basis for discussion of the Theunissen/Honneth argument that Hegel neglects true intersubjectivity.

Another important question, when considering the work of Sartre as it is relevant to the study of Hegel, is related to the question of the ontological primacy of the in-itself over the for-itself.²⁵ These two categories in Sartre's ontology might very roughly map on to the idea of objects and subjects respectively. As Mary Warnock succinctly puts it:

Beings-in-themselves are non-conscious things, which can be said to have essences, which exist independently of any observer and which constitute all the things in the world. Beings-for-themselves are conscious beings whose consciousness renders them entirely different from other things, in their relation both to themselves and to one another, and to those other things.²⁶

Beings-in-themselves are therefore the kind of beings between which intersubjective relationships are possible. It is fundamental to Sartre's system that the relationship which obtains between for-itselfs is a relation of being, not of knowing – in other words, it is an ontological rather than an epistemic relationship. This is part of the reason why Sartre rejects Hegel's account of intersubjectivity:

Thus when idealism asks, 'How can the Other be an object for me?' Hegel while remaining on the same ground as idealism replies: if there is in truth a Me for whom the Other is an object, this is because there is an Other for whom the Me is an object. Knowledge here is still the measure of being, and Hegel does not even conceive of the possibility of a being-for-others which is not finally reducible to a 'being-as-object.'²⁷

As Sebastian Gardner says, cognitive relationships are, for Sartre, only a correlate of a more fundamental ontological relation, which for Sartre means a relationship of being.²⁸ In this sense, we have to include as a possibility that 'intersubjective being' could be an alternative to 'intersubjective cognition' and 'intersubjective action'. This definition of 'ontological' is clearly different from the one suggested by Horstmann which I discuss below, and it will remain to be seen which definition is the most helpful for Hegel's account of intersubjectivity.

Repressed Intersubjectivity and Monistic Ontology

My first aim in this section is to reconsider the historical dialogue between Hegelian and Kantian theoretical and practical philosophy from the perspective of tragic and ethical conflict. There has been a renewed focus in recent years on contrasting the Kantian 'philosophy of the subject' with an intersubjective Hegelian account of human knowledge and experience.²⁹ Critics of Kant argue that Hegel, at least in his earlier Jena writings, provided a genuinely intersubjective account of human experience in a way that Kant never could. Kant's philosophy sets up the autonomous subject against a background of equally autonomous and unconnected subjects or legislators. Experience, particularly shared moral experience, is never truly shared.

In this section, I will explore the difference between an account of public reality that relies on the presence of more than one person/potential ethical authority, and an account which assumes that human experience is intersubjective on more than just a practical level. This difference could be characterised as that between practical and ontological intersubjectivity. To explore whether this difference is truly a coherent and useful one, I will begin with some of Hegel's own remarks about tragic conflict and compare them with an interpretation of an earlier stage of Hegelian consciousness, the master/slave dialectic.

For intersubjectivity, we might conclude, it is necessary that the Other – that person who gives and demands mutual recognition, and the person with whom creative bonds are forged – is relevantly similar to the self. Creon in Sophocles' tragedy might have been a candidate for this, but the universal law and objective spirit are not. It seems important that, if the human world is to be created intersubjectively by mutually recognising subjects, it should be free of the sort of substantial content that the universal law appear to represent. In terms of creating the *ethical* world, Kant's ethics seem to come closer to this ideal than Hegel's in some respects in presenting a categorical imperative without substantial pre-existing ethical content. In Kant's ethics, ethical agents are presented as rational and autonomous agents, without having to struggle for subjecthood (and acknowledge objecthood) in the way that Hegel's beings on the way to self-consciousness must. For this reason, I will examine at this point the sense in which Kant's ethics, and indeed his wider philosophy, might be regarded as intersubjective.

The most obvious way in which an account of moral philosophy (or indeed any philosophy) can be seen as intersubjective is if the living of an ethical life, by which I mean being an ethical agent at all rather than behaving in an ethically commendable manner, presupposes the existence of other ethical agents. Hegel's ethics certainly seem to, as indeed it does not seem possible even to be self-conscious without the presence of another potential recogniser and recognisee. However, this is perhaps rather too quick. Whilst there have been many discussions of the concept of recognition, particularly in the English-speaking world, which have attempted to interpret recognition as an explicitly ethical principle, it is not completely clear whether the connection between self-consciousness (for which recognition is necessary, on some accounts) and ethics is quite so unquestionably clear. If an ethical agent is subject to some conflict which arises within the universal law in objective spirit, it is not clear whether that agent has to be fully self-conscious. However, the focus on ethics in Hegel's work is on the ethical sphere, which is a collection of fully self-conscious ethical agents. Ethics in this sense clearly requires self-consciousness, and the whole concept of the sphere rests on there being more than one member. Whether or not someone could be an ethical or moral agent in some non-Hegelian sense outside of this

ethical life is a further question. We might tentatively conclude, then, that the Hegelian account would not allow someone to be an ethical agent as the only person on a desert island.

Equally, the Kantian account of ethics seems quite straightforwardly to require or presuppose the presence of an Other. This is most clearly expressed in the demand that others should be treated as ends and not merely as means. Moreover, just as with the Hegelian demand for mutual recognition as a precondition for self-consciousness, the ethical life seems to rest upon the idea of relevant similarity. As a moral agent performing some act, and therefore a subject, it is morally necessary to treat the Other at the same time as a subject. With the means/end distinction, Kant is referring to the same kind of subjecthood and objecthood that I have used as a framework for the interpretation of Hegel. Whilst the categorical imperative in some of its formulations could be used by a person alone on a desert island (such as a decision about how to treat the wildlife or natural environment), it is quite difficult to see how any of these could produce ethically meaningful results, or how the use of the calculus would produce qualitatively different results than using, for example, the test on whether one could will a non-ethical principle (if such a thing exists) to become a universal law.

The crucial difference, of course, is that where Kant's ethics require the presence of others whom the ethical agent treats as an end or subject, Hegel's account of self-consciousness and the ethical sphere require their co-operation in according mutual recognition. Moreover, Hegel's account requires the Other to be the right *kind* of other, that is, a fully self-conscious in his particular sense, whereas the Kantian account is only one-way. Hegel's account of the ethical sphere simply does not include any participants that are not self-conscious. One could, in the Hegelian picture, be thwarted in one's attempts to participate in the ethical life purely by the refusal of others to recognise one and thereby let one in. It could be, and indeed has been suggested that this is a problem for the Hegelian account of self-conscious in general and the ethical life in particular, but it seems a fair claim that the players in the ethical sphere are in some practical way more tightly enmeshed in Hegel's philosophy than in the philosophy of Kant.

The discussion of reason adds another dimension to the dialogue between Hegel and Kant about intersubjectivity. Reason in Kant is certainly intersubjective, as his comment in the Doctrine of Method that reason has no dictatorial authority demonstrates – reason, for Kant is constituted by the agreement of free individuals. For this reason, and many others, the view of the Kantian subject as radically autonomous is a misunderstanding. For Hegel, the picture is certainly yet more complex, not least because of the difficulty of ascertaining any kind of temporal order in his famous *Doppelsatz* (the rational is actual, and the actual is rational). Certainly, it would be difficult to argue that the rational is rational for Hegel because it has been designated as such by free, autonomous citizens.

The Repression Thesis – Honneth, Theunissen, Habermas

Michael Theunissen and Axel Honneth, as well as, to a certain extent, Jürgen Habermas, have an ontological (in sense (c)) objection to Hegel's account of intersubjectivity.³⁰ Michael Theunissen argues that intersubjectivity is indeed destroyed in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* at the point at which Hegel transfers self-consciousness from absolute spirit to objective spirit, as this destroys the basis on which the world can be intersubjectively constituted by those who live in it.³¹ If the universal law is not constituted by humans but exists already, this seems to support his argument. Theunissen argues that Hegel casts non-human entities in the role of the Other, particularly the state. In his discussion of tragedy, however, it seems to be the case that Hegel casts the universal law or ethical substance in this role. It is the demands that stem from the already-existing law that objectify, in this specific sense, the ethical actor. Indeed, Theunissen does argue that Hegel starts his analysis of ethical community with ethical substance rather than individuals, as he discusses in paragraph 156 of the *Philosophy of Right*. Ultimately, he claims, Hegel therefore reverts to a monological conception of the will and of subjectivity. His main point is not that Hegel is too individualistic, but too monological.

Axel Honneth has argued in a broadly similar vein in his 1994 work *Struggle for Recognition*.³² He argues that true recognition was only an important topic for the young Hegel of the Jena period, after which the original concept was subsumed into a monological conception of subjectivity. Intersubjectivity, the relationship between self-conscious subjects, is replaced by a concern with the relationships between the self or subject and various externalisations of this self. Honneth suggests that this amounts to no more than an updating of Spinoza's account of the relationship between substance and accidents.

It is Habermas' belief that the concept of recognition provides an alternative to subject-centred reason and a way of escaping the subject/object dichotomy. The key lies in being part of a tradition and solidarity group.³³ This latter group could, perhaps, be identified with Hegel's account of the corporations in the *Philosophy of Right*. This account accords very well with Robert Brandom's later interpretation of Hegelian self-consciousness. If standards are generated by a community of which one is a part, this sublates the subject/object dichotomy and institutes in its place a form of recognition that takes place at the communal level. The self-representation that forms such an important part of self-consciousness becomes then a self-representation to an intersubjective community rather than something which stands genuinely outside the individual. As previously mentioned, however, it is Habermas' view, just as it is the view of Michael Theunissen, that Hegel abandons this commitment to genuine intersubjectivity in favour of a monological concept of self-reflexivity, certainly by the time of the writing of the *Philosophy of Right*, and perhaps by the time of the *Phe-*

nomenology.³⁴ The discussion of ambiguity in Chapter Four of this work might demonstrate that this is not the case, although I do concede that the categories of subject and object are preserved on the interpersonal level.

Honneth develops Habermas's account in a practical direction and suggests that there are three forms of recognition: primary relations such as love and friendship, legal relations and a community of value and solidarity. For him, love, self-confidence and self-esteem are closely linked. Love enables self-confidence, right enables self-respect, and social esteem develops self-esteem. The overall *telos* is clearly mutual recognition. In this way, relations are intersubjectively constituted. However, over the course of the development of Hegel's thought after the Jena period, according to Honneth, Habermas and Theunissen, intersubjective relationships are replaced by relationships between the subject and the self-externalizations of that subject, as Honneth says 'a monologically self-developing Spirit'.³⁵ The fundamental objection, then, is that Hegel moves, in a retrograde fashion, back into the 'philosophy of the subject' which was the basis of so much of his criticism of Kant.

Honneth's criticism of Hegel relies on Theunissen's essay, which in turn focuses almost entirely on the concept of intersubjectivity in the *Philosophy of Right*. According to Theunissen, this concept is present in the text, but suppressed. He describes the role of intersubjectivity thus:

[T]here exists for the Hegel of the *Philosophy of Right* a relation to other individuals that co-constitutes the individual in its existence and sparks the living freedom of the individual for the first time, a relation that is neither banished nor exiled in idylls, but rather that exists only in the underground of the disfigurements of the human beings that his criticism reveals.³⁶

Certainly, when considering Hegel's account of tragedy, the point Honneth and Theunissen make about the Other not being the Other necessary for intersubjectivity and recognition but something else – the state, the universal law, objective spirit, representations of the self – seems valid if there is no unproblematic way to argue that this account would not apply in our modern, Christian world. Honneth's point in particular seems to fit particularly well with Hegel's discussion of tragedy, where there seem to be two selves, one having obeyed one part of the universal law and one having obeyed another, and the failure of the tragic hero to be both of these selves leads to their destruction.

What is required to answer this question with regard to the relations between the self, the Other and institutions, as well as the world in general, is a full explanation of what a monistic ontology would actually look like. It is to this question that I turn in the next section.

Monistic Ontology, Tragedy and Theology

How can a monistic ontology best make a case for itself in the face of the repression thesis, and similar objections raised by Levinas and others? Recall-

ing arguments made in this chapter and elsewhere, there are the following three major objections:

1. (Theunissen, Habermas et al) – a monistic ontology such as that of Hegel means there can be insufficient distance between the subjects to make genuine intersubjectivity possible.
2. (Levinas) – a monistic ontology in fact introduces *too much* distance between the subjects, introducing an unwarranted rupture between the ethical and the ontological by prioritising the ontological.
3. A monistic ontology can only exist if supported by a range of theological theses that are unwarranted. At its heart must be a mysterious divine unity we have no reason to believe exists.

There are more potential objections, but most fall into one of these three categories, broadly speaking. 1 and 2 are diametrically opposed, but 3 might be held in connection with 1 (or, less obviously, in connection with 2). It is interesting to note that the first two are motivated by concerns from practical philosophy and the third with concerns from theoretical philosophy. As I have dealt in some detail with the first two objections, I will now discuss the third in the context of tragic conflict, which, as I argue in Chapter Five, has a particular relevance for forgiveness.³⁷

One practical objection to the view that Hegel argues for an intersubjective reality is the presence in the *Phenomenology* of the discussion of tragic conflict and the human and divine laws. Whilst the master/slave dialectic describes an attempt to struggle for recognition and thereby in some sense approach intersubjectivity, the discussion of tragic conflict in the 'Spirit' section of the same work in which the master/slave dialectic appears to describe a situation in which the possibility of intersubjectivity is denied from the beginning as structurally impossible. It is particularly relevant to the concerns of this chapter because it is, at least on my interpretation, an example of the monological nature of Hegel's philosophy preventing intersubjectivity.³⁸ It is the interplay of the human and the divine laws which makes it impossible for Antigone to act as an intersubjective agent or a moral agent. I also discuss a reply that might be made to such an argument, which focuses on the difference between the Attic Greek and Christian worlds. As part of the examination of this reply, I examine briefly the role played by Hegel's theology in his account of intersubjectivity. This involves referring to Horstmann's discussion of Hegel's monistic ontology.

For Hegel, tragic conflict occurs when there is a clash of two justified ethical authorities. His discussion of tragedy in the *Phenomenology* in paragraphs 469–75 focuses on Sophocles' *Antigone*.³⁹ The eponymous heroine is in a position where she must decide whether to follow the divine law and bury her brother, or the human law represented by her uncle King Creon which prohibits this action. Hegel expresses this conflict as applied to the subject in terms of individuality. The essential law, Hegel claims, is the unity of both the divine and the human laws, and both aspects are present in human action whether or not the actor is

consciously aware of the claims of each authority. Guilt is present in a conscious form in the case of explicit awareness, and an unconscious form in the case of what he terms 'implicit' awareness.⁴⁰ When, in the case of implicit awareness, the actor acts, he must acknowledge the actuality of the opposite act, for the whole of what is ethically right is actual. This has serious consequences for his individuality and the reality of his self:

Thereby, however, the agent surrenders his character and the reality of his self, and has utterly collapsed. His being lies in belonging to his ethical law, as his substance; in acknowledging the opposite law, however, he has ceased to find his substance in this law; and instead of reality this has become an unreality, a mere sentiment, a frame of mind.⁴¹

The conflict, in many ways, is really no conflict at all. The tragedy is that it is impossible for an ethical actor in these pagan times to actualise both elements of what is in fact one universal law. In the context of Hegel's earlier discussion of the master/slave dialectic, the ethical actor has ceased to become a subject, the source of self-consciousness, an autonomous rational agent, but is an object subject to the combination of the law and contingent circumstances.

The possibility of being an ethical agent able to actualise both the human and the divine laws in such a situation depends, for Hegel, on the movement out of pagan times. More specifically, the possibility of *Aufhebung*/sublation of this divide, the essential reality of the identity-in-difference of human and divine laws, depends on the revelation of God in Christ.⁴² This brings us to the concept of mediation by something outside of the ethical actors, which could be conceived as a potential practical problem for any account of intersubjectivity in Hegel which argues for positive, wide-ranging applications of the concepts of self-consciousness, recognition and intersubjectivity.

Hegel's discussion of tragedy in this part of the *Phenomenology* has many interesting points of comparison with the discussion of self-consciousness in the master/slave dialectic of paragraphs 178–96. The master/slave dialectic is also a conflict, a fight not between two aspects of a universal ethical law but a struggle for self-consciousness and subjecthood that can only be achieved through recognition. The master enslaves the slave, treating him only as an object but thereby perversely robbing himself of the opportunity for mutual recognition – only a self-conscious subject can recognise another self-conscious subject. The slave is robbed of the opportunity to be recognised by the master's refusal to recognise him. Again, there is the argument that both aspects of the person's being (here this refers to objecthood and subjecthood) are actual, but both the master and the slave fail to acknowledge one aspect of their being (respectively, object and subject). At the point of the master/slave dialectic, however, we cannot speak of guilt or of tragedy, as full self-consciousness has not been reached. In tragedian terms, the master/slave dialectic is a dumb-show, as neither character has developed the voice they need to participate in the ethical life.

It seems that once the struggle for self-consciousness and mutual recognition has been won, whether or not this takes place at a stage of individual human psychological moral development, it is still possible to be robbed of one's status as a fully autonomous agent and a subject in this context simply by virtue of contingent ethical circumstances. The only way that Antigone could have retained her position as a subject would be for her to have fulfilled or actualised both the human and the divine laws, which in the practical circumstances in which she found herself would have been impossible.

Since Antigone is literally destroyed, the next question which suggests itself is whether the kind of conflict we find in Sophocles' drama is also present in everyday life, and therefore whether the ethical consequences might ever trouble us, particularly those who would reject the existence of a divine law. Could the tragic conflict also be said to be present when a more quotidian clash of responsibilities occurs, such as a long-held promise that conflicts with some crucial last-minute responsibility? It seems clear that the Hegelian picture of the ethical life would not allow for any kind of categorical imperative, let alone a complicated moral calculus to decide whether or not one would will the action to become universal law. The universal law, for Hegel, exists already and there are likely to be circumstances in which we cannot actualise all of it. How serious is, then, the transformation of the ethical subject into an object, as we would say today, a victim of circumstances? It does not seem to inhibit rational autonomy in a practical, Kantian sense, and yet it would seem impossible to be an autonomous object. Is intersubjectivity destroyed? The 'subject' here that is enslaving the ethical actor is the universal law of objective spirit, not an egomaniac master.

The pagan world, then, seems to lack the kinds of structures that would make possible true intersubjectivity, or at least would seem to lead to certain circumstances beyond the control of the individual subject that prevent her from acting as an intersubjective ethical agent. To what extent is this a devastating criticism of Hegel's account? Looked at from one angle, it is no criticism at all. Hegel is not trying to write a prescriptive ethics, and it might very well be the case that not everyone is capable of being a self-conscious agent capable of intersubjective cognition and action. It is a valid question, however, to ask to what extent his account of an intersubjective world, if that is indeed what he provides, reflects our own experience of the world.

Hegel's conception of the role of God, specifically the role of the Christian triune God, in Spirit and therefore intersubjectivity, is essential to any thorough discussion of the significance of the *Antigone*, and therefore of Hegel's view of tragedy in general. Antigone's failure to act as a true intersubjective agent is in the context of the Attic Greek, pre-Christian world. It is therefore important to examine how this differs from the world of the late 2nd (and early 3rd) millennium AD. The question of the relationship between Hegel and Christianity is a rich and wide-ranging one, which unfortunately can receive only the briefest of

discussions here. It is specifically with the role of the Christian God as regards intersubjectivity with which I will be concerned here.

To begin this discussion, it is necessary to return to the basic distinction Hegel makes between three types of spirit – subjective, objective and absolute. As Paul Redding points out, ‘the study of subjective spirit might be seen as roughly equivalent to what we now think of as ‘philosophy of mind.’⁴³ In many ways, this is where intersubjectivity resides – the idea of the self-conscious subject inhabiting a world of rule-governed interactions. This, as Redding states, is where an individual can find recognition. This is where the conditions of self-consciousness can be met. ‘Objective spirit’, then, is where spirit is objectified in these particular realms. In other words, objective spirit is the subject of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. Subjective spirit, of course, pre-supposes objective spirit. The unification of subjective and objective spirit takes place in ‘absolute spirit’. Redding sees absolute spirit as the ‘objectification’ of the products of the cultural practices of art, religion and philosophy, that is, spheres of culture.⁴⁴ This objectification, he claims, gives the products a certain autonomy from the concrete cultures from which they originate. One might think that the opposite is true – that any kind of objectification would root the products of the cultural sphere in the concrete culture – but Redding sees the difference between absolute and subjective spirit as underlining precisely their movement out of a finite, historically-located society. The attempt is to integrate normativity with a naturalistic position, and to hold fast to the idealist commitment to the rationality of norms as they apply to the individual. Redding is of the opinion that Hegel’s success is limited in this respect, although not negligible.

The ultimate conflict, then, is once more between a naturalistic account and one which can be described as ‘metaphysical’ or ‘transcendental’ – one which the norms of human experience are grounded in concrete, everyday reality or in which they are grounded in some monological, non-naturalistic account, perhaps a *supernatural* one. It is at this point that Hegel’s account of Christianity becomes once more particularly important. The incarnation of God in the person of Christ has, as Redding sees it, a parallel in philosophy. Christ coming down to earth brought God into the world. In an analogous manner:

Hegel brings the norms of thought itself into the world where they are objectified in the social life of human communities as a series of finite ‘shapes’ of consciousness and self-consciousness, all destined, like individuals, to appear in the world, have a short existence, and then die off to be replaced by something different.⁴⁵

God, then appears as finite by coming down to earth. The finite, concrete and particular in objective and subjective spirit pass into the infinite universal in absolute spirit, and the coming of Jesus demonstrates the opposite. Rather than the fact that God is or can be affected by finitude undermining the idea of

absolute spirit, it undermines the sceptic or relativist who takes the fact of the finitude of norms in objective or subjective spirit as a license to claim that 'everything is allowed', as Jacobi would put it. The particular connection between the finite and the infinite, objective and subjective spirit on the one hand and absolute spirit on the other, pulls the rug from under the sceptic.

At this point, we can make a tentative connection with the universal and divine laws. In the Attic Greek, pre-Christian world, there was no conception of God as finite in the way accepted by today's monotheistic religions. The relationship between the finite and the infinite therefore had an entirely different character for the inhabitants of that world. The concept of absolute spirit therefore applies in an entirely different way. In the pagan world, as Jagentowicz-Mills writes, 'conflict is always 'resolved' on one side or another, but the two laws are inextricably bound up with each other such that the fulfilment of one calls forth the other's revenge.'⁴⁶ The two laws, divine and human, have their source in subjective and objective spirit respectively. It is only in absolute spirit that they can be *aufgehoben*.

For my analysis of self-consciousness and recognition, developed fully in Chapter Four, this has the following consequences. Antigone cannot be a truly self-conscious intersubjective agent because she can only ever be an object as regards whichever law she is transgressing, which in this case is the human law with its root in objective spirit. We could also make the a similar claim about Creon, who is a subject with regards to this human law when he makes the pronouncement that anyone found burying the body of Polynices will be sentenced to death. Later in the play, after the point of anagnorisis, he is an object with regard to the law, but this time it is the divine law.⁴⁷ There is no possibility for either of the characters to be both a subject and an object with regard to this law. Only the unity of the divine and human laws in absolute spirit can offer this possibility of ambiguity between objecthood and subjecthood. There is no possibility of recognition between Antigone and her uncle, no possibility of genuine intersubjective action with each individual treating themselves and the other as subjects and objects simultaneously.

In practical terms, it remains to explain this analysis with regard to history as well as our modern world. Whilst we can conclude from Hegel's analysis of Greek tragedy that absolute spirit is crucial to the possibility of intersubjectivity, it remains to be seen what practical consequences for his account this will have. Does the possibility of intersubjective action rely on all relevant parties' acceptance of the triune nature of God, or at least some interpretation of the person of Christ as having a human as well as a divine nature? This does not seem to be the case, as an awareness and acceptance of absolute spirit is presumably not required simply in order to abide by a law that is objectified in it. More central is the following question – is the possibility of law in absolute spirit something that relies on the (prospectively) intersubjective action taking place after the

historical point at which God sent his son, and himself in human form, to the earth? This would equally seem problematic, as it is surely the case that absolute spirit existed before this historical time. There would also be a theological question about the triune nature of God and change throughout time.

Relevant to these considerations is the fact of Hegel's advocacy of religious pluralism and strong stance against religious fundamentalism.⁴⁸ If it were the case that true intersubjectivity could only be realised within one specific religious community, such statements as the following would be more than a little puzzling:

Those who 'seek the Lord' and assure themselves, in their uneducated opinion, that they possess everything immediately instead of undertaking the work of raising their subjectivity to the cognition of truth and knowledge of objective right and duty, can produce nothing but folly, outrage and the destruction of all ethical relations.⁴⁹

The only way to begin to answer these questions is through an examination of Hegel's theology and his views on Christian philosophy specifically. As Christopher Irwin points out, there has been a strong tendency to see Hegel as a secularist in the mould of Marx or Feuerbach.⁵⁰ Such a view might amount to a view of God that is anthropomorphic in a particular sense, seeing God as a creation of man or, at the very least, a canvas for projection of real or imagined human qualities. At its least atheistic end, such a position would embrace the view (Irwin interprets it as an Enlightenment view) of God as subject to the limits of human thought. Irwin correctly rejects this view of Hegel as a 'prophet of secular humanism', whereby the human subsumes the divine.⁵¹

At the same time, of course, there is the opposing view which sees the divine as swallowing up the human in a kind of monological divine conception that could be seen as pantheism. Hegel's statements about God as the ultimate origin and end of philosophy could be seen as evidence for such a view. Irwin sees Hegel as steering a path between these two courses in the form of a dialectical reading. If this view is convincing, it will have important consequences for any view of intersubjectivity in Hegel's work.

One of the most important questions to be answered concerns the precise relationship of God and human beings. Whilst Hegel does argue for religious pluralism, he also thinks that the Christian religion uniquely allows this philosophy to reach the truth of its content in conceptual form. There is therefore a particular relationship in the case of Christianity between that faith and philosophy in terms of shared concepts and mutual conceptual enlightenment. The price of this, as Irwin points out, is that heresy is risked if doubt is thrown on the idea that God might exist outside of this field of philosophical discourse.

The term 'pantheism' is of course a fairly loaded one, in theology as well as the philosophy of religion. In this short section, I will examine whether a monological divine conception as explored by Irwin can be described as a pantheistic one, and, if

not, what the crucial differences are between this and a monological divine conception that might be said to apply to the work of Hegel. In this way, I hope to clarify precisely what a monological divine conception might mean for Hegel and for us.

Pantheism is defined by Eric Steinhart in the following way: 'A *pantheist* claims that (1) all existing things are unified; and (2) the maximally-inclusive unity is divine'. He points to recent work by MacIntyre, Levine and Oppy as examples of scholars who accept this definition. Levine describes pantheism as 'the belief in one God, a God identical to the all-inclusive unity, but [the pantheist] does not believe God is a person or anything like a person.'⁵² In this way, the two end of the human/divine spectrum identified by Irwin are preserved.

Much of the discussion about whether a certain conception is pantheism will hinge on what is meant by 'unity'. Levine says that some unities from the history of philosophy are in fact merely 'formal' unities, giving, amongst others, the example of Spirit in Hegel and the One in Plotinus as examples of those unities which are not formal in this sense.⁵³ A formal unity, for Steinhart, is something like a heap of sand, as opposed to the non-formal unity that might be represented by an organism or mind. He seems to agree with Levine that the kind of monism represented by Hegel and the neo-Platonists is indeed non-formal unity, as opposed to a part-whole or class-member unity which could be described as 'formal'. The kind of views of unity held by Hegel or Plotinus are seen by him as 'relics of seventeenth- and nineteenth-century monisms and idealisms.'⁵⁴ He says that no-one could seriously argue that reality is an organism or something like mind, and therefore he argues for the opposite view, which he claims is scientifically more coherent.

However, Steinhart is wrong to reduce the various options as concern unity in this sense. The kind of unity which is present in Hegel's system is not the same kind of unity as would be found in a part-whole or member-class sense, certainly not in the way that might be represented by a heap of sand. This would not be a monological kind of unity, or really any unity at all. When the main part of the discussion concerns intersubjectivity, the example of sand is particularly pertinent. We might imagine the individual human subjects as grains of sand in this system. For intersubjectivity in the sense that Hegel demands, humans would have to be more unified than such grains of sand. In this sense, it is incorrect to refer to Spirit as 'formal' unity.

Considering the world as a heap of sand certainly disarms the charge of pantheism, but at too great a cost to someone who wants to argue for a genuine conception of intersubjectivity in the work of Hegel. To argue that this particular monological account is not pantheistic, it is the 'divine' part of 'monological divine conception' that needs to be examined rather than the particular kind of unity involved in the 'monological' aspect. Whilst arguing for a non-pantheistic account of the monological divine conception initially seems more difficult in, for example, Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion* where, as J.A. Leighton succinctly

puts it, 'God appears as spirit, and nature is his self-externalization',⁵⁵ it is less difficult in the *Logic*, where the existence of categories can determine (*bestimmen*) the bare assertion of the unity as God.⁵⁶ In the *Phenomenology*, it is less difficult again. Using Pippin and Hartmann's conception of what they call Hegel's 'metaphysics', it becomes possible to give the 'divine' a meaning that will not lead to pantheism.⁵⁷ What Hegel's monism consists in, for exponents of this 'non-metaphysical' view, is not a quasi-divine intelligence or mysterious supernatural entity, but self-grounding reason which man is a part of just as much as God. To explain the basis of this conception, one must go even further back than the *fin de siècle* time of J.A. Leighton's Hegel scholarship, to Meister Eckhardt, whom Hegel quotes with great approval in the *Philosophy of Religion*:

The eye with which God sees me is the eye with which I see Him; His eye and my eye are one. In righteousness I am weighed in God, and He in me. If God did not exist, nor would I; if I did not exist, nor would He.⁵⁸

Given this analysis of the nature of God and his role in the world, it is impossible to talk about the human being subsumed into the divine, for Spirit is, as J.A. Leighton asserts, the meeting point of God and man.⁵⁹ Both are equally essential to Spirit, and to self-grounding reason. For this reason, Hegel's monological divine conception cannot be interpreted as a pantheistic account any more than it could be as a pananthropic one, and the divine does not subsume the human any more than the human subsumes the divine.

Monistic Ontology as a Response to the Repression Thesis

The above does not answer the question of whether the monistic ontology, would crumble without the divine element, and if this kind of dependence is problematic – monistic ontology as outlined by Hegel might be theologically acceptable, but is it philosophically so? There certainly could be a monistic ontology without God; there is no logical problem with this. It seems clear that, for Hegel, the monistic ontology is grounded in theological premises: this can be seen from the discussion in the previous section. That does not mean, however, that it must always be thus and that there could not be an atheistic monist ontology. Rolf-Peter Horstmann argues the following:

Monism has almost no common sense basis and there is an inclination to think of it as an irrational option mainly because it is so close to theological speculations.⁶⁰

This certainly sums up a popular view. Horstmann presents monistic ontology in quite a different way, with his starting point being a transcendental argument itself:

[O]ntology, as I understand it, is a derivative discipline: it tells us what we have to accept as the structure of reality if we want to make sense of our most basic beliefs (e.g., that our

world contains individual objects that are spatio-temporally related), experiences (e.g. that there are other persons around) and attitudes (e.g., that we care about our lives). Now, with respect to ontological theory itself, two major options seem to be available. Either one can maintain that what our epistemic and non-epistemic practices suggest is that we have to endorse a pluralistic view of reality; or one can claim that, in order to make sense of these very practices one has to favor a monistic conception.⁶¹

The latter approach is the argument for monism, and it is based in an understanding of ontology that accords with senses (b) and (c) as described in the Introduction of this work. The way in which we interact with the world and its other inhabitants can, on one line of argument, form the basis of an argument for a monistic ontology. As I try to show here and in the next chapter, it is the interaction with the world's other inhabitants that most convincingly points us towards monistic ontology. In order to examine this claim, a good approach is to examine what Horstmann sets up as the opposing position to monism, namely, pluralism. He does not define this as such, but it refers to the thesis that there is more than one entity in the world that is fundamental, that entities (people, objects, events, facts and so on) are fundamentally separate and can be unified in the understanding in a theoretical-philosophical framework. For one approach that Horstmann outlines, this is the wrong approach from an ontological point of view in sense (c) as described in the introduction (he terms this metaphysical, but in my terminology this stands outside metaphysics).

Horstmann defines Hegelian monistic ontology as follows:

The entirety of actuality must be seen as a single all-comprehending, self-developing rational entity, which achieves knowledge of itself in a spatio-temporal process of realizing its distinctive conceptual determinations. More precisely, this thesis claims that we must not view the entirety of actuality, understood as a totality, as constituted through the multitude of its elements – i.e. of all objects, facts and events – or as an additive collective unity. Rather, we have to think of this actual totality as a whole that is prior to its elements. The elements must be comprehended as products in a process of internal differentiation of that totality.⁶²

He describes this as an obscure formulation, but in fact it is quite clear and lucid, particularly in the context of my aims in this work. Knowledge of the Other *is* knowledge of the self, and reality is fundamentally a unified entity which can subsequently be understood as being made up of different parts, not a sum of observable parts which can then be put together into a theoretical-philosophical framework. This monism not only overcomes pluralism, but dualism of appearance and reality, which is closely linked (and also often, confusingly for this discussion, termed 'monism'). A view such as the Kantian one, which has a separation between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, the world of appearances and reality, is a kind of pluralist understanding of reality. The world of appearances, according to such a view, shows us entities separately and then fits them

into a theoretical framework of corresponding to things-in-themselves, reality as it is aside from experience. Where there is no distinction between appearances and reality, there is only one entity, and no entities are needed to ground other entities (there are no fundamental and less-fundamental entities).

On a picture where the human subject has immediate access to reality as it is, there would be an important question to answer about finite and infinite entities, as it would not be possible in this non-dualist picture for finite, observable entities to be simply reflections of a fundamental infinity. In other words, a non-dualist (where the dualism is between appearance and reality), pluralist picture is inherently deeply problematic. A non-pluralist, dualist account also has serious problems: if there is fundamentally one entity, why would there be a gap between appearance and reality? Why would it not be the sort of thing to which we can have direct access? Asking the question in this latter way makes it clear that this kind of dualism is an ontological (in sense (c)), rather than an epistemological argument.

As Horstmann puts it, the starting-point is the following:

Hegel's basic metaphysical idea [is] that only a monistic theory of actuality, i.e. a monistic ontology, is in a position to deliver a consistent total world view that neither takes off from indemonstrable assumptions nor leads in the end to unacceptable reductionist consequences.⁶³

This should be considered in combination with the following ontological positions:

Dualist pluralism (DP) – there are several entities that are fundamental, and they are not the kinds of things that we can access directly through experience

Non-dualist pluralism (NDP) – there are several entities that are fundamental, and they are the sorts of things that we can access directly through experience

Dualist monism (DM) – there is only one fundamental entity, but it is not the sort of thing we can access directly through experience

Non-dualist monism (NDM) – there is only one fundamental entity, and we can access it directly through experience

I am taking NDM to be Hegel's position (and the one I am arguing for). DP starts from unwarranted assumptions inherent in a theoretical framework that decides which entities are fundamental (as mentioned above). NDP has unacceptable (if not necessarily reductionist) consequences to do with explaining the place of finite and infinite entities. DM seems immediately unpromising, erecting as it does a gap between appearance and reality which seems entirely unwarranted. This leaves NDM as the only position that fulfils Horstmann's (and Hegel's) brief as set out above.

An argument for NDM can be made stronger by considering the consequences for intersubjectivity for each argument. DP seems that it would be the

worst ontology in terms of alienation – not only is one's contact with the Other likely to be mediated through some more fundamental entity, one cannot even directly access the Other in its actual being. There are therefore two barriers between the self and the Other. NDP has only one of those barriers but, in terms of the subject/object distinction which I discuss in the next chapter, it is a high one (as is the case with the DP position). How can the Other's access to the self, and vice versa, be direct if there is a pluralist ontology? How can the human subject see itself, and the Other, as a subject and object at the same time when there are other entities for both the self and the Other that might be more fundamental? If the phenomenon of ambiguity as I discuss it in the next chapter is the key to positive recognition, then any pluralist ontology, but particularly a dualist one, will create unwarranted barriers between the self and the Other and make genuine intersubjectivity and positive recognition impossible. Dualism itself comes with similar problems – if the self does not have access to the Other as s/he really is, then ambiguity as a concept cannot function as the very idea of subject and object does not work in the same way as it does on a non-dualist picture. NDM is therefore also highly problematic from the point of view of intersubjectivity.

Picking up again the argument from the first section of this chapter, it is quite clear that the NDM view is the only one which fits with the picture of the moral self described there and in the Introduction to this work. The only self that fits in with a pluralist account is a completely autonomous and fixed one. The self cannot in any way be constituted by the Other – why would it be, when they are ontologically separate? Equally, a position like DP or even NDP rules out a 'broken middle' picture of the self as discussed in the Introduction, where the self is constantly being broken and remade, for the self is fundamentally separate from itself and therefore has nothing surrounding it which could cause this process of *metanoia*. Under the DM position, genuine intersubjectivity seems seriously undermined, as the Other with which the self is interacting is not, in some sense, the 'real' Other, or at least there is something grounding this Other than is not perceivable or graspable by the self.

Of course, none of these observations constitute devastating criticisms of the three opposing positions (DP, NDP, DM) – perhaps the kind of intersubjectivity I am suggesting is necessary for positive recognition simply is impossible, because either DP, NDP or DM simply is the case. As Horstmann puts it:

Whatever this thesis...is supposed to mean in particular, for Hegel it is not meant as a mere sharing of a personal perspective, a private preference, but rather it is supposed to count as an assertion for which indisputable reasons can be adduced.⁶⁴

That is to say, there can be (and is) a fact of the matter about monist, dualism and pluralism. My argument is that only a monistic ontology will allow genuine intersubjectivity of a kind that will permit positive recognition to take place, that is, will mean that there can be a subject which is changed fundamentally by inter-

action with the Other, and can have the kind of ambiguous view in interaction which I outline in the next chapter. This all begs the question against the pluralist or dualist (or both) who do not think that the self and intersubjectivity work this way. If a defence of this transcendental argument (or, as Horstmann puts it, transcendent argument) is necessary, it is difficult to know which approach could be offered other than a gesture towards the lack of suitable alternatives.

On one understanding, Levinas' account of intersubjectivity, if it is the one which is favoured, is also an argument for a monistic ontology. The intimate way in which the self and the Other are joined and relate to one another accords well with the ontological (in sense (c)) view that there is fundamentally only one entity in the world, be that Reason, Fichte's Absolute I, or something else. The Other calls the self to action even before cognition is involved precisely because the self and the other are not ontologically divided. The problem with this view is that Levinas' own position is not an ontological one, but an ethical one – the relationship of the self to the Other is not fundamentally grounded in an ontology, but ethics as first philosophy. This does not mean, however, that there could not be an ontology surrounding this ethical encounter which is the primary point of contact, any more than an initial encounter or confrontation being of a character other than cognition means that cognition or re-cognition is impossible. All of the insights into concepts of selfhood and intersubjectivity which I discussed earlier in this chapter can be incorporated into a monistic ontology and indeed, if it seems that this understanding of intersubjectivity accords most closely with recognition, they can form a transcendental argument for such an ontology. It therefore seems that, far from repressing intersubjectivity, Hegel's monistic ontology, or something like it, enables it.

I argue, as Horstmann does, that it is not particularly important for the purposes of this discussion how this entity is conceived, as Reason, substance, as for Spinoza, or as Absolute I, as for Fichte and Schelling.⁶⁵ There is no particular reason why the entity would have to be a divine one, although of course a non-atheistic view would have to hold that the entity was divine. As outlined above, there are a number of reasons why Hegel's monistic ontology does have to be a divine one. Whether these reasons are central to the kind of account of forgiveness and love I am arguing for is a matter for Chapters Five and Six. In the next chapter, I continue my analysis of intersubjectivity as a basis for positive recognition by exploring the phenomenon of ambiguity.

4 AMBIGUITY AND THE ONTOLOGICALLY SPLIT SELF

In this chapter, I introduce fully one of the monograph's central arguments, that is, that genuine sociality, intersubjectivity and recognition require a certain 'ambiguous' attitude, where one regards oneself and the other as simultaneously both subject and object, and where the Other regards the self simultaneously as both subject and object. I trace this concept out in the master-slave dialectic and its triphasic progression itself, as well as in the work of Simone de Beauvoir and her appropriation/criticism of it. I then explain how this relates to the demand for ontological monism, arguing that a certain kind of monism grounds the nature of self and Other as subject and object. I contrast this view strongly with Sartre's view of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, where social life is conceived as an endless, and endlessly frustrating, struggle for subjecthood and mastery. Whilst Beauvoir was what one might term a biological pessimist, to strongly tied to a biological view of potential masters and slaves, subjects and objects (for her, men and women), Sartre is a psychological pessimist, but also perhaps an ontological one, for how can our desire for subjecthood and mastery be overcome if not by its grounding in our ontology? I discuss the role of desire, a central concept for Hegel, in this constellation. Finally, I argue that ambiguity is the ontological and ethical foundation of the possibilities of positive recognition discussed in the final two chapters.

Having established the importance of the cognitive and epistemic elements of recognition in the previous chapters, this chapter is concerned with examining how the self must see the Other, and vice versa, in order that (positive) recognition might be possible. In this context, I also examine failures of recognition – what epistemic and cognitive failures, perhaps conditioned by the social world or reflecting some psychological conflict or inherent or acquired deficiency of attitude, lead to or constitute failure of recognition? What is additionally required for this to be an *ethical* failure?

One example of a failure of recognition which nevertheless provides us with some extremely useful insights is Simone de Beauvoir's discussion of the master-slave dialectic. Whilst, for a variety of reasons, some of them theoretical and some

of them biological, she does not think that men and women mutually recognise each other, I argue that one particular insight of hers does point towards an understanding of the practical epistemic side of positive recognition, as well as its theoretical counterpart. I term this the phenomenon of ambiguity. As I go on to argue in this chapter, exploring ambiguity as a phenomenon will show us the epistemic and cognitive processes involved in positive recognition, and those epistemic and cognitive processes that are lacking when recognition fails. I begin my exploring the phenomenon of ambiguity, that is, of seeing oneself and the Other both as subject and object simultaneously, in Hegel's work itself, before moving on to the details and shortcomings of Beauvoir's analysis and suggestions about how the concept can work for the kind of positive recognition I am proposing.

Subject and Object: The Ambiguous Attitude

I start with a quick note on terminology: in the analysis, I will use the terms 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' as well as 'subjecthood' and 'objecthood'. These two concept pairs are not synonyms in this case. Subjectivity and objectivity refer to the basis of knowledge and epistemological concepts, whereas 'subjecthood' and 'objecthood' will refer to an individual's being a subject or an object from whichever point of view is currently being considered. This use of terms is intended to avoid some of the confusion that can arise with the vocabulary involved in the discussion of this particular phenomenon. For the avoidance of ambiguity and unwarranted presupposition, it should also be noted that I will use the term 'conscious being' to denote the Hegelian 'subject' when I am reserving judgement on whether that conscious being is, at any time, a subject, object or both. The use of 'subject' and 'object' will therefore be deliberate.

It is a matter of logical necessity that, in recognising the Other as subject in one's interaction with it, one must also accept one's own objecthood at that moment. I will argue that this arises out of ineluctable facts of human existence, that is, the embodied nature of the self and the essential sociality of human existence. As argued in the previous chapter, this essential sociality of human existence includes the sociality of reason and self-consciousness. In Hegel's terms, the conscious being must always be an object at any time, at least in the context of its existence as a human being. Self-consciousness presupposes encounters with other conscious beings; it presupposes, therefore, at least the embodiment aspect of human existence.

This is one reason for my rejection of Sartre's analysis and appropriation of the master/slave dialectic, as he sees the status of objecthood (being an object) as something undesirable and at least theoretically avoidable.¹ Self-consciousness as full humanity involves being a certain sort of being and also, inextricably, perceiving oneself in a certain way. As a consequence of the intersubjectivity of Hegel's view, self-consciousness will also be tied to the way one perceives other relevantly similar beings. Here, at the most basic level, the conflict that drives the dialectic emerges.

What follows is an elucidation of how the development of self-consciousness in the master/slave section and the paragraphs immediately preceding it can be seen as having three distinct stages. These stages are picked out by Hegel in paragraph 176 of the *Phenomenology*, in his description of what is to follow in the coming master/slave dialectic that spans paragraphs 178–196 of the same work. However, it has been for later commentators on the work to ascertain precisely how these stages fit together. As an interpretative tool, these three stages – primary, secondary and tertiary self-consciousness – demonstrate particularly well the conscious being's progression from the perception of oneself as pure independent subject, the only I, to pure dependent object, something that exists only as a corollary of the Other, and finally to an ambiguous state accepting of its status as simultaneously subject and object.

The terminology of subjecthood and objecthood I am using here means that particular care must be taken when interpreting the original Hegelian language, especially in the sense that Hegel speaks of objective (*objektiv*) and subjective (*subjektiv*) self-certainty. Hegel sees self-consciousness as having been achieved when the objective sense of self-certainty has been reached – this is what occurs when the third stage, tertiary self-consciousness, has been achieved. Objective self-certainty, clearly, is not the same as the awareness of oneself *qua* object – it is the level at which a full awareness of one's ontological status as subject and object has been reached. Nor does the 'objective' of objective self-certainty imply the kind of view-from-nowhere in the Nagelian sense.² Equally, the 'subjective' of 'subjective self-certainty' should not be taken to mean that the conscious being counts as a subject in the full sense. As Nancy Bauer points out, the full sense of 'subject' involves, as she puts it, 'acting' in a particular sense which requires 'deliberately – self-consciously – undertaking to *transcend* one's given desires by assigning oneself a project, the fulfillment of which necessitates the subordination of these desires.'³

The sense in which the subject is, at the first two levels of self-consciousness 'subjectively' self-certain is in that its picture of itself does not take into account any kind of shared point of view, or intersubjectively constructed reality. It is its own point of view without reference to the Other – the second stage of self-consciousness is not an idea about how the Other might view it, but a fear, albeit ungrounded, of what might actually be the case. There is no attempt, in secondary self-consciousness, to move towards intersubjectivity.⁴

Primary Self-Consciousness

In a state before that of self-consciousness, the subject wants to be the only subject, the only 'I' – this is the starting point. The first moment of self-consciousness, primary self-consciousness, begins then with the simple awareness of oneself as distinct from the world, independent of what Hegel terms 'other'. The 'other' is relevant only in terms of desire-satisfaction:

The simple ego is this genus, or the bare universal, for which the differences are insubstantial, only by its being the negative essence of the moments which have assumed a definite and independent form. And self-consciousness is thus only assured of itself through sublating this other, which is presented to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is Desire. Convinced of the nothingness of this other, it definitely affirms this nothingness to be for itself the truth of this other, negates the independent object, and thereby acquires the certainty of its own self, as true certainty, a certainty which it has become aware of in objective form.⁵

For this primary self-consciousness, says Hegel, 'its essence and *absolute object* is I', and what is 'other' is regarded as inessential.⁶ The response to the challenge of the Other's appearance is immediately to sublate (*Aufheben*) this Other, to negate its existence. Here we might refer to the Kojèvean interpretation, which sees negation as consumption or the utilisation of an Other for the purposes of desire-satisfaction.⁷ It is interesting to note that self-consciousness reassures itself of its own existence by negating the Other which is presented to it as an independent life, as a subject. Already at the first stage of the emergence of self-consciousness, the fear of becoming subordinate to this independent life is present, and the self-consciousness attempts to reassure himself by negating the Other.

At this stage, it is worth examining exactly *how* the subject recognises that the Other is a thing that warrants this kind of attitude or consideration. Again, here we must refer to global considerations about the general significance and nature of the master/slave dialectic – whether it is psychological or historical, etc. I, along with Sartre and Beauvoir, am assuming a psychological reading that sees the master/slave dialectic as playing a role in our everyday lives, be that at an early stage of childhood (which seems convincing in many psychological respects), or at the level of adult interaction, or indeed both.⁸ Bearing this in mind, we can split the question as formulated above into two separate ones. Firstly, how does the subject at the level of primary self-consciousness distinguish those others that warrant the status of Other in this special sense from those that do not? Secondly, how does the subject realise in the first place that some special attitude of this kind is warranted when it encounters *any* object – what drives it in the first place through the levels of self-consciousness as elucidated by Beauvoir?

The first question is, on some level, fairly banal and everyday. The subject simply sees some similarity between itself and the other being that is encountered. This similarity is likely to be physical and behavioural. It is the very similarity in these terms – a presumed psychological or, perhaps more accurately, an ontological similarity – that drives the subject to its worry about being the only object at the secondary stage of self-consciousness. The subject has to see the Other as being capable of subjecthood, otherwise the possibility of recognition cannot get off the ground. An identification of some kind between the subject and the other being encountered is a condition of the possibility of recognition (a necessary but not sufficient condition), and therefore of the genuinely human life.

At the same time, of course, there is a balance to be struck. If the identification goes so far as to attempt to subsume the other being into the subject by means of a mirroring, the subject will not have progressed beyond the primary stage of self-consciousness, which involves the 'I' trying to fill the world. The otherness of the Other can be disconcerting, but it is a narcissism displaying precisely the failure to recognise one's ambiguity to deny that otherness.

Here the tension that drives the subject through the stages of self-consciousness can be seen. The other can have its status as Other denied in two ways – its existence (either as an object worthy of this kind of consideration, or its existence at all) can be denied, or it can be subsumed out of narcissism by the original subject. The complete denial of the existence of the other seems impossible, and is not considered by Hegel or by Sartre or subsequent critics. The denial of the status of the Other as warranting this kind of consideration is perhaps what the master in the master/slave dialectic attempts to achieve. The slave is treated like an object, a means for the master to attain his natural desires. Clearly in this case, there is no ontological or epistemological realisation that the other is an Other worthy of this kind of consideration. The master of the master/slave dialectic remains stuck at the primary stage of self-consciousness that both are in at the outset:

That which for it [the subject] is other stands as inessential object, as object with the impress and character of negation. But the other is also a self-consciousness; an individual makes its appearance in antithesis to an individual. *Appearing thus in their immediacy, they are for each other in the manner of ordinary objects.* They are independent individual forms, modes of consciousness that have not risen above the bare level of life (for the existent object here has been determined as life). They are, moreover, forms of consciousness which have not yet accomplished for one another the process of absolute abstraction, of uprooting all immediate existence, and of being merely the bare, negative fact of self-identical consciousness; or, in other words, have not yet revealed themselves to each other as existing purely for themselves, i.e., as self-consciousness. Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own certainty of itself is still without truth.⁹

The italicised sentence clearly illustrates that the relevant similarity of the two self-conscious beings is not apparent at the beginning of their encounter – only the status as for-themselves is apparent, not the status as fully self-conscious beings. The narcissism suggested by Beauvoir does not appear at this stage. However, an earlier comment might suggest the mirroring of the Other as a possibility for the pre-self-conscious subject:

This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double sense is at the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For, firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with itself again through the cancelling of its otherness; but secondly, it likewise gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets the other again go free.¹⁰

At one stage, the subject must *give back* the Other's otherness to it, because, as Hegel tells us in paragraph 179, it sees itself in the other initially, and the other is not essentially real. This narcissism can be seen as an expression of the stage of self-consciousness at which the subject wishes to fill the world with a single 'I' – if the Other cannot be destroyed, it can be subsumed by means of mirroring into the self.

Secondary Self-Consciousness

Secondary self-consciousness is marked by the realisation that the existence of the I is inevitably dependent on the existence of independent objects, since the I after all is nothing other than what Hegel calls 'desire' – it is essentially appetitive in nature:

In this state of satisfaction, however, it has experience of the independence of its object. Desire and the certainty of its self obtained in the gratification of desire, are conditioned by the object; for the certainty exists through cancelling this other; in order that this cancelling may be effected, there must be this other. Self-consciousness is thus unable by its negative relation to the object to abolish it; because of that relation it rather produces it again, as well as the desire. The object desired is, in fact, something other than self-consciousness, the essence of desire; and through this experience this truth has become realized.¹¹

The I's realisation that the I is dependent on something external or other raises for secondary self-consciousness the disconcerting possibility that in fact it is the *I* that might be inessential – might be, that is, an 'other' (an object), at least from the point of view of the independent object. In order to negate the Other, the Other must be there, and it must be something Other in order that it can be negated in the first place. In this secondary moment of self-consciousness, therefore, self-consciousness perceives a clash between its conception of the I as essential (which is the central conception of primary self-consciousness, and the starting point) and its conception of the I as entirely 'other' – in other words, the encounter with the Other causes a clash between the conception of the self as pure subject and the conception of the self as pure object. The ever-present fear is that the I might be the object, might in fact *itself* be entirely other. This phenomenon is displayed by the slave in the master/slave dialectic:

[T]he master gets his recognition through another consciousness, for in them the latter affirms itself as unessential, both by working upon the thing, and, on the other hand, by the fact of being dependent on a determinate existence; in neither case can this other get the mastery over existence, and succeed in absolutely negating it. We have thus here this moment of recognition, viz. that the other consciousness cancels itself as self-existent, and, *ipso facto*, itself does what the first does to it.¹²

It is Sartre's description in *Being and Nothingness* that illuminates particularly well the fear that is associated with this secondary form of self-consciousness. Thanks to his analysis, we can well imagine how this possibility might present

itself to the human subject. It is extremely difficult, however, to imagine how one could actually consider oneself as an object alone, a dependent consciousness. We return again to the general proposition, put forward in various forms by Kant, Hegel and their later critics, that it is impossible for that which is being examined to have the same character as that which is doing the examining. This alone would surely rule out a conception of oneself as pure object, pure dependent consciousness – the self cannot be an object for itself (see the next section).

At this stage, it is interesting to note that the description of this secondary stage of self-consciousness is to be found in the actual master/slave chapter rather than the discussion of consciousness which precedes it (paragraphs 166–77). What are we to make of this? In the paragraphs immediately before the master/slave dialectic, this secondary self-consciousness makes only a fleeting appearance as an intermediate but in some way unstable stage between the self as the only I or subject and the self as ambiguous. In the dialectic itself, there is a description of how the slave enters this position and how it overcomes it. The slave is physically dependent on the master, and therefore is unessential as a dependent consciousness. The slave recognises the master as the only independent consciousness, and therefore a one-way recognition emerges. In the next paragraph Hegel points out that this recognition is worthless; in fact, as the master is dependent on the slave for his self-certainty, it is the master who has failed to achieve self-consciousness. The situation is precisely the reverse of what one might initially imagine:

In all this, the unessential consciousness is, for the master, the object which embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is evident that this object does not correspond to its notion; for, just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved.¹³

It remains mysterious as to what precisely it is that has caused this dependence of consciousness on the slave on the part of the master. Kojève's theory focuses on the lack of work and interaction with the environment of the slave, other theories such as that of Bauer formulate precise laws about the inability of the master to act other than as a direct consequence of one's natural desires. Certainly, it does not seem to be something within the slave – it is not a direct consequence of the logical or psychological impossibility of the self viewing itself as an object – but within the master (we may leave aside for the moment what it is within the master that leads to this situation). Perhaps the slave can only be in this situation (of seeing himself as an object) if he is physically or otherwise forced into it, lending weight to Sartre's claim that the ontological facts of the matter can be changed by the action of one of the parties. Alternatively, we could see this section of the master/slave dialectic in combination with my analysis of the three

stages of self-consciousness as one of the clearest indications we have that the master/slave dialectic is a thought-experiment or allegory intended to illustrate these stages of self-consciousness.

Tertiary Self-Consciousness

Tertiary self-consciousness, the third 'moment', is marked by some kind of unification of these two conceptions of the I, when, as Hegel says 'it comes to have the unity of itself in its otherness'.¹⁴ The crucial step is this one:

Consciousness has an object which implicates its own otherness or affirms distinction as a void distinction, and therein is independent. The individual form distinguished, which is only a living form, certainly cancels its independence also in the process of life itself; but it ceases along with its distinctive difference to be what it is. The object of self-consciousness, however, is still independent in this negativity of itself; and thus it is for itself genus, universal flux or continuity in the very distinctiveness of its own separate existence; it is a *living self-consciousness*.¹⁵

The object of consciousness, the Other, is presented as something Other but at the same time independent, as in fact the distinctions that are apparent are false, and both consciousness and Other are part of Spirit. The object of consciousness, the Other, like the conscious being who encounters it, is a living self-consciousness. 'Living' should here be read with the particular Hegelian meaning which links it to the natural world – *das Leben*, the physical existence, just as important as the self-consciousness as the life of the mind. Consciousness is both living object and self-conscious being.

This part of paragraph 176 is especially difficult to understand, given the fact that Hegel talks in terms of self-consciousness rather than persons, and it is rather difficult to ascertain who is the object and who is the subject, grammatically speaking, of the sentences. In fact, this is not so crucial. Hegel is talking about the development of self-consciousness rather than the development of *someone's* self-consciousness. When we tell the story, we talk in terms of one being with the possibility for self-consciousness encountering another being with the same capacity, and the process that the first being undergoes. In fact, both beings may go through the same process at the same time.

As with the examination of the master/slave dialectic in general, it is possible to leave aside for the moment questions about when, where and how these stages occur in real life. In this work, I am representing a broadly psychological account of the dialectical development, rather than a historical one. Therefore, I see the process described here as one which human beings undergo, rather than something which happened at some stage of history. This approach is one I hold in common with Beauvoir, Sartre and many others. Nevertheless, the question presents itself even within this psychological account of what place the dialectic has in our everyday lives. Does this process occur every time a human being

encounters what it thinks is another human being, or is it a stage of childhood development? This question is indeed a crucial one, but for the moment I will leave it aside. For the first part of the analysis, what is important is the recognition of the self-conscious subject of its ontological status, and what precisely this means with regard to real life and the master/slave dialectic.

A further tension can here be added to the tension between self-as-object and self-as-subject, one which will be just as difficult to resolve. The difficulty is in Hegel's word '*Anderssein*', otherness. Clearly this is involved in the crucial stage of the development of the self-conscious subject – when consciousness becomes self-consciousness, it becomes 'the unity of itself in its otherness'.¹⁶ At the same time, one crucial moment of the development of this self-consciousness is the understanding of the fact that distinctions are not, in fact, real distinctions – all self-conscious beings are part of an absolute substance:

When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just as much ego as object. With this we already have before us the notion of *Spirit*. What consciousness has further to become aware of, is the experience of what spirit is — this absolute substance, which is the unity of the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and independence of their opposition as component elements of that substance: I that is 'we', and 'we' that is I.¹⁷

At this stage, a self-consciousness is both subject and object but is not yet aware of itself or has not yet experienced itself as part of Spirit, that apparently contradictory entity which is one substance but contains discrete entities that are free and independent. The Other is other, but is also the same in a crucial sense, and here the second tension emerges. It seems from this passage that it is possible for a self-conscious being to have achieved the necessary pre-requisites with regard to perceiving oneself as subject and object without having a concept or awareness of Spirit. In many ways this lends weight to the interpretation of the entire master/slave dialectic as psychological and ahistorical – without being aware of the underlying ontological structure of mind and world, the self-conscious being can and must still conceive of itself as subject and object simultaneously. This is not the tale of a historical dialectic which ends with the enlightenment of spirit. This precise stage is the moment at which the self-conscious being is lead into the fully human life:

Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness — the notion of spirit — its turning-point, where it leaves the coloured appearance of the sensuous immediate, passes from the dark void of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous, and steps into the spiritual daylight of the present.¹⁸

The ambiguity of the otherness of the Other who is also part of the same substance of Spirit underlies the position of human self-conscious beings as at the same time both subject and object. The self-conscious being is aware of its subjectivity and objectivity but not (yet) of the intersubjectivity of its world.

Ambiguity and the 'View from Nowhere'

It is at this point that we can return to the analytical insights into the 'problem' of self-consciousness, and the possibilities of the naturalistic and transcendental worldviews. There is an inherent connection between the desire to avoid being 'other', an object for an independent other consciousness, and the thought that the self cannot be an object for itself. This post-Kantian thought has found much currency amongst analytical philosophers. In his *Self and World*, Quassim Cassam discusses what he calls the 'epistemological premise' – that the subject, *qua* subject, cannot be an object for itself.¹⁹ Here we can return to the secondary stage of self-consciousness as discussed above, where there is the fear that the self might be a pure object rather than an independent consciousness. If we accept the epistemological premise, we will have to see the secondary stage of self-consciousness as illogical on a fundamental level. One might be able to imagine oneself as a purely dependent object, just as one might be able to conjure up an idea of oneself as part of the fantasy of an evil Cartesian demon or a computer game, but it is a matter of psychological as well as logical impossibility to genuinely believe that one's subjectivity is entirely imagined.

Does the psychological impossibility of seeing oneself as a pure object, not only for the Other but also for oneself, stem in fact from the epistemological impossibility of having this ontological status? Or is the situation in fact precisely the reverse, having its roots in a kind of Humean scepticism about the self? Kant states that

To be an object for oneself in this sense would be for one to be introspectively aware of oneself as an abiding substance, but no fixed and abiding self can present itself in the flux of inner appearances.²⁰

'Can' here refers not to any kind of logical possibility or circularity argument, but more to an empirical statement of cognitive or psychological fact. We cannot bracket out the I that is perceiving or introspecting from the I that is being perceived or examined, not because this would cause us any logical problem, but because we are so rooted in our own situation that we are *psychologically* incapable of such a feat. Hegel would go further in this respect, and state that any attempt to bracket out the I in this sense will fail because of the intersubjective nature of reality. The self can never be a 'solid' self, removable and observable by the self as perceiver, because although that self is discrete from the other selves in the world in some respects, it is part of the same entity (for Hegel, Reason). The view from nowhere would, in fact, have to be the view from everywhere.

This links up directly to the discussion, began in the Introduction to this work, of the self as not fixed and autonomous.²¹ Accepting that the self is not fixed and autonomous removes the desire to occupy the position of the only subject, the only transcendent, filling the world. The self cannot be a matter of pure contemplation for the self, not only because it cannot be held in isolation from

the self as an object to be observed, but also because the self does not stay as it is, unchanged between encounters. The very act of observing the self and casting it into the role of object would mean that the self had changed again. Additionally, the self could not be considered as completely separate from its social environment, as autonomy cannot be so clearly sketched.

Failures of Recognition – Sartre and Beauvoir

Sartre and the Struggle for Subjectivity

The compulsion nevertheless to attempt to perceive a solid self in this way is at the heart of the conflict within the self that Hegel and his later commentators have described, and has its roots in the particular ontological situation of the self. For Sartre, the struggle of the master/slave dialectic – which Sartre interprets in a psychological sense as the story of general human interaction – is the story of a struggle for subjecthood. Simply put, the desire of a subject or conscious being at any one time is the desire for subjecthood, and the only way to achieve this subjecthood is to claim it for oneself, and thereby turn the Other into an object. The inequality that inevitably arises in the master/slave story and in human relationships in general is a result of different levels of fortitude, physical or psychological. The full humanity of self-consciousness is the constant struggle for mastery. Those who fail to achieve this full humanity are the victims of someone else's having achieved mastery over them. According to Sartre, Hegel's belief that the master/slave dialectic could be overcome or resolved was the result of a kind of misguided ontological and epistemological optimism. Crucially, nothing can be a subject and an object at the same time. The key passage is this one:

Hegel's optimism ends in failure: between the Other as object and the Me as subject there is no common measure...I cannot know myself in the other if the other is first an object for me: neither can I apprehend the other in his true being – that is, his subjectivity. No universal knowledge can be derived from the relation of consciousnesses. This is what we shall call their ontological separation.²²

For this, and other reasons, recognition, for Sartre, will always fail. As Robert Williams says, 'Sartre, like Kojève, fails to see that for Hegel recognition has an ontological structure capable of supporting a wider range of instantiations than master/slave, conflict, and domination.'²³ His criticism falls short of the mark, and it is instructive in the content of this chapter to observe exactly where the mistakes are made. It is particularly interesting to note that Sartre's practical observations about the possibility of recognition are supported by an ontological (in sense (c)) claim about the possibility of extrapolating theoretical philosophical conclusions from practical philosophical premises, which is precisely the line of argument I am adopting in this work.

Sartre's position is, on one level, a manifestation of the psychological compulsion I discussed above – the compulsion to perceive the whole self, a 'solid' self, at any particular moment in time. Moreover, in the light of Sartre's comments one extend this conception further. Part of the same psychological phenomenon is a desire for a 'view from nowhere'²⁴ as far as subjectivity and objectivity, or subjecthood and objecthood, are concerned. What does it mean, for Sartre, to *be* a subject? It means to become a master and thereby enslave someone else. Sartre's description seems to suggest that there can be some kind of truth as regards who is a subject and who is an object. It is difficult, given the epistemological premise discussed earlier, to imagine from whose point of view this could be ascertained. The assertion that it is impossible to be a subject and an object at the same time also seems to presuppose a single perspective that has some kind of privileged epistemological status.

Beauvoir, Biology and Transcendence

Simone de Beauvoir, whose interest in Hegel and the problem of self-consciousness in this specific regard predates that of Sartre, rejected the idea that one cannot be both subject and object simultaneously, arguing that in fact this ambiguity is an inherent part of the flourishing of self-consciousness as full humanity. According to Beauvoir, our attempt to negotiate and reconcile ourselves to this inherent ambiguity of situation is a necessary precondition of the moral life – I would extend this and tie it to the conditions of possibility of an existence that is distinctively human, and therefore include the kind of epistemological conditions that were discussed in the previous chapter.

Beauvoir ties these insights closely to the established concept of women as objects and men as subjects. This view, she argues, should be superseded in the light of the fact that all conscious beings are both subject and object. In fact, Hegel (as Beauvoir recognises) seems to exclude women altogether from the process of recognition in the sense that is important for self-consciousness. This is due to her biological determinism, which prevents the woman from being a freely self-determining object. Marion Heinz expresses the essential biological difference thus:

[W]hile the man has not succeeded in integrating his corporeality as the natural dimension which threatens his status as a subject, and thus splits this dimension off from himself, seeking to externalise it in the form of woman as 'dreaming Nature', the woman has not yet attained the status of subject in the first place.²⁵

Man, then, tends towards seeing himself only as object, whereas woman does not see herself, and indeed is not seen, as subject due to biological factors. As Heinz argues, Beauvoir maps relationships between the sexes onto the (not just) existentialist concepts of immanence and transcendence, and it is this insight that is so indebted to the Idealist, and particularly Fichtean, 'tradition which

sees the negating power of Spirit as the essential feature of humanity'.²⁶ It is this very polarising insight, along with her biological determinism, that means she does not think recognitive relationships between men and women are possible.

The ambiguity of our position, according to Beauvoir, yields two interesting conclusions for feminist thought. Firstly, it may be the case that, given their frequent need to reconcile internal and external pressures, women are particularly well placed to assimilate themselves to this ambiguity that is a natural feature of human life, rather than to attempt to overcome it. Secondly, the need to classify humans as one of two types of being – men and women – is a manifestation of the uncomfortable nature of ambiguity. For the moment, I will leave aside these comments about the importance of gender, although they will become important once more at the end of this chapter and the Chapter Six.²⁷

If the idea that the desire for subjecthood is symptomatic of a wider desire for a self and world that can be seen from no particular perspective is a useful one, Beauvoir's comments in this respect can be extended. Allowing the thought that one is object as well as subject is tantamount to acknowledging the necessity of one's own situatedness, and therefore the impossibility of a view from nowhere. The inherent problem of ambiguity can now be restated – one must find one's own view whilst simultaneously acknowledging that this view is not a view from nowhere, as it would be if one were ever to achieve absolute subjecthood. Nor, indeed, is it a view from everywhere, giving one a view of the reality that is constructed intersubjectively. One is part of this intersubjectivity whether or not one is aware of this. The desire for subjecthood is the desire to be the only one that creates reality. The first part of the equation is as important as the first – whilst one can never fill the world with an I as the only subject, one is at the same time a subject as well as an object. The message therefore becomes one of liberation as well as resignation, not just a coming-to-terms, but some relief from the existential fear Sartre correctly characterized as belonging to the thought that one could be *just* an object. If this analysis, and that of Beauvoir, is correct, one cannot be enslaved in the Sartrean sense of being made an object. We might return to Hegel and now see how it is that the slave is never permanently enslaved. The slave remains a subject as he interacts with the world, thereby finding himself in the position of a subject. He is not merely used, but also uses objects he finds around him.

The idea that ambiguity is a tool for the rejection of the view from nowhere can be closely linked to the arguments of the previous chapter. In some ways it could be seen to mediate between the naturalist and transcendentalist interpretations of the *Phenomenology*, and is certainly useful in the consideration of the McDowellian concept of the partly re-enchanted nature. The enchantment, in this sense, is the realisation that the bald naturalism of scientism tied to a view from nowhere (the two seem to entail each other to some extent) is impossible, and that the human being can never be an asocial creature. The

socialised transcendental subjects that constitute reality are a clear reason to reject the possibility of the view from nowhere – there is nothing (at least nothing epistemologically relevant) that one could find by getting outside the human point of view. The fact that the psychologically appealing view of objecthood and subjecthood – the view that there can be a view from nowhere with respect to ourselves – causes an ontological or even existential worry for the conscious being does not mean that such a view is actually possible, any more than the fact that bald naturalism or scientism is psychologically appealing or comforting is a strong argument for that view.

The biological side of Beauvoir's analysis takes over the story at the stage of secondary consciousness as described above. The woman does not risk her life, as the participants in the master-slave dialectic do, because she, as the creature who gives life, is tied to that life and cannot give it away.²⁸ This is biologically-determined, and it is difficult to imagine whether we should read it at the individual level or some more general level (but, of course, the same difficulty exists for the master-slave dialectic itself). Does the woman who does not wish to, or cannot, have children find herself in the same situation with regard to the fight to the death? Beauvoir's answer is that they surely would, for this determinism does not work on the level of each individual woman. Rather, it is entrenched from the beginning of human history and, whilst biology plays its part, it no longer directly guides the relationship of each pair (or indeed, more than one men or women). For her, it is a case of entrenched patriarchy, and in order to disentangle this and change things for the better one would have to return to the source, which is the man's setting himself up as transcendence as opposed to the woman's immanence. This inequality, which is now socially and in some sense even theoretically ingrained, is the source of recognition's failure.

Both Sartre and Beauvoir seem to assume from the outset that the fundamental impulse towards the Other is hostility, even violence. Beauvoir states that 'the subject can be posed only in being opposed – he sets himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object'.²⁹ Beauvoir, not unreasonably, takes this to be a Hegelian insight which one can set up against a view like that of Levinas, who sees the initial impulse as not to murder, rather than to want to obliterate the other. At this stage, it is useful to refer again to the idea outlined in the Introduction to this work of *metanoia* and the essential violence of human interaction, of the remaking which constantly takes place, meaning that the subject is not stable and unchanging. The subject will always resist this – there will always be a built-in inertia that holds the subject back from giving up part of himself and becoming something else. Nowhere is this more true than in particularly close relationships such as that between lovers. I discuss this again in Chapter Six.³⁰ For now, I will note that the initially violent and hostile reaction on the part of the self to the Other might not primarily be borne

out of misanthropy, a naturally violent tendency or an entirely negative inherent terror or paranoia, but rather the natural resistance to change which, if things go well and positive recognition occurs, will drop away. Love and forgiveness, my two examples of recognition, are key examples of this. Asking or accepting love or forgiveness, or giving or seeking those things, involves radical change on the part of the subject that will always give rise to fear and resistance.

Is Beauvoir's pessimism therefore unwarranted? Since her doubt that truly recognitive relationships could take place between men and women (and perhaps at all) stems from an unhappy coincidence of beliefs relating to social facts and constructs, biological facts which have become culturally and socially ingrained, and this all passing into a tacit ontological theory (in sense (a) as set out in the Introduction), then maybe it would suffice for enough of these conditions not to hold? Could social and cultural change this ontological theory, which is a sort of 'folk ontology' as a counterpart to the 'folk psychology' which underlies the simulation theory/theory theory debate, rather than an ontology based on sound philosophical reasoning? Perhaps Beauvoir herself would agree that the situation as far as social and cultural factors has now improved, at least in many parts of the world, from the one that prevailed in 1949. Whilst notions of womanhood, despite three or four waves of feminism, are still strongly tied up with notions of motherhood, there is a greater willingness to consider women as fulfilling all manner of roles previously seen as suitable only for men. What would be necessary, if not sufficient, for recognition, would be for men to recognise women as transcendent, which requires a more fundamental shift than simply understanding that womanhood is not automatically tied up with womanhood (and vice versa, that parenthood is not automatically tied up with being a woman).

There is a strong embodied element in Beauvoir's reading of the master-slave dialectic. For her, one reason why the master-slave dialectic fails is that the master identifies himself with the non-corporeal (cast in existentialist terms as transcendent) and the slave is identified by the master as corporeal (in existentialist terms, immanent). Equally, in the division of the sexes, the woman is seen (and perhaps sees herself) as corporeal, as Life, as non-transcendent, and the man is seen (and sees himself) as non-corporeal, as Existence, as transcendent. In Hegelian (and general German Idealist) terms, the woman is cast as finite and concrete, the man as infinite. This then maps on to the picture of woman as object and man as subject.

Whose fault is the failure of recognition here? The tale is not a simple of oppression, for one cannot wrest recognition from the Other as it would not then be worth the name. If the man achieves transcendence in his own eyes, in those of the woman or of society in general, then, just like the master in the master-slave dialectic, his Other has been cast by him into a position where s/he cannot bestow recognition. In any case, of course, recognition has to be mutual. The master or man might think that becoming transcendent is the final goal

and the point of play, and, indeed, it sometimes appears that Beauvoir thinks this is the case.³¹ According to Hegel's analysis and the one I am providing here, it is not. The fault, therefore, cannot lie with an aggressor, although we might well be able to claim that, had the man/master/aggressor or initiator of the confrontation acted differently, positive recognition could have developed. This behaviour, however, would be going against his instincts and, as Beauvoir's account shows, against recognised social norms. This is not to say one could and should not expect this behaviour (that is, going against norms), but one can see that recognition is set up to fail before it even gets off the ground.

A number of important questions remain when this chapter so far is set in the context of chapters One, Two and Three and the Introduction. How does the ambiguous position fit into the picture of the self suggested in the Introduction, influenced by the work of Gillian Rose and Judith Butler? Is it possible to set apart the subject from the object, seeing oneself and the Other as subject and object simultaneously, when the difference between subjects and objects, self and Other, is not clearly drawn (and of course where both of these are ultimately rooted in a single monological entity)? This is a version of the question asked in Honneth and Theunissen's 'repression thesis', as described in the previous chapter, but goes somewhat further than this in the light of the assertion that this epistemic way of relating to the Other is crucial for recognition. On a picture where self and Other relate to each other as intimately connected, part of the same monological entity and perhaps even relating to each other in a sense beyond the ontological (as Levinas claims), with the boundaries between self and Other blurred, we can see how positive ethical relationships are possible and how self-Other relations are forged before cognition is involved, even if cognition becomes crucial later (as I have argued it must be for mutual recognition, and indeed, re-cognition in general, as the re-making involves this radical rethinking of one's own position relative to the world and to others).³² If ambiguity is as important as I have argued, however, the picture seems to be more complex. If ambiguity, certainly an epistemic/cognitive phenomenon, is a precondition for recognition, and is a phenomenon that has to be mutual to lead to positive recognition, then it seems clear that recognition does not occur at the pre-cognitive level, but only later, when the subject has correctly understood itself and the Other as subject and object simultaneously. Is this a serious problem for the account I am suggesting, particularly in the light of the position which I will later accord to love and forgiveness?

The tension between some kind of primordial relationship between self and Other, where they confront each other in the pre-cognitive sense, and a more rationally-driven confrontation where the other is apprehended and understood in a cognitive sense, is also present in Hegel's master-slave dialectic, so it is not a problem that is introduced by considering his account along with those of his crit-

ics.³³ Again we might return to Levinas' account, which is much less ambiguously one which takes place on the pre (or non-) cognitive level. The face of the Other ethically compels the self to moral action, no frameworks or cognition required. This level of communication, if it can be called that, cannot in itself be an example of recognition, since it is not cognition. As I argued in the last chapter, however, this does not mean that two people who encounter and confront one another, on Leibniz' account, could not subsequently recognise each other. In Hegel's account, however, there is a tension, because the bar for self-consciousness is set so high. Recognition is a pre-condition for self-consciousness, so the two subjects who confront each other at the beginning of the confrontation are not even self-conscious (this does not in itself mean that the initial relationship cannot be a cognitive one).

We do not have to accept the claim that self-consciousness is a pre-condition for any knowledge in order to construct an account of positive recognition. In order to examine further the question of epistemic and cognitive involvement, however, the most important step is rather to examine two examples of how such phenomena might actually function in the social world. It is to this task that I turn in the remaining two chapters.

5 FORGIVENESS: CONFRONTATION, METANOIA AND THE FREEDOM OF THE OTHER

The central thesis of this chapter concerns the necessity of the recognition's mutual nature, and that this is its strength as an ethical concept. On the theme of confrontation, I discuss a range of ways in which recognition could fail, because of failures on the part of the self and the Other. I discuss five such archetypes. I also make reference to the concept of epistemic injustice, where a harm is committed by someone's refusing to accept a particular testimony, and ask whether something similar might be the case where recognition is somehow refused. I introduce forgiveness as an instructive example of the failure of mutuality (where, for example, repentance and remorse are not met with a forgiving response, or where forgiveness is not sought when a confrontation ethically demands this). I discuss Hegel's own passages on forgiveness at the end of the *Phenomenology* in order to put forward a model of how such an interaction can constitute precisely the sort of positive recognition whose preconditions I have discussed in the previous chapters. I discuss whether the particular features of forgiveness, particularly the question of who is qualified to seek and dispense it, and its theological dimensions, mean it is less, or perhaps even more, suitable as an ethical model of positive recognition.

The Confrontation With the Other

Before the analysis proper, I offer here a note on terminology which carries with it some substantial content. Over the course of this work. I have sometimes used the term 'encounter' and sometimes 'confrontation'. At this point I would like to clarify what I mean by the latter. An encounter is the most general term possible for contact with the Other – even perceiving the Other, although perhaps not being perceived *by* the Other (as this could be done without one's knowledge) is a kind of encounter. The most fleeting glance on the street, entirely by chance, would qualify for this. A confrontation, however, is more deliberate. One does not have to have actively sought the Other out for some purpose, but, in a con-

frontation, either the self, the Other, or both, must have some purpose which they wish to accomplish. This might be the case in a chance meeting – the self comes across the Other (or vice versa) and, during this encounter, develops some kind of purpose to the interaction. Of course, the self realising that the Other *is* an Other for it – the sort of creature that can recognise and be recognised – is a necessary condition of something being a confrontation rather than merely an encounter (where a confrontation is a sort of encounter).

A confrontation, then, is always something cognitive in character, whereas an encounter might not be. Take Levinas' encounter with the Other in *Totality and Infinity*, for example, as described in Chapter Three.¹ This is definitely an encounter rather than a confrontation, as the self cannot have any purpose in mind when he encounters the Other. There is no ontology involved – no understanding of the sort of thing that the Other might be, and certainly no theory of psychology as discussed in Chapter Three. It is merely the face of the Other that calls the self to action (or to lack of action, that is, not to kill). If Levinas' account of the encounter with the Other were to serve as the building blocks for a theory of social interaction, confrontations as I am describing them would not feature, at least not at the most fundamental level. Levinas' self and Other might well subsequently have a confrontation where there is a purpose to their interaction, but this is not the primordial level at which they interact.

Confrontation is not to be understood as a negative term, any more than 'violence' as discussed in the Introduction to this work and the next chapter is to be understood as purely negative. It has the following features:

1. (as stated above) It is an encounter with the Other involving some purpose, and thus an encounter where the Other is understood cognitively
2. It is in some way transformative for self and Other
3. It can (but does not necessarily) end in recognition

The second point connects the idea of the confrontation with that of *metanoia* and the broken middle, and the self as having less than total autonomy. Each confrontation produces some change in the human subject, and makes it a slightly different self (or very different self, as there are some confrontations in our lives that transform us to a fairly radical extent). Hegel's master-slave dialectic is a paradigm example of a confrontation – the purpose of the encounter is survival, and the encounter is transformative even though it does not lead to recognition.

Does a confrontation have to be just between two people? Are there limits to the forum in which it could take place? These two questions are particularly important for love and forgiveness as potential examples of positive recognition. I will consider the forgiveness angle here. It would be better for an account of forgiveness if we could conceive of a confrontation between more than two people, as in practice this is quite often what situations involving forgiveness and reconciliation require. It would also be better for an account of positive recog-

nition in general, as most interactions we have as a matter of course are with a number of people at once. If recognition is to function as some kind of model, it would be more realistic if confrontations could work on this multiple level. The alternative is to conceive of each of our interactions that are relevant for positive recognition and forgiveness/love as a series of interactions between two people (a series, that is, of confrontations), even if these happen in quick succession. The problem with this is illustrated above in the examples of forgiveness; A, B and C as described above are clearly all closely linked to each other and to the offence that might or might not have been committed, and to its forgiveness. To consider confrontations between A and B and A and C in the same way as between two pairs of people who have nothing to do with each other seems not to reflect the reality. Whilst the master-slave dialectic is a paradigm example of a confrontation, this does not rule out a confrontation between more than two people. The situation becomes more complex, however, when we consider the possibility that one confrontation is resolved as an example of positive recognition and the other is not – for, of course, not every confrontation ends in recognition (indeed, the master-slave dialectic does not). However, even here we can consider each pairing involved in the interaction as a confrontation, although not a separate one, as each pairing clearly affects the other. The encounter, considered as a whole, can be seen as transformative. Thus, the interaction or encounter as a whole can be seen as a confrontation.

Forgiveness as a Model of Ethical Recognition

In this work as a whole, I argue that forgiveness is particularly suitable as a model of ethical recognition because of the pre-conditions of offering, and, to some extent, receiving, forgiveness. I make reference to the Kantian account of forgiveness to illustrate that forgiveness of the other cannot be a simple moral imperative such as a categorical imperative in the Kantian sense. Rather, it depends on one's particular circumstances as to whether the offering (or indeed seeking) of forgiveness is a morally praiseworthy action. This is not to be understood in the same way as the moral worth of any course of action being assessed according to one's concrete situation, in the sense that one's circumstances might be plugged into a sort of calculus to decide whether one could rationally will one's actions as a universal law. The situation is rather more complex. There is also a notion of ethical development at play which is not present with moral concepts such as generosity or kindness, where an aggregation would always be morally better than an absence (or, to put it more simply, more would always be better). The decision whether or not to forgive is one which could itself aid moral development.

Even more particular to forgiveness is the particular mutuality which is involved, and this is key to Hegel's account. Whilst the relationship of forger

and forgiven (or, perhaps more accurately, potential forgiver and candidate for forgiveness) is asymmetrical, that is, the ethical obligations on them, assuming such exist, are of a different nature, these obligations are bound up with each other in a way that demands and requires co-operation. Is it possible to forgive someone who does not ask for, or otherwise seek, forgiveness? It depends on the reason why that forgiveness was never sought. There does not seem to be a problem with the idea that someone who believes what they have done to be so bad as to be unforgivable can nevertheless be forgiven by someone with a relevant connection to the offence. Indeed, such a forgiver might be seen as especially compassionate, offering forgiveness where they have not been prompted to do so. We might think, perhaps, of a person who has, through carelessness, been responsible for the death of someone's close relative, who is so racked with guilt that she does not ask that person for forgiveness but is told by the bereaved that it has been offered anyway.

The situation is more difficult, though, when the reason for forgiveness not being sought is because the candidate for forgiveness does not believe themselves to have committed an offence that would require forgiveness, or perhaps does not believe themselves to have committed an offence at all. To offer forgiveness in such a case might even seem to be a slight, particularly if the person has not been careless in their actions but has behaved at all times in adherence to their own moral code. One might think, perhaps, of a person who, after careful consideration, does not offer to lend money to an impecunious friend subsequently being informed by this friend that she is 'forgiven' – significant offence might quite justifiably be taken. If we are happy to accept the case of the bereaved relative as forgiveness, but not the friend who has not lent the money, then we are making a clear connection in forgiveness terms between an offence having been committed, or, perhaps more accurately, a shared *belief* that an offence has been committed (as we can imagine the transaction of forgiveness being offered but not sought in the context of a moral code we do not share). In order to be forgiven, or a forgiver, there has to be an acceptance on both sides that one stands in a particular relation to the offence.

When we consider one of the most difficult questions about forgiveness, namely, *who* it is that can forgive, we can refine this statement and say that there has to be an acceptance on both sides that each stands in a particular relation to the role of forgiver and forgiven – more simply put, that each is a candidate for forgiveness and a potential forgiver respectively. Moreover, each must be considered as such by the other for forgiveness to take place. Similar to the case above with the friend who refused to lend the money, we can think of a case of 'misplaced' forgiveness, where the candidate for forgiveness does not consider the potential forgiver to be the relevant person to bestow forgiveness, as that potential forgiver is not the victim of the offence. Think of a case like the following: person A, out of jealousy, spreads some malicious gossip about person B, and

person C, B's close friend, discovers this and takes A to task for her actions. A realises that she has committed some offence, and confesses to C the reason for this. C shows sympathy and compassion for A, and the resentment she has felt towards A dissipates, along with the social sanctions she had put in place against her. Thus, by either definition discussed in the previous chapter, C forgives A. A, to some extent, makes good her offence by letting it be known that the gossip she had spread is untrue. B, meanwhile, remains unaware of the offence. Now, it might well be the case that A does not 'accept' C's forgiveness, maintaining that C is not the victim of the offence and is not, therefore, in a position to forgive A. This might remain the case even if B subsequently becomes aware of the offence, and the confrontation between C and A, and offers his own forgiveness to A – in other words, if there is a confrontation of sorts between A and B. Nevertheless, it seems relevant to the calculus as a whole whether there is a confrontation between A and B. If B remains entirely in the dark, or perhaps even more so if B discovers the offence but harbours resentment and imposes social sanctions against A, it seems less appropriate for C to forgive A. In fact, it seems like some kind of slight towards B for C to offer forgiveness, and for A to accept that forgiveness, if B is in a state of knowing about the offence, but not having forgiven it. It is a slight instead of, rather than as well as, an instance of forgiveness – a kind of non-mutual forgiveness that therefore does not count as an example of such.

The situation seems much more straightforward for someone who does not 'accept' forgiveness as they believe that an offence has been committed, but they are not the author of that offence. There need be no confusion or argument about the actual order of events here, but merely about who might be a suitable candidate for forgiveness as a result of that offence. Most obviously, one might think of a member of some family or ethnic group who has suffered from some family feud or ethnically motivated persecution (whether or not the potential forgiver has himself personally suffered as a result of these historical offences), where the potential forgiver offers his forgiveness to a member of the persecuting family or ethnic group who was not personally involved in these offences. Let us assume that the member of the offending family or group accepts entirely the fact that a series of grievous offences has been committed, and let us assume for the sake of argument that this person accepts that the potential forgiver is indeed a victim of these offences, either because the person was directly affected or because he accepts the principle that victimhood can pass through the generations (an eccentric, but not in itself illogical view if this person is not willing to accept that candidacy for forgiveness can be thus passed down). Does whether or not we consider the confrontation between potential forgiver and candidate for forgiveness depend on whether *we* think the candidate for forgiveness is in a position to be forgiven, or whether the person considers *themselves* to be in such a position? In order for us to speak about forgiveness unproblematically, it seems

that both have to be the case. Where the candidate for forgiveness accepts the 'guilt', but, in our view, wrongly or incorrectly, we might still be able to accept the confrontation and resolution as forgiveness, albeit as an odd sort of pointless 'show' confrontation. Where the candidate ought, in our view, to accept the guilt and see himself as a candidate for forgiveness, but he does not, then it seems to us that a mutuality of forgiveness has failed, but not that forgiveness is somehow completely off the table, not rearing its head at all.

What we can take from the cases above is something like the following: in order for something to count as forgiveness, there is an extent to which both the candidate for forgiveness and the potential forgiver have, in the relevant sort of way, to acknowledge each other as both offender and offended, and, for there to have been a successful confrontation between the two, as candidate for forgiveness and potential forgiver. It is possible to see someone as a victim but not as someone who might potentially forgive oneself, the offender, just as it is possible to see someone as the offender without seeing someone who might seek forgiveness from oneself, the potential forgiver. In none of the cases considered above does victim or offender status carry with it an automatic status of potential forgiver or candidate for forgiveness respectively. In order for forgiveness to come to fruition by means of a confrontation, each person has to acknowledge the other as having the right kind of status as regards forgiveness, and their own status as forgiver/forgiven.

There is a clear parallel here between the recognition involved in forgiveness, and the concept of ambiguity as discussed in the previous chapter, with successful confrontation and interaction requiring that each recognise the role of the other in a particular way as well as recognising one's own role – subject and object, here the subject and object of forgiveness. The concept of forgiveness is here a particularly good illustration of the fact that objecthood is not a passive state of affairs, and that it is linked inextricably to the other's subjecthood. In being the subject of forgiveness, that is, the one who forgives, one takes into account the extent to which one is the object of a particular offence. (Indeed, it is the very transformation from the status of 'passive' object to 'active' subject which is seen as part of the healing nature of forgiveness for the victim of an offence). Clearly, in order to see oneself in some kind of relevant subject-centred relation, one has to view the other in the relevant kind of object-centred relation. Emphasising the role of ambiguity makes it clear that one must see oneself and the Other as both subject and object at the same time – one can never solely be the subject of forgiveness, bestowing gracious mercy on an object who is merely there to receive forgiveness.

It is worth making a note here about 'silent' forgiveness, that is, the sort of forgiveness that takes place without any kind of confrontation. An obvious case of this is forgiveness of someone who has died. We certainly speak of forgiving the dead, indeed, of this process being a healing one, but can it be a recognitive process? Going back to Chapter One and the analysis of master/slave dialectic, it seems not.² This is

either an indictment of the way I use the term 'forgiveness' in the previous chapter, and here, that is, that it doesn't properly capture the way that we generally use the word, or it is further demonstration of the importance of mutuality in recognitive processes. Of course, it could be both. If 'silent' forgiveness is indeed forgiveness, it is not the kind of forgiveness which is an example of successful recognition.

The example of 'silent' forgiveness makes it clear that, as well as mutuality, some kind of confrontation as described above is required for a process of forgiveness to count as recognition. It's not clear that this confrontation would have to be a particularly emotionally-charged or angry one, but 'encounter' seems too mild a term – there has to be some kind of meeting, in the loosest possible sense, between parties in which both make reference to the offence, or perceived offence, and their own roles in relation to the offence. This confrontation would not even have to be in person, but could also take place by correspondence. Forgiveness does not always have to be asked for, although this is one clear way in which the candidate for forgiveness can see and acknowledge themselves in the relevant relation to the offence and to the potential forgiver. Like recognition, forgiveness might come without being demanded. In order that the forgiven to acknowledge the forgiveness, and thus for the process of forgiveness to be properly completed, the forgiven has to identify herself as the proper recipient of forgiveness, and thus as subject and object simultaneously. However, it is entirely possible to thus acknowledge and view oneself without having sought out the forgiveness or recognition. This accords well with how forgiveness functions in our everyday moral lives.

In terms of forgiveness arising from confrontation, the public nature of such an encounter seems, in our everyday moral lives, to add weight, without being a necessary condition for forgiveness or recognition. One reason for this is the question of how the potential forgiver and the candidate for forgiveness are enmeshed in the general social world in which they find themselves. The example above of the malicious gossip demonstrates how neither potential forgiver nor candidate for forgiveness is likely to be operating in a social vacuum. The effects the offence, or perceived offence, has or had on people other than the potential forgiver are likely to be particularly relevant to a decision to forgive. As the malicious gossip example shows, it could be seen as disloyal or perhaps undermining the whole process to forgive where one is not the only person negatively affected by the offence, which might well be the same as not being the only person who is a potential forgiver of the offence (there might be some discussion about whether C in the example of the malicious gossip is the victim of the same offence as B – is the offence, from the point of view of C as the victim or B as the victim, properly seen as 'spreading malicious gossip about B' or 'spreading malicious gossip about me/my friend?'). A public confrontation – which need not, of course, be an actual argument in public, but could also be a discussion in person or via correspondence whose contents are made known to people other than the direct participants

– can further situate an offence and its forgiveness in its social context, making clear who else might or might not count as a victim, and thus potential forgiver. Public forgiveness, like public recognition, shows the forgiven as the forgiven, the forgiver and forgiver, and thus the recognised as recognised and recognisers and recognisers (each being both recognised and recognising at once). Thus, the process of public forgiveness underlines the sense of ‘re-cognition’ outlined in Chapter One, and again in more detail in Chapter Four³ – re-cognition is the re-thinking and re-imagining of oneself and the Other simultaneously. In our ordinary moral lives, this is likely to take place in a strongly social context.

Mutuality and Group Forgiveness

This leads us to another key aspect of forgiveness that is not a feature of many other operative concepts in our moral lives. It is very often the case with some offence that has been committed that individual identification not only of victims and thus potential forgivers, but also perpetrators and thus potential candidates for forgiveness is difficult, impossible or simply not appropriate. Not only is the committing of an offence against any given individual likely to have consequences that extend to his family, friends and other close associates – and perhaps a community as a whole, contributing to the general level of crime or antagonism that pervades in a workplace, village or group of a small enough size that a single offence can affect it – but, in the real world, a crime less obviously definable and out of the ordinary is likely to be perpetrated in some sense by a group of people. Some of these people will bear more guilt than others, but the group of candidates for forgiveness, which does not operate strictly by such degrees, is likely to number more than one.

For example, we might think of a woman who faces sexual discrimination in the workplace. On her return from maternity leave, she is confronted with a changed attitude from a number of her immediate superiors. She is given less interesting assignments, less work that constitutes useful experience for career progression, and as a result her career and general working life suffers. There is no active conspiracy that results in this state of affairs, no ringleader who suggests that the woman should be treated differently on her return. What happens to her, that is, the offence, is simply a result of lazy and unthinking stereotypes and reactions on the part of a group of people, and a failure on the part of others who might have been able to effectively challenge this behaviour to do so. The woman, quite rightly and correctly, feels wronged, and that she has been the victim of some offence. If she is to forgive the perpetrators, where could she even start? Would it be necessary to forgive each and every person who went along with the discriminating behaviour, as if there were no real connection between the actions of each one, and then the same with everyone who had a good chance to change the way things were developing, but did not? Even if it were practical to do so, this

does not seem to capture what would be happening if the woman were to forgive her (former) workmates and superiors. At the same time, by saying that she forgives them we do not want to suggest that she merely accepts that they were acting from some kind of inevitable social prejudice or stereotype which they had all, to varying degrees, internalized. To forgive someone is something quite far beyond simply understanding why they behaved as they did, and that their bad behaviour merely reflected a social norm which is or was more or less prevalent.

What is involved in the forgiveness of a group of people in a case like the one detailed above? If there is to be a confrontation of some kind, what would it consist in, and how could it be public? These are important questions, particularly because these cases of offence and injustice are likely to be at least as common as the more individual, personal ones like that of the malicious gossip, where the offence can be clearly defined, pinpointed in time and space and isolated from the general social life of a community. Here is one place where recognition meets social justice, and recognition of a potential forgiver as a victim is seen as part of a healing process. This is not the direct concern here, but it shows how forgiveness as recognition has a bearing on the wider moral and political issues. Can we speak of some kind of group responsibility, of, in the terms of the collective intentionality debate, there being a sense in which we are responsible over and above you being responsible and me being responsible? Can there, by extension, be a sense in which *we* are candidates for forgiveness over and above *you* being a candidate for forgiveness and *me* being a candidate for forgiveness?

If our everyday moral lives are a guide, then we will want to accept that there is some sense in which groups can be candidates for forgiveness, and not in some kind of extended historical sense as in the family or ethnic case outlined above, but in a case like that of the workplace discrimination. (I am not ruling out family or ethnic groups as candidates for forgiveness, but they could not practically function as such in the context of confrontation and public recognition, and I am thus leaving such cases aside). Referring again to the case of the malicious gossip, the various colleagues involved in the workplace discrimination case have all committed the same or broadly the same offence against their female colleague, and out of broadly the same kind of motivation (prejudiced thoughts, a desire to gain an advantage over a colleague, an unwillingness to 'rock the boat'). It would certainly be eccentric if she were to forgive some of her colleagues or former colleagues, whilst refusing to forgive those who had behaved in a similar way for similar sorts of reasons. These, of course, are tests, rather than definitive indicators, of a kind of group responsibility. Nevertheless, they are clear demonstrations of how these concepts operate in our actual moral lives.

We can accept the possibility of forgiveness of groups (that is, with the candidates for forgiveness forming a group) both because of some sense in which the offence was committed as a group, and because there is a sense in which they can,

as a group, be forgiven in a way that goes over and above each of them individually being forgiven. Of course, the latter is dependent to a great extent on the former, although the former is not a sufficient (or even a necessary) condition for the latter. There is a question over how forgiveness is to be sought when it is a group that is to be forgiven – although, as discussed above, this is not an absolute requirement for a process of recognition as forgiveness to take place. We can surely, however, imagine a situation where a small number of members of a group, with the public support and acceptance of a good number of other members of the group, seeks reconciliation with the victim once they acknowledge and realise that an offence has been committed. It is then very much up to the potential forgiver how she finds a way to forgive a group in a sense that goes beyond forgiving each of its members. The broader social context is likely to be particularly relevant here. In the case of the workplace discrimination, the actions of the workmates were at least partly based on social attitudes in general. Forgiveness is clearly something far above and beyond an understanding of the reasons an offence was committed, but nevertheless the recognition and understanding of the circumstances surrounding the behaviour is part of the confrontation – when seeking, or even accepting forgiveness, one typically offers reasons for, or an explanation of, the offending behaviour, not generally in order to excuse oneself, but to help the potential forgiver to understand the circumstances surrounding the offence. Indeed, were this step in the granting and accepting of forgiveness to be left out, it would be questionable as to whether forgiveness would count as such. Just as the social context is likely to be particularly relevant to the committing of the offence, so it is likely to be particularly relevant to its forgiveness.

All of these considerations about forgiveness, considered together, demonstrate a number of factors which the phenomenon has in common with a particular type of love as ethical partnership. The relevant factors about forgiveness are, from this discussion, as follows. First, and perhaps most importantly, *mutuality*. It is not possible, certainly in the sense that we are discussing forgiveness here, to forgive someone who does not accept that forgiveness in the sense of not seeing themselves as a candidate for it due to not having committed an offence, or not recognising the person doing the forgiving as a suitable person to do this. Forgiveness, in the non-mutual cases detailed above, fails. Secondly, this mutuality must work in a particular way – there are a range of reasons why recognition as forgiveness fails, some more catastrophic for that recognition than others. As with all of these phenomena concerning difficult human relationships, success and failure is not simply binary. There are some facts about an attitude or situation that will form an absolute obstacle to recognition and forgiveness, and some which will mean that the process goes only so far, and no further, failing to complete, but not, perhaps, without any value at all (although this is a separate question from whether something is properly seen as recognition). Whether the

right kind of mutuality can be said to exist is a matter, as discussed above, of the precise relationship and stance the potential forgiver and the candidate for forgiveness adopt towards each other and towards their past behaviour. Thus, the recognitive process of forgiveness can be said to develop in *consultation*. This is underlined by the demonstrated importance of confrontation in the process of reconciliation. The third and fourth factors I discussed as important for the forgiveness relevant as a recognitive process were the *public* and *social* aspects of the forgiving process. Private forgiveness might well count as recognition, but this effect is greatly enhanced if the confrontation that leads to the forgiveness is played out, to some extent, in public. Linked to this, as demonstrated by the case of the workplace discrimination, an understanding of the social context in which the original act or offence was committed might also be said to be critical for recognition, since a sufficiently detailed understanding of motivation and how this is socially influenced is crucial for forgiveness and recognition. I discuss in the following chapter how these four features – mutuality, consultation, and the public and social aspects – apply to love as ethical partnership.⁴

Forgiveness, Justice and the Ethical Life

It is important to note that not every example of successful recognition in the form of forgiveness will fulfil other accepted moral demands. A candidate for forgiveness might be forgiven without having shown what many ethical intuitions would state is the right kind of remorse. It is possible that the conditions for recognition in terms of both forgiver and forgiven standing in the right relation to the offence are met, without this being the *morally* correct stance for either to adopt. Some aspect of the offence which our ethical intuitions tell us is crucial might be ignored or given insufficient weight by both candidate for forgiveness and potential forgiver. For example, a man might forgive a man who has mistreated his wife in some way for the insult that this implies to him as victim and potential forgiver – this forgiveness might be publicly sought in the right way, publicly forgiven, seen in the correct social context, and the other conditions above fulfilled, without the discussion ever touching on what most would see as the core of the offence, the violence towards the woman. Nevertheless, it is a successful example of forgiveness as recognition, or could be if the correct conditions are met.

Why is this important, and does it cast doubt on the usefulness of a concept of positive recognition? This touches on an issue of central concern to my argument in this work. Understanding other's motivations, past actions, desires and the social context of all of these, and even taking these factors into account in one's actions, does not guarantee that one will treat them in an ethically good way. Moreover, of course, it does not guarantee that one will *love* them, although I leave full consideration of this to next chapter.⁵ If it did, positive recognition would be a different sort of ethical concept – positive recognition would be

necessary and sufficient for correct ethical action and could function, in ethical decisions that involve another in the relevant way (that is, nearly all of them) as a sort of categorical imperative. Ensuring the functioning of a positively recognitive relationship would be all one would have to do. This would be highly problematic, as positively recognitive relationships are supposed to provide the structure, but not, or certainly not all, of the content of a moral theory. This would only work if there were some procedural element to the role of recognition in a moral theory. Again, as in Kant's categorical imperative or Rawls's original position, this would mean that an action would be moral if and only if it were determined in a particular way. This is not how positive recognition as discussed in this work would function.

The kind of distinction I am referring to here can be illustrated with reference to the concept of epistemic injustice. As discussed in Chapter Two, this takes place where a person is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower.⁶ Their testimony is ignored, in all likelihood because of some inaccurate, prejudiced judgement about their epistemic ability. Epistemic injustice is unjust, and immoral, because it undermines the kind of epistemic structures that are required to produce judgements used in moral decisions. Additionally, it is immoral because it undermines the recognition of a particular person or people (or perhaps a whole group) as having the necessary epistemic ability to participate in discussions, including moral ones. (There might also be a separate sense in which prejudice of this type, in and of itself, is morally wrong). It is an important feature of our joint epistemic lives that we do not base membership of the club of people whose judgements are trusted on anything other than the trustworthiness of those judgements. If we do this, it makes our joint epistemic lives less effective, and undermines our access to the general body of knowledge. We are all less good knowers. There is a direct link here to discussions of collective intentionality: there is a sense in which we are good knowers that is something above and beyond you being a good knower and me being a good knower. In this case, the societal element is easy to identify. In not trusting the person against whom the epistemic injustice is committed, we are harming the general social basis of knowledge even if we already knew what the knower wanted to tell us. Societal knowledge is not just the sum of all our knowledge. Similarly, and vitally, the following principle holds: in defined circumstances of unreasonably refusing to trust the testimony of a knower, we have committed epistemic injustice *even if that testimony is false*.

So it is with recognition. If we fail to engage in the sort of ethical partnership, or forgiveness, outlined above and in the next chapter, then we are undermining the general structures of moral agency, even if, respectively, the decision arrived at by the ethical partnership is not fair to each of its members or the broader social group, or the forgiveness does not reflect the moral principles we should accept (as in the case of the forger of the violated wife described above). Of

course, a large part of the *value* of recognition, in its expressions as loving ethical partnership and as forgiveness, is that adopting the structures I outline in this work is likely to lead to positive moral treatment of others, of accepting and respecting their status and treating them fairly because of it. This is not the same claim as saying that creating recognitive relationships *is the same as* ensuring positive moral treatment of others. To express this point in somewhat bald terms, we can imagine that, in the partnership example above, partner A wants to move to city X in order to more easily pursue his hobby of pickpocketing, whereas partner B wants to move to city Y in order to sell dangerous, illegal substances to local schoolchildren. Whichever compromise, or otherwise, they find, they will not be performing morally praiseworthy actions. Nevertheless, their interaction could, if they adopt the correct standpoint in relation to the matter and each other, count as an example of positive recognition and ethical partnership.

One reason why the often difficult distinction between content and structure is so important is that the content for forgiveness and ethical partnership is impossible to prescribe, and this is part of the attraction of focussing on the structures. Phenomena like forgiveness unquestionably are part of our everyday moral lives, and yet we find it impossible to state the exact circumstances under which someone should forgive another person. Even under circumstances that are so similar as to be identical, we would not be likely to find it appropriate to argue that one wronged person is wrong not to forgive when the other does. We might find the failure to seek forgiveness morally blameworthy, but what we are actually finding wanting is the lack of acceptance or understanding of one's own crimes that this suggests, or the squandering of an opportunity to make amends and provide the potential forgiver with an experience that might prove healing. We cannot form any principles that state that one is obliged to forgive in a particular situation, since forgiveness does not seem to be the sort of thing that can or should be performed out of moral obligation. Indeed, an act of forgiveness performed out of a strong sense that one ought to forgive the offender seems not, on our everyday moral understanding, to qualify as forgiveness at all. My analysis of forgiveness as positive recognition explains this in terms of forgiveness involving an understanding of oneself as potential forgiver, and the candidate for forgiveness, in a particular relation to the offence. It does not primarily involve fulfilling a perceived moral obligation.

Kant's solution to the problem of forgiveness as moral obligation is to say that it is supererogatory, or at least that it is an imperfect duty where the agent has full discretion over how and when to discharge this duty. This accords well with our everyday moral understanding. Whilst we might find it difficult to condemn someone for not forgiving – often precisely because we are aware of the many difficulties involved in treating forgiveness as a moral obligation, for which see the discussion below – we do seem happy to accept that someone who forgives

where there was no obligation to do so has performed a morally praiseworthy action. Indeed, our moral admiration might grow along with the perceived seriousness of the offence for which the forgiveness was granted. It must have been particularly difficult to forgive, we think, and therefore the forgiver has done something particularly praiseworthy. (In itself, of course, this might not be a sensible way of thinking about moral action and demandingness). Forgiving where there was no need to forgive – because none had been sought, no remorse had been shown, or a similar reason, rather than no offence having been committed – might also be seen as morally praiseworthy, if somewhat confused. It is the thought, and the moral improvement that comes with it, that seems to spur on this moral admiration.

Seen in the context of the analysis in this work, this kind of moral admiration seems misplaced. In the terms I use here, the terms of ambiguity, excessive supererogatory moral behaviour towards the other risks seeing yourself only as subject, objectifying the other. As discussed above, unless the candidate for forgiveness stands in the right kind of relation to the potential forgiver and the offence, recognition is not possible, and neither is forgiveness in the true sense. There is nothing morally wrong with forgiving where the proper conditions for forgiveness, with regard to the potential forgiver, the candidate for forgiveness, or the offence, have not been met. However, such ‘forgiveness’ does not build recognitive relationships. At best, an unusual readiness to forgive might be seen as *indicative of the sort of character* that can easily build recognitive relationships, that is, does not cling to a desire to be the only subject. However, it might of course be that such a person is simply quite weak and easily led, relegating themselves to the sort of objecthood typical of the slave in Hegel’s famous passages. In any case, performing an action that is indicative of a certain sort of moral character is not the same thing as performing an action that is morally good. There might, as there seems for Kant, be a sense in which it is morally good to perform an action which leads to the development of a good moral character (indeed, it would also be possible for this to be accounted for on a consequentialist system). But, even on Kant’s system, which emphasises moral character, excessive readiness to forgive is not morally praiseworthy.

One reason why we find it so difficult to account for forgiveness in a prescriptive moral system is that we feel it has more value if spontaneous, and we feel that this spontaneity is only possible if there is no obligation to forgive. Moreover, much of the folk understanding of forgiveness as a moral concept has an unstated virtue ethicist view at its foundation, as stated above. A clear comparison is with a concept such as compassion. If one were morally compelled to compassion, it would not be true compassion. The key assumption is that forgiveness, like compassion, is to be performed out of love for one’s fellow human being, that is, out of *caritas*. This makes any moral theory that cannot account for the centrality of this phenomenon entirely redundant (perhaps it makes any analytical moral theory redundant – one can work towards developing greater love for one’s fellow man, but if it is entirely absent then notions of ‘could have acted otherwise’ are diffi-

cult to account for, and moral condemnation would involve a complex back-story, probably a theological one). All this is presumably the reason why, despite its playing a central role in our moral lives, forgiveness attracts far less commentary from moral philosophers than other phenomena such as punishment and responsibility. And yet, given that it *does* play such a vital role in our everyday moral lives, it is a criticism of any moral theory that it cannot properly account for forgiveness. Kant's account of forgiveness, discussed below, is the discussion of the phenomenon that one can most easily discuss in the terms of analytical philosophy.

Kant on Forgiveness

What relatively little Kant does have to say about forgiveness directly is scattered throughout his works, and generally relentlessly practical, focussing on forgiveness as action motivated precisely towards a particular goal. In the *Lectures on Ethics*, Kant tells us that forgiveness is 'the remission of compensation or payment.'⁷ In this sense, Kant's view foreshadows Nietzsche's much later view of punishment in the *Genealogy*, which plays on the double meaning in German of the word 'Schuld', that is, guilt or debt,⁸ as well as putting us in mind of the English use of the term 'forgiveness' of a debt. Forgiveness in this sense has something to tell us about retributive justice, but not mental processes. In this sense, it provides a clear contrast to one of the most famous and influential accounts of forgiveness, certainly at the time of Kant's writing – that of Joseph Butler, who argues in his *Fifteen Sermons* that forgiveness should be understood as the cessation of the *feeling* of resentment.⁹ On this view, there is little place for reconciliation in any meaningful sense. All it would mean would be the balancing of the books, with no way of deflecting Nietzsche's alarming suggestion that wrongs can be righted by the infliction of harm by the victim on the original perpetrator. It is a purely legalistic view, even Kant is explicit about the fact that this type of forgiveness refers to moral, not legal, punishment – that is, a rejection of someone's friendship, for example, rather than any legal sanction.¹⁰ Indeed, for Kant, this must be the case – we have a duty of apathy, a duty to *stop* our moral emotions interfering with our sober judgement of the facts at hand, and, most importantly, our choice of action. We might feel indignation at the violation of the moral law, even if we ourselves are not the victims, but this cannot cloud our judgement.¹¹ Nor, of course, is forgiveness a deliberate refraining from feeling moral emotions, accompanied by a refusal to seek moral redress. This would be to ignore or forget, not to forgive. Kant says that forgiveness might well entail 'consign[ing] his offence to oblivion, in regard to saying anything about it, and to display towards him the appearance of no longer recalling it' – but forgetting the offence entirely would require 'superhuman virtue.'¹²

The other important comment on forgiveness contained in the *Letter on Ethics* is Kant's claim that forgiveness is a duty of virtue, that is, as opposed to a duty of right, a major difference being that a duty of virtue cannot be coerced.¹³

As mentioned above, this seems to accord well with our common-sense understanding of forgiveness – we cannot be forced to forgive, or what is wrung from us is not forgiveness at all. However, when we set this in the context of Kant's earlier comments on forgiveness as regards the decision not to seek compensation, we note that it is of course possible for us to be coerced into this behaviour. Kant does not, however, think it is desirable for us to be thus coerced, for a duty of virtue has a particular motivation in his system. Fulfilling duties of virtue can serve two particular ends – the end of our own moral perfection, and that of the happiness of others. The first of these is particularly interesting from the point of view of moral optimism. The suggestion that performing virtuous acts that are not in any way compulsory can lead to our own moral improvement is in accordance with the view, attractive in many ways to those working from within a Christian context, that action can produce virtuous inclination or feeling. This insight can be combined with Kant's later observation that moral duties are simultaneously religious duties (although not, of course, vice versa).¹⁴

The external acts of forgiveness, therefore, are useful and praiseworthy, if not compulsory, because they improve our moral sensibilities and personalities. David Sussman, in his influential account of Kantian forgiveness, also suggests that forgiveness might lead us towards moral progress. On Sussman's account, forgiveness, like God's grace, has to do with instilling an attitude of 'trust and hope' between victim and perpetrator, coming to see 'the relationship we might come to have in the future.'¹⁵ This seems very much like our general concept of reconciliation. Moreover, it fits in more broadly with a recurrent theme in Kant's philosophy, a concept that underlies both his theoretical and practical work, from the 1781 *Critique of Pure Reason*, and intensifying to reach a peak in *Towards Perpetual Peace* (1795). Just as the thing-in-itself, the noumenon, remains hidden from view and yet influencing the world of phenomenal appearances, so our political action must aim at a goal that will ultimately always remain out of reach, but which must nevertheless constantly guide our action – that of the world-state (Weltstaat). Perfect forgiveness and the chance of perfect reconciliation, of perfect trust, is ultimately unattainable, but by performing the action of forgiveness, we can nonetheless be constantly improving our moral selves. Understood this way, Kant seems like much less of a pessimist.

Hegelian Forgiveness

Hegel's account of forgiveness in paragraphs 667–79 of the *Phenomenology* has been viewed by some critics as an example of positive Hegelian recognition.¹⁶ In this section, I will examine this claim and make some connections between love and forgiveness as examples of positive recognition.

In his 1997 article, Alan Singer discusses the Hegelian concept of forgiveness as the *telos* of Greek tragedy.¹⁷ He argues that, from the Hegelian point of view, it

is a mistake to see tragic catharsis as an example of misrecognition. I agree with this analysis: the basic conditions for recognition are not present, so that the tragic impasse cannot be seen as a failure of recognition even in the same way as the master/slave dialectic. In the master/slave dialectic, recognition is not achieved because neither party makes the crucial step of recognizing the other. In some of the examples of a failure of recognition and failure to provide the right environment for self-consciousness which I discussed in the previous chapter, the situation can also be described as 'misrecognition' because they arise from failures on the part of others to provide recognition, or indeed a simple refusal. The example of Antigone is much more akin to the way Simone de Beauvoir seems to view the roles of men and women in recognition: that is, women are not treated as candidates for recognition because they do not enter into a master/slave like struggle.¹⁸ There is no way that Antigone can gain recognition because of her objective status as regards the divine and human laws. In this sense, forgiveness is also impossible.¹⁹

Refusal to forgive, however, is a form of misrecognition quite similar in structure to the master/slave dialectic, as is shown here:

But the admission on the part of the one who is wicked, 'I am so', is not followed by a reply making a similar confession. This was not what that way of judging meant at all: far from it! It repels this community of nature, and is the 'hardheartedness', which keeps to itself and rejects all continuity with the other. By so doing the scene is changed. The one who made the confession sees himself thrust off, and takes the other to be in the wrong when he *refuses to let his own inner nature go forth in the objective shape of an express utterance*, when he contrasts the beauty of his own soul with the wicked individual, and opposes to the confession of the penitent the stiff-necked attitude of the self-consistent equable character, and the rigid silence of one who keeps himself to himself and refuses to throw himself away for someone else.²⁰

The refusal to forgive, and to admit similar guilt, mirrors the refusal to recognize. The refusal to forgive is a refusal to adopt objecthood, as the italicized words demonstrate. The one making the confession adopts something like the position of the slave, and the one who refuses forgiveness something like the position of the master. The refusal to throw himself away is a refusal to enter into a relationship which expresses intersubjectivity.

As Singer points out, the need to ask for forgiveness arises inevitably from the structure of human action and the necessity of acting from 'a law of subjective moral consciousness' which presupposes its universality with respect to the Other.²¹ There is a clear connection between this thought and the idea of an onto-theology as discussed in Chapter One. Onto-theology was defined there as the provision for the individual to look back and trace its origins to a pre-individual stage. The need for forgiveness arises because it is not possible for the individual, in this onto-theology, to locate an *objective* moral consciousness, although such a thing might exist.

The Christian context of Hegel's account of forgiveness is obvious, although of course the Christian account of forgiveness links the necessity of confession and forgiveness to the doctrine of original sin rather than the impossibility, on the level of the individual, of ascertaining an objective moral consciousness. This does not constitute an objection to his account, as he is patently not justifying it or developing it from a supernatural level.

Whilst the relatively complicated and demanding nature of mutual recognition on a level outside that of forgiveness might make one despair that it could ever truly be possible, the resolution of the case of forgiveness as recognition is far easier:

The word of reconciliation is the objectively existent spirit, which immediately apprehends the pure knowledge of itself qua universal essence in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself qua absolutely self-confined single individual – a reciprocal recognition which is Absolute Spirit.²²

Here it becomes clear once more precisely why it is *reciprocal* recognition which is important for self-consciousness: namely, because only then is the subjectivity and self-confined nature of the subject realized through recognizing the Other as part of the universal essence, and going back to the pre-individual stage is a crucial part of this. Hegel's remark at the end of the quoted passage is also crucial – the Other is not subsumed, as Theunissen, Honneth and Habermas suggest. In this way, the phenomenon of forgiveness as a form of recognition also contributes to a defense of Hegelian recognition and intersubjectivity against their objections.

In one of the few accounts that make an explicit connection between forgiveness and recognition in the Hegelian sense, Allen Speight, in a 2005 article, outlines two features of forgiveness as seen by Hegel (and Butler, whose account of forgiveness I discuss earlier in this chapter).²³ For both Hegel and Butler, so Speight, 'forgiveness is (1) an *overcoming of resentment* that is based on a *revision of judgment* and (2) a recognition of conditions affecting both agency and judgment in general.'²⁴ Thus, Hegel seems to share Butler's, rather than Kant's, view of what forgiveness actually involves as an action, as opposed to when it can be said to have occurred. The second aspect of Hegelian forgiveness is particularly relevant to the kind of analysis of forgiveness as recognition outlined above, but the first is also relevant. The act of forgiving involves an epistemic, not simply an emotional skill, as Speight points out.²⁵ Forgiving someone involves a shift in how you understand them, their actions and the general social context, not just a shift in how you *feel* towards them. The emotional aspect, the overcoming of resentment, comes later, and, importantly, as a consequence of this epistemic shift.

This puts Hegel's account (and Butler's, of course) immediately at odds with that of Kant. Kant thinks that forgiveness *consists in* refraining from placing some kind of social sanction on the perceived offender/forgiven, or ceasing such a social sanction that has already been put in place. For an account such as that of Hegel,

this would be a *consequence* of forgiveness rather than forgiveness itself. More fundamentally, Hegel sees forgiveness as a process that concludes with some kind of 'judicial' (not necessarily in the formal, legal sense) ceasing or refraining from sanctions. For the purpose of considering recognition, it is the earlier part of the process that is much more useful and interesting to consider. How, precisely, is judgement revised, and what is the mutual aspect of this revision of judgement? Is it important how the perceived offender or candidate for forgiveness judges the potential forgiver? For recognition, the key is that it is a mutual process.

As I have tried to show in this chapter, there are a number of respects in which Hegel's account of forgiveness fulfils, or could fulfil, the role of an example of positive recognition. In particular, Hegel's account of forgiveness is clearly bound up with the general framework of recognition which I argued in Chapter Five, 'Forgiveness as a Model of Ethical Recognition' is essential for it to be an example of positive recognition and accord well with our everyday understanding of forgiveness. As I have also tried to show, Hegelian forgiveness, and any forgiveness as positive recognition, is a process of judging and acting rather than simple feeling. Nevertheless, how one judges as regards the Other is vital for positive recognition. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in the example of love, to which I turn in the next and final chapter.

6 LOVE: ETHICAL PARTNERSHIP AND THE SELF IN THE OTHER

In this chapter, I discuss the possibility of love as another ethical model of positive recognition. I make reference to Hegel's discussions of love and partnership from his early and late works, from the early Jena manuscripts to the *Philosophy of Right*. I also take account of the small amount of recent scholarship on Hegel and love. One central question here is whether the model of loving partnership required for positive recognition would in fact undermine the autonomy that is desirable for a number of reasons, not least ethical personhood and the possibility of freedom. Another key consideration is whether the love involved in this idea of positive recognition would have to be instantiated in an exclusive, loving partnership, or whether such interactions could take place on a wider scale, including the idea of love as *caritas*.

From Pre-Jena to the Philosophy of Right: Hegel on Love and Recognition

Hegel's writings on love spread out throughout his work, from the pre-Jena *Early Theological Writings* to the *Philosophy of Right*. Sometimes love as partnership takes centre stage, and sometimes it is a more general love as *caritas*. A full examination of Hegel's views on love is obviously well beyond the scope of this chapter and work in general. What I offer here are some suggestions of how love as ethical partnership could be an example of positive recognition in the sense that I have outlined it over the previous five chapters. The main focus is therefore on love as close partnership in the way one observes it in a marriage or similar relationship, although I also argue that love can be the basis of other ethical partnerships. One central question is also the extent to which the concept of the self as outlined over the course of this work underlies and shapes the idea of love as positive recognition.

Over the past decade or so, there has been a great deal of interest in Hegel's *Early Theological Writings*. To a great extent, this has co-incided with a resurgence of interest in the topic of recognition as a potential positive ethical phenomenon. The thought or hope behind this is often, as Peter Wake puts it:

...to read parts of Hegel's later systematic works through the earlier ones with the hope of capturing a spirit of engagement and openness to future events that is too often concealed behind the still-lingering image of Hegel's work as a triumphalist philosophy of historical progress, a totalitarian theory of the Absolute, and the last stand of the onto-theological tradition.¹

This image of Hegel's later works is misleading (as indeed Wake implies), but nonetheless the impulse is easy to understand. What we can observe in this early Hegel is a shifting and changing approach to the ethical, to theology and to the concept of the self, particularly the social self. Hegel moves from a much more autonomous view of the self in the early essay *Positivity of the Christian Religion* (1795), to a view much more like his later one, and much more like what is being proposed here, in the better-known *Spirit of Christianity and its Fate* (1796). Richard Kroner, in an introduction to T.M. Knox's translation of the *Early Theological Writings*, incisively remarks that there seems to be a century between the writers of these two pieces, that the writer of the first seemed to be a contemporary of 'Moses Mendelssohn, Lessing, Sulzer or Kant, whilst the author of the second was evidently a contemporary of Jacobi, Herder, Schleiermacher, Fichte, Schelling and Hoelderlin.'² In the *Spirit of Christianity*, Hegel has moved on from the purely Enlightenment way of reasoning and reached the kind of post-Kantian idealist position which he would represent in the *Phenomenology* and beyond, and a key part of this is a move away from the autonomy of the self that ones finds in a (somewhat caricatured) Kant. The fact that his comments on love that have most in common with his later statements on the same emerge in precisely this period is surely no co-incidence.

Hegel and the 'Pantheism of Love'

What Kroner terms Hegel's 'Pantheism of Love' is the first real glimpse of the dialectical method that would be one of his most enduring legacies. The main thrust of the argument is the overcoming of dualisms, in a manner very much reminiscent of the discussion in Chapter Two of this work, that is, including the division between subject and object.³ Another dualism which this Pantheism of Love as expounded in the *Spirit of Christianity and its Fate* (and glossed by Kroner) wishes to overcome or sublimate is that between reason and passion, between being led by intellectual or epistemic factors and being led by emotional ones. There is a fundamental problem with the Kantian notion of autonomy: in mastering himself (and being the only master of himself), one becomes master and slave, and thus estranged from oneself (to use slightly anachronistic terminology). At best, one is mastered by reason and becomes a slave. It is in Jesus' ethics that we find an ethics of love, free from rational constraint, that allows us to be reconciled to ourselves without alienation.⁴

Whilst theological speculation is clearly at odds with Hegel's later ontological (in sense (c) as described in the Introduction to this work) claims and method,

it does at least resonate with his work on recognition. Recognition and self-consciousness precede knowledge of reason in the *Phenomenology*, so it is not *qua* rational being that the self encounters the Other. If one first had to attain a state of rational autonomy as a fully-developed self, then alienation as described in the *Spirit of Christianity and its Fate* would surely occur. At the same time, when the self and the Other develop together and both become rational possessors of knowledge, the relationship between them does not fundamentally change.

These, and other, considerations might suggest that there is one dichotomy that should be overcome before a genuine account of positive recognition might be possible. That dichotomy is between the epistemic and the emotional, the cognitive relation with or understanding of the other, and the emotional connection. At many points in this work, I have asked whether the relationship of self to Other needs to be epistemic or cognitive, or whether there is any place for a Levinasian relationship between self and Other that comes before any epistemic or cognitive conception. I have concluded that, as long as self and Other ultimately have a relationship that is epistemic or cognitive, their initial contact not being thus is less important. But is the distinction really so clear in the first place? Are we really sure what we mean when we separate emotion from understanding?

This is a fundamental philosophical question going far beyond the scope of this work. However, by using some insights from the philosophy of emotion, and by reflecting on the concept of the social self from the previous chapters of this work, and by examining Hegel's work on love in the rest of his work, I make some suggestions.

In the *Fragment on Love* from the *Early Theological Writings*, Hegel seems to sense this dilemma when he writes '[i]n love the separate does still remain, but as something united and no longer as something separate; *life senses life*'.⁵ The confrontation (in the sense I discussed it in the previous chapter) is transformative, and it is not initially cognitive, but rather, is a more Levinasian in the sense of a primordial encounter where the Other compels in some way without the involvement of any cognitive framework or epistemic work. The self recognises something fundamental in the Other that is the same as the self, the self repeated in the Other, but this does not have to be on the level of rational thought or epistemic reasoning, just as Levinas' confrontation or encounter between faces (as described in Chapter Three) does not have to be.⁶

Desire, as in the master-slave dialectic, acts in a paradoxical way. Although desire at first affirms or is conscious of the self and wishes to negate the other, it simultaneously does the opposite: it affirms the Other and denies the self. Such objects resist desire, and the subject affirms the reality of the other by highlighting its resistance. What is more, if self-certainty and even my reality is achieved only by this relation to the other, if I negate the other I will simultaneously negate myself. Although I have a strong desire to negate the other, I have a vested

interest in its continued existence. The only other possibility for the subject is a life of existential instability, a life of finding objects to desire and negate.

It is only in love that an equilibrium is achieved between negation and affirmation is achieved, and the precondition for this is total physical and general surrender of a particular kind. This is most strongly and concisely elucidated in this passage from the fragment on love:

Love is indignant if part of the individual is severed and kept back as a private property. This raging of love against [exclusive] individuality is shame... If shame, instead of being an effect of love, is an effect which only takes an indignant form after encountering something hostile which wanted to defend an assailable property of its own, then we would have to say that shame is characteristic of tyrants, or of girls who will not yield their charms except for money, or of vain women who want to fascinate. None of these love; their defence of their mortal body is the opposite of indignation about it; they ascribe an intrinsic worth to it and are shameless.⁷

Shame, then, is a reaction to the Other of love wishing to defend an aspect of itself and to refuse complete surrender. Here we can see an instructive parallel with Sartre's concept of shame, which is a reaction on the part of the subject to being objectified by the Other (the famous keyhole example). Hegel's subject feels shame when the Other remains in some respect resolutely Other, when it insists on differentiating itself. By differentiating itself in this way the Other in turn objectifies the subject – recognitive intersubjectivity in the real sense does not take place, so the only possible relation the subject can have for the Other is that of an object to the Other's subject. Like Sartre's shamed subject, Hegel's shamed subject under these circumstances becomes an object. The *Fragment on Love*, then, seems to support the general view of recognition as involving ambiguity that I outlined in Chapter Four. Recognition in a positive sense involves the self seeing itself and the Other as both subject and object simultaneously.

At this point in the discussion, I am treating love as *caritas*, that is, love for one's fellow human, in the same way as romantic love or love as partnership. In the *Spirit of Christianity and its Fate*, Hegel is talking mainly about the former and in the *Fragment on Love*, mainly about the latter. This demonstrates how clearly Hegel, at least the very early Hegel, believed love as *caritas* to be enmeshed in theology. The *Fragment on Love* lacks this framework in any obvious or explicit sense, although it might well still be rooted in an ontology (in sense (c)) involving theological aspects.

Love in Hegel's Later Works

Hegel sometimes seems to regard love as the purest or highest form of recognition, and it often seems that it forms a paradigmatic sort of counterpart to the failed recognition of the master-slave dialectic. In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel

treats love as a form of recognition. For example, in the context of a discussion of unity, he says the following:

In this simple beholding of the self in other, being-other is not posited as such; it is a distinction that in pure thought is immediately no difference – a recognition of love in which both lovers are by their very nature not opposed to each other.⁸

This picks up the theme, discussed particularly in Chapter Four of this work, that the sort of unity involved in positive forms of recognition, unlike the master-slave dialectic's failed recognition, does not involve subsuming but the overcoming of difference to some extent. In this sense, there is continuity over the course of Hegel's works in his comments on love.

Hegel begins his discussion of marriage in the *Philosophy of Right* with a discussion of love, a clear sign that love, for this later Hegel, is not a formal kind of construct but rooted in emotion. Nor can this love be entirely from afar, or with an artificially constructed Other. Whilst everyday relations could conceivably take place with a 'fake' other or one that is not genuinely self-consciousness, marital love, because of the extent of knowledge of the other and depth of emotion experienced, is necessarily between two people who are fully self-conscious. The key factor in a loving partnership as I am describing it here is the long-term perception of oneself as part of a unit and the relevant sense of renunciation of independence. Whilst Hegel seems to have been talking specifically about marriage, it seems that we could, from a 21st century perspective, include other relationships which fit into category of shared goals and the sense of being a unit. A deeper examination is necessary to determine whether the relationship must be 'romantic' in the sense of common parlance – perhaps this could take place in the context of the philosophy of emotion, as detailed in the final section of this work. It may be decided that two extremely close friends, or indeed other pairings with no 'romantic' background, could fit into this category. Instinctively, however, we might imagine that the unification of self-consciousness would practically require the depth of emotion found in romantic love.

In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel sees love as an amazing contradiction (*ungeheuerste Widerspruch*), a dialectical struggle between individuality and unity.⁹ The first impulse or desire is to become subsumed in the other, but soon after the sense of autonomous selfhood is galvanised by the same relationship that threatened to obliterate the self entirely. This opposition or gap between self-affirmation and self-obliteration can only be reconciled by *mutual* recognition, which promotes a deep sense of unity with the partner and autonomy of the self. In this sense, the phenomenon of ambiguity comes into play, along with the preceding stages of wanting to be the only subject and wanting to be the only object.

The fact that this happens on an epistemic as well as an empirical level can be seen in the following, quite famous, passage, central to the understanding of love in the *Philosophy of Right*:

Love means in general terms the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not in selfish isolation but win my self-consciousness only as the renunciation of my independence and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me.¹⁰

In love, my self-consciousness is gained only by renouncing my individuality on one leel. The self-consciousness is negated before being affirmed once more by the other's recognition. In this sense, love seems to form the mirror-image of the struggle between master and slave, which could help us to examine the sense in which the latter is seen as a failure of recognition. The loving and the master-slave relationships represent polar opposites in a normative ethical sense, but seen from an epistemological point of view there are interesting similarities. The theme of obliteration is present in both relationships, but in love there is the initial desire to be obliterated, at one stage at least, whereas for the master and slave the desire is to obliterate. The experience of love is what prepares the individual to enter into ethical life, and therefore the sense of recognition most clearly typified here is the most basic sense of recognition and is chronologically prior to the other two senses of the term.

Desire at its most basic level involves the desire to negate the object and to consume it. We want to transform otherness into oneness, difference into identity. It is only by negating the object that we can affirm our own existence. In this way, the reluctant lover, of the *Fragment on Love* who wants to keep himself back from the self is rather like the reluctant forgiver described in Chapter Five. Just as with the example of forgiveness as discussed in the previous chapter, Hegel demonstrates in one place the failure of the form of recognition before moving on to describe a positive form. Here, the negative form as regards love as partnership comes much earlier, in the *Fragment on Love* with the positive form much later, in the *Philosophy of Right*. Despite not providing a clear model of how love as positive recognition could work in the *Fragment on Love*, there is a certain continuity between these early and late works in terms of what is important for love, that is, not to hold back in the way that the reluctant lover does. What has come into play in Hegel's work since his early writings is a highly developed and detailed theory of self-consciousness which bears heavily on how we understand his concept of recognition as elucidated in the *Phenomenology*.

One interpretation of self-consciousness is that it rests on the ability to act other than as a function of one's natural desires.¹¹ The connection to recognition is clear; the ability to act properly and participate in ethical life and especially in the family is a demonstrable manifestation of this ability. Even the ability to enter into contractual relationships presupposes the ability to forgo the pursuit of a natural desire.

In love and the family the situation is perhaps more complex, as it is not entirely clear where my natural desires end and the desire to enhance the well-being of my family begins. Indeed, it could well be argued that the desire to protect and further the well-being of my family is a natural desire; certainly this behaviour can be

observed in the animal kingdom when a mother or father protects their young. The situation is clearly more complex, however, as Hegel's picture of love portrays a unit so close that it is no longer meaningful to speak of a couple's own desires separately. That said, empirically we know it is a vital part of a close relationship, especially a marriage-like one, that basic and overriding desires are discussed and balanced. One might think of career and location decisions – differences are discussed within the marriage unit and a united plan for the satisfaction of what is now a joint desire is (hopefully) presented. The question of whether such desires are *natural* desires is a relevant one, and if we are keeping with the agreed definition of natural we would have to conclude that they are not.

In that case, we can present the following picture. Self-consciousness involves the ability to act other than as a result of one's natural desires. We might imagine that this is a practical or empirical precondition for forming a marriage-like relationship in the first place, as it is rather difficult to imagine how even the initial stages of a courtship might proceed without this ability. Recognition in an epistemological or ontological sense is involved here, as is the ability to see the other as a subject and not a mere object and the ability to see oneself as a subject with regard to the other. A dialogue is occurring about the balance of one's own natural desires and the natural desires of another, or, in the most basic sense, the realisation that the other can form a restriction on one's natural desires without the explicit realisation that this is because of the natural desires of the other. Phenomenologically, the following steps take place in this process.

1. There is an Other that is a potential obstacle to my satisfaction of my natural desires. (Recognition of oneself as a subject – I am the source of the natural desires)
2. The reason that I might not be able to satisfy my natural desires is because the Other has its own natural desires. (This is the recognition of the Other as a subject – the other has natural desires that are conceptually similar to mine. This realisation presupposes the subjecthood of the Other).

These two steps above demonstrate recognition in the strict epistemological sense. I am aware of myself as a subject through the perception of the Other in the context of my natural desires, and this fulfils the condition I have set for self-consciousness.

Even after realising the truth of these two statements above, the subject might in some sense be incapable, physically or psychologically, of according weight to the desire of the other by modifying its own actions. Equally, the subject might be capable of acting other than as a function of his natural desires but decide not to do so (of course, this would still make him self-conscious, as it is ability that is important there). The important factor for self-consciousness is the basic epistemological and cognitive empathy required for the two statements above.

The elucidation of the relationship is, however, interesting and important for the parallel phenomenological process that occurs in recognition in the family or a partnership. Here, we no longer have to make a distinction between natural

and non-natural desires, having already established that the self-conscious subject is able to at least conceive of acting other than as a function of its natural desires, even if is not able to apply this knowledge in an area that goes beyond the cognitive. The process can be portrayed as follows.

My partner is a possible obstacle to the fulfilment of my desires.

My partner is an obstacle because she has her own desires she wants to

fulfil. (Recognition of the Other as relevantly similar in this manner).

So far, this phenomenological process is occurring on a purely cognitive level, involving only the realisation that the Other or partner is relevantly similar, that she is the subject of her desires and I am the subject of mine. However, in a partnership that works the way Hegel is envisaging, the deliberations will not stop there, but will instantiate the following thought processes:

Because of the relation of self-consciousness we have with each other that is the result of love rather than contract, it is desirable for me on some fundamental level that the desires of my partner are fulfilled. The desire that the wishes of my partner are fulfilled is like a second-order desire for me. The strength or importance of this desire must therefore be weighed up against my other desires and other factors.

We might need to look again at the concept of second-order desires and extend it from Frankfurt's original definition of it being a desire for a desire.¹² It is particularly important to find an acceptable way of distinguishing between first-order and natural desires, and the precise definition of second-order desires and 'proxy' desires as described above will depend partly on this. My partner's desires are at the same time my desires, but her desire to, for example, go and live in Paris is not the same for me as if it were my desire in the first place: she presumably has a series of motivations for wanting to live in Paris that I do not necessarily share. Nevertheless, a proxy desire is still *my* desire.

Here we see again that self-consciousness is often better explained as an appetitive phenomenon than a cognitive one. When we consider the above, we can understand much better what Hegel means when he talks about self-consciousness becoming united between partners in such a relationship.

The unity of desires is a manifestation of this unification of self-consciousness; my partner's desires are my desires, and to say this we do not have to add in any extra stage of the argument. Of course, the underlying desire that causes her desires to be my desires by proxy is that I want her to be happy, but this is already built in to how we conceive the marriage-like relationship in the first place. This does not make the relationship I have with my own desires qualitatively different from the relationship I have with my proxy-desires, as we could equally ask why I want my own desire to be satisfied – it is equally a valid question. The answer would be that I want to be happy.

In this appetitive context we can see the exact parallel with the first case in terms of subject and object. In the first case, it was a necessary stage in the

proceedings that I recognised the other as a subject. In the case of the marriage-like relationship, it is a necessary stage in the proceedings that I recognise my partner as a particular kind of subject and object for me. The recognition that love entails, requires and constitutes is a movement of the phenomenon of self-consciousness into this appetitively unified context.

What do we say of loving relationships that do not involve this kind of appetitive recognition? We would have to say they cannot exist, by definition. Recognising proxy desires does not involve altruism or a considerate nature, as to recognise a desire does not mean that this desire becomes the most important consideration. Perhaps I am an extremely selfish person, and my own desires will outweigh my proxy desires in all cases. This does not mean I do not love my partner, although it does perhaps mean I need to work on becoming less selfish. If my relationship with my partner is such that her desires are not proxy desires for me, that they do not even register on my scale of what is important, then it cannot be that I love my partner in the sense that is important for Hegelian recognition – i.e., in such a way that loving recognition will be possible.

One consequence of these ontological and epistemological conclusions is that Hegel is committed to a deep communitarianism. I argue that the social or cultural sense of recognition need not apply only to married or loving couples, but can come into play in a variety of close social relationships. Finally, I examine briefly the extent to which Hegel's detailed picture of recognition might be applied to the contemporary political philosophy of recognition in terms of feminism and multiculturalism, given that it is the act of recognising rather than of being recognised that seems to do the most work in Hegel's account. In particular, I argue on meta-physical and epistemological grounds against a portrayal of Hegelian recognition as an ontology which ultimately reduces all difference to an identarian totality: his monological view does not entail such an ethically suspect position.

One important sense in which recognition is an ethical impulse is seen in the discussion of the role of the family in the *Philosophy of Right*. The formation of the family – in Hegel this is extremely difficult to distinguish from the formation of the marriage contract or relationship – is portrayed as the centre of ethical life.

The existence of shared desires as the basis of marriage-like love is what makes loving recognition the basis of ethical life. Shared desires, although the proxy connection might not be as strong, are what underpins all kinds of connections in civil society. It is what makes public goods possible – only through desires that are shared in a fundamental sense can have a vested interest in the progress or justice of the society in which I live.

As D. Duquette correctly points out, one of the main issues in the debate about Hegelian recognition focuses on the relative importance of the question of the social and historical aspects of recognition and the more strictly psychological significance.¹³ The discussion which preceded this chapter explicitly

wished to move away from the world-historical aspects of Hegel's concept of recognition in favour of a more psychological approach. Although I reject a strictly internal reading of the master/slave chapter, the immanence rather than the transcendence of the Other means that the impulses of domination and servitude cannot be seen as characterising or polarising one person in a partnership. There is a great extent to which both forces are present within an individual ego, although this might not be true of any particular moment in time.

The historical interpretation that sees the master and slave as not psychological but historical archetypes is not my concern.¹⁴ On my interpretation, the master/slave conflict is not resolved in any historical era but necessarily re-emerges as part of any relationship, even sometimes in an essentially loving one. The kind of view of a marriage-like relationship Hegel has does indeed include the resolution of the master/slave conflict to lead to a positive form of recognition.

I have argued in the previous sections that the master/slave dialectic represents recognition that is defective, rather than a complete lack of recognition. The deficiency of the relationship is therefore not entirely epistemological, but also has a normative dimension. The master fails to relate conatively to the slave: his relations remain cognitive and therefore no true recognition occurs – the master does not see himself as a subject in relation to the Other (in this case, the slave), he simply sees the slave as an object that mediates his relationship to the natural world to such an extent that the master becomes isolated from the world. This occurs because the slave is used to fulfil the desires of the master. The master perceives the slave cognitively as an object. Whilst the master might come to accept, by means of perception and cognition, that the slave is relevantly similar and therefore an object of the same kind as himself, this falls a long way short of the true recognition that can only come from relating conatively in terms of desires that sometimes conflict but ultimately must be reconciled. The slave's interaction with the world means that the master is not dependent on the world, and the master interacts with the world only cognitively.

The slave, meanwhile, does relate to the master in terms of desire and can come to see himself as a subject in relation to the Other, that is, the master. The slave recognises that he is dependent on the natural world and can react with it through work, which is desire held in check.¹⁵ Work is activity that is not a function of the slave's natural desires, but a function of the lord's desires.

A relationship with the Other that goes beyond, or perhaps stops before, the purely cognitive or epistemic has been a theme of this work in general. On the one hand, I argue from the Introduction onwards that recognition has to involve cognition, as recognition simply is a rethinking of the self in relation to the Other (re-cognition). On the other hand, our relation to the Other just does not seem to be purely cognitive, or even mainly or primarily, or first of all. In the fourth section of this chapter, I explore a potential solution to this tension.

Love as Ethical Partnership and as *Caritas*

How far do the four features of forgiveness I discussed in Chapter Five – mutuality, consultation, and the public and social aspects – apply to love as ethical partnership?¹⁶ The first is clearly necessary for the partnership aspect, so much is obvious. Mutuality, of course, is not reciprocity. There is an important parallel with the forgiveness case, in that both parties need to stand in a particular relation to the perceived offence – or, here, the perceived joint intention, project, problem, opportunity, challenge, or similar (we might use the umbrella term ‘matter’ – something that confronts people living their lives together). Standing in a certain relation to a matter, and understanding that the relevant other person also stands in a particular relation to this matter, does not, of course, imply, much less require, that each stands in the same relationship to the matter. An ethical partnership only has to be an equal partnership in a certain sense, namely recognising the other and oneself as standing in a particular relationship to whatever the matter at hand is at a particular moment. It does not have to be equal in the sense of equal input into a decision, understood as each person’s viewpoint being reflected in the course of action that is ultimately chosen, although the recognition in the sense described might well ultimately lead to this being the case.

One might think of a basic example – the decision about an upcoming relocation, to city A or city B. Partners X and Y both stand in a particular relationship to the matter, by virtue of the strength of their preferences, the relationship to other life goals, practical circumstances, the history of the relationship, and so on. What is important for an ethical partnership in the sense of recognition to exist is that each partner understands how these particular circumstances and preferences determine where the other, and she herself, stand in relation to the matter at hand. In practical terms, this might mean partner X having a strong desire to live in city A because of the possibilities it would offer to pursue his hobby of attending concerts of a particular style of music, whereas partner Y has a strong desire to live in city B because of its proximity to a dear, close relative who requires regular care. In an ethical partnership, each partner will recognise the factors in his or her pattern of beliefs and desires that lead to the desire for dealing with the matter in a particular way, and will also recognise these factors in the other person. This is what is required for each to stand in a particular relation to the matter in the manner described above. What is not required is that this is done in a fair or equitable manner. In the case described above, on the face of it partner Y’s case for moving to city B seems much stronger than partner X’s case for living in city A. Even in an ethical partnership with both partners standing in the right relationship to the matter at hand and to each other, however, it might still be the case that X over-rides Y and the couple move to city A. This might well, after consideration of all the relevant facts, not be a fair or even

ethically correct decision. A particular relationship at a particular point can be an ethical partnership in the way required for recognition whilst still remaining wanting or lacking in some ethical senses.

The other three features are also important to love as a potential example of positive recognition, but are less philosophically interesting for the particular purpose I am discussing here. Consultation is a key feature of an ethical partnership such as one of love, where each party defines the relationship in consultation with the other, and both decide consultatively how they will relate themselves to the social world. The ethical partnership stands in the public and social world when the couple present themselves to their social environment as a unity on some important matters. Thus, parallels with the forgiveness as positive recognition can clearly be observed.

What does the discussion about mutuality tell us about the way recognition could work in love as *caritas*, rather than as ethical partnership? The fact that a relationship can be a recognitive one without producing positive ethical consequences seems on the one hand to reduce the suitability of love as an example of positive recognition, particularly where love as *caritas* is concerned. It seems distinctly odd to create a model of love for one's fellow human being that will not guarantee, or even be enormously likely to, lead to an aggregation of positive ethical behaviour. Love as *caritas*, clearly, does not have the same enormous wealth of emotion that Hegel, in all of his comments on love, believes it to have. Nevertheless, we can talk, as I do in Chapter Five, of confrontation as transformative, as anything that goes beyond the most banal of exchanges has the potential to change us in the way we are socially constructed.¹⁷ The degree with which we have to be acquainted with the Other and somehow invested in her in order that a recognitive relationship becomes a possibility in a meaningful sense is a matter for another study, but we can say here, also in the light of the next section of this chapter, that some emotion and not just cognition is a pre-condition of the sort of positive recognition I am presenting in this account. Indeed, love with no emotion at all would be a nonsense. Emotion, as well as partnership and working together for common goals, suppressing our most immediate desires, is all important for love as positive recognition. It might be fairly demanding, but it seems possible that love as *caritas*, that is, love for one's fellow human, could fulfil this.

Love as Recognition and the Philosophy of Emotion

To return once more to the question I posed towards the beginning of this chapter, in this section I explore the relation between Hegel's various concepts of love and recent discussions in the philosophy of emotion. Alison Jaggar's 1989 account of love and epistemology in *Inquiry* takes on precisely the dichotomy I outlined in the first section of this chapter. There, she gives an outline of the dichotomy between emotion and reason or knowledge in modern Western phi-

losophy, remarking that it has become absolute orthodoxy that reason, and not emotion, is the way to acquire knowledge.¹⁸ Contrary to this, Jaggar argues for the epistemic potential of emotion.

One of the first questions to be considered in this context is whether emotions are intentional (thus picking up a strand of thought from contemporary social ontology as discussed in the Introduction to this work, where I considered whether collective intentionality was possible). On what Jaggar calls the Dumb View, emotions are not 'about' anything, 'but ... contrasted with and seen as potential disruptions of other phenomena that are about some thing, phenomena such as rational judgments, thoughts, and observations'. This is a positivist view of emotion, which is ultimately unconvincing and untenable for a number of reasons, not least the famous experiments performed by Schachter and Singer in the late 1960s, which showed that the injection of adrenaline into various subjects in order to produce an excited state which was interpreted as a different emotion by those subjects, depending on the emotional context.¹⁹ If emotions are not intentional, then it is difficult to explain the self-description or ascription of emotions in this way, for if emotions simply consisted in some chemical release in the body there would be no difference in these self-ascriptions between subjects. Emotions cannot be mere feelings, unless we also want to argue that one does not necessarily have access to one's own emotions. Even if one rejects the positivist view, however, and accepts that emotions are intentional, there are a number of questions to be answered. Are emotions mental states? What is their significance in the field of ethics? These questions have a bearing on the relationship between recognition and the philosophy of emotion.

Another type of philosophy of emotion is a cognitive view, which sees emotions as having an affective and a cognitive component which processes the feelings from the affective component. This is comparable in structure to an empiricist epistemology, which sees the intellect as processing sense-data obtained from the perceptive faculties. Indeed, such a cognitivist view of emotion faces exactly the same difficulty as some kinds of empiricist philosophies, in that they must account for the relationship between the raw data and the processed form of that data, that is, for the empiricist, between appearance and reality. This quickly turns into a 'two worlds' view, with the private sphere (here, the emotions as feelings) hidden from view, and the public (here, the cognitively processed feelings being described as one of a range of established emotions – anger, fear, delight etc.) being separate and without any way of mapping one onto another.²⁰ Whilst this is not a devastating criticism, such a view is particularly inimical to the account of interaction, and indeed the self, which I am putting forward in this work. If the private inner world is, by its very nature, cut off from the public sphere, it would be a nonsense to say that the self is in any way socially constructed or falling short of total autonomy.

How does the idea, common, as Jaggar notes, in Western epistemology (although not universal), that emotions, whatever sorts of phenomena they might be, interfere with the pursuit of knowledge? If it is true, it is problematic for forgiveness and love in particular, both of which rely on some kind of emotion to get them off the ground (the feeling of being wronged, the feeling of having wronged, feelings of love, feelings of being loved, and so on). An account which saw emotions as the sorts of things that could not or should not be used as the basis for reasoning or argument would find it difficult to come up with any account of forgiveness or love as a positive ethical model. However, when we consider the failure of recognition in the master-slave dialectic, we can see a situation where the emotion of fear prevents the emergence of recognition, as it moves the slave permanently into the subordinate position. It is surely the case that emotion sometimes, or maybe often, clouds our judgement and epistemic ability when we encounter the Other, preventing recognition, which after all is the re-thinking (re-cognition) of the self and the Other. This does not mean, however, that recognitive relationships cannot and do not result from an initial or formative emotional confrontation.

Love, even more than forgiveness, is the most important emotion to consider in this context, and particularly romantic love or love as partnership, which in the general cultural or folk understanding is the emotion most likely to cloud judgements and make rational thought impossible. However, it is not clear that love can or does always function as an emotion in this primal sense, making people act unthinkingly and on impulse in the same way that fear or anger might. The evolutionarily programmed impulse to protect or care for one's child, for example, might function precisely thus, but love in the sense of partnership with or even desire for the Other does not. Here, again, the distinction between emotion as raw feeling and as something more developed comes into play once more.

One key question in the philosophy of emotion is the extent to which emotion is socially constructed. If the positivist view is correct, emotions just *are* raw feelings, occurring without any cognitive counterpart. If it is not, however, then even the most naturalistic account of the philosophy of emotion would have to accept that the self-ascription and perhaps even experience of various emotions relies on concepts acquired socially. This kind of conceptual involvement would be entirely compatible with a cognitivist account of emotion as described above – the feelings are interpreted and categorised by the understanding. For this account to be correct, it must be the case that emotions require judgements, another reason why this could not be the case on the positivist account.²¹

There are a number of levels on which emotions function socially and in ways relevant to the discussion of love and recognition. If something like the cognitivist account is correct, socially constructed and acquired concepts will guide even children into a culturally and socially appropriate categorisation of the raw feeling, and certainly into a culturally and socially appropriate form of *expression* of

that emotion. Without any social framework, pure feelings cannot be directed anywhere – to say this is not necessarily to accept the cognitivist view, as there is no consensus at all on how emotions differ from pure feelings.

If an emotion is simply a judgment of a particular kind, working from a particular kind of data, then there is no dichotomy between emotion and the cognitive, as emotions *are* cognitive on this account. To say that love is a judgement seems, however, inadequate (fear or anger might work in this way), so this is not a satisfying way to resolve the dichotomy. It also seems to rule out situations where one experiences unwanted emotions, since making a judgement seems to be the sort of thing that one has some control over. It also raises interesting questions about the ethics of emotions. If an emotion is likely to lead you to perform some action that is not the best one from a moral point of view, does the ethical subject or agent have some responsibility not to have that emotion, that is, not to make that judgement?

What is the alternative to the cognitivist account? A more nuanced account, still broadly following the cognitivist pattern, factors in the role that values place on the formation of emotions. The picture would then run broadly as follows: the raw feeling, as it were, would arise from and, to a great extent, be guided by, the values held by the person experiencing the emotion. These values are formed in a social context and guided by cultural factors. Values help to guide the raw feeling into the eventual judgement that is the emotion. With the example of forgiveness, this picture would run as follows: A experiences shame, a raw feeling, because his socially constructed values tell him that he ought not to have stolen the item he just did. This leads him to the emotion of regret, that is, he judges that regret is the appropriate emotion and feels this emotion, even if he does not want to feel regretful.

We are, partly at least, responsible for our values, but it seems incorrect to say that the wrongdoer in this example is responsible for his raw feeling of shame (he is responsible in that he committed the theft that unleashed the feeling of shame, but he is not, it seems, responsible for that theft's having unleashed in him the feeling of shame). On this understanding, part of our emotional lives are outside of our control and thus outside of our ethical responsibilities. Kant, in the *Groundwork*, provides quite a different view, arguing that, whilst we cannot have an obligation to possess a certain moral endowment (or 'moral feeling'), we have a duty to do what we can to cultivate one when it is present.²² As Pamela Sue Anderson puts it:

Equal rational agents should carry out moral actions, including acts of love, which are done for the sake of duty alone. The moralization of love, whether human or divine, depends on reason. A divine being would will what reason requires; insofar as the 'personal' being requires love, God's practical reason is the same as love.²³

Only a divine being (perhaps a beautiful soul) is unfailing in rationality and thus unfailing in His love. We might not be responsible for our bare feelings, but we are responsible for the context in which they develop and how they are cultivated.

Jaggar offers a view that is similar in some important respects to Kant's view. Rejecting the positivist and the simple cognitivist view, she offers one which treats emotions as a sort of habit:

The action/passion dichotomy is too simple for understanding emotion, as it is for other aspects of our lives. Perhaps it is more helpful to think of emotions as habitual responses that we may have more or less difficulty in breaking. We claim or disclaim responsibility for these responses depending on our purposes in a particular context. We could never experience our emotions entirely as deliberate actions, for then they would appear nongenuine and inauthentic, but neither should emotions be seen as nonintentional, primal or physical forces with which our rational selves are forever at war.²⁴

Seen in this way, the dichotomy between the emotional and the epistemic genuinely begins to break down. We have some degree of responsibility for our emotions (as, incidentally, does the community we live in, since the values that form part of an emotion and its expression are socially constructed), but do not have total control. This all seems particularly relevant to love (and to forgiveness). To characterise love as partnership or even love as *caritas* as a habitual response is an approach that is phenomenologically and empirically convincing.

To return to the original question, then, is love as positive recognition an emotional or a cognitive/epistemic phenomenon? It seems it must be both, and there is no particular useful purpose served in asking whether it is primarily, in terms of importance or in terms of the order of events in a confrontation, emotional or cognitive/epistemic. Love is a habitual response to a situation (the proximity of the beloved), conditioned by the chemical and physiological raw feeling, but shaped by socially constructed values and by the concepts which we have learned as members of communities. We are ethically responsible, to some, but not an unlimited, extent, for who we love and (perhaps more relevant to a discussion of *caritas*), who we do not love.

To love is certainly to recognise, for the reasons we can glean from the discussion of Hegel above. To love is to see the beloved and oneself simultaneously as subject and object. This is involved at all levels of the 'right kind of habitual response', as Jaggar puts it – it is not something that precedes the raw release of emotion, and nor is it an afterthought. As an insight from the philosophy of emotion, this concept of what an emotion is constitutes a highly promising answer to a wide range of questions about what is going on in human inter-relationships. Above all, it provides a solution to the dichotomy of epistemic and ethical relationships that has run throughout this work.

Love, Violence and Equality

In this chapter, and the previous one, I have presented love and forgiveness as examples of positive recognition. The reason why I have chosen these particular phenomena is because I consider that their exploration affords the best way of

examining and explaining what positive recognition might entail. In some ways, the phenomena have a lot in common, most obviously the fact that they are both of the utmost importance in theology. Forgiveness, however, differs from love in one crucial respect. When forgiveness happens, it automatically goes well – if something can be called forgiveness according to the characterisation given in the previous chapter, it has happened and it has gone well. The forgiveness could, in some strange and unusual circumstances, be given back, but in general it will stand, completed and accomplished. Love is entirely a different sort of phenomenon, romantic love in particular but also, to some extent, love as *caritas*. Not only is it a persistent state, or at least a state that continues for a certain length of time rather than an event, it also does not require perfectly respectful and pleasant behaviour at all times to be considered worthy of the name. Even in love as an example of positive recognition, there will be negative moments. How might one approach this sort of question or problem? What does it say about the value of positive recognition?

We can return at this point to Gillian Rose's insights, discussed in the Introduction to this work. According to Rose, love is always violent. This sounds like an entirely negative view of love and human interaction in general but, as with the use of 'confrontation' at several points in this work, it is in fact used neutrally or even positively. As Rowan Williams puts it in his analysis of Rose's *The Broken Middle* and whilst referring also to René Girard:

Violence negatively constructed suggests a primordial situation of equal or 'parallel' subjects, each in possession of itself, a situation that violence proceeds to disarrange... but in fact there is no such situation. Subjects are always already unequal, and the processes of negotiation work with a fiction of equality...The abstract universalism and egalitarianism of enlightened social philosophy must be ... *exposed* as fiction.²⁵

Relevant similarity and the thought that the Other could be the subject for the self-as-object does not imply some kind of strict equality, and even less so that each be fully 'in possession of itself', that is, on one understanding, fully autonomous and individual in some kind of caricatured Kantian sense (whose work Williams' reference to enlightenment recalls). Nowhere is this idea of inequality in human relationships more clearly observable than in love and forgiveness. In forgiveness, this is obviously the case: one person in the interaction or confrontation is the seeker of forgiveness, or candidate for it in some way, and one is the person who, perhaps uniquely, has the power or right to forgive. There is no primordial equality; quite the opposite. Love, depending on the type of love, but really any kind of human love, has the same structure of inequality. It is a rare case, at any point between lovers or partners, parents and children, siblings, or similar close and defining relationships, where what one person offers to the other is returned in precisely the same type and measure. This is precisely because we are not contentless subjects, bare placeholder autonomous rational legislators as in a Kantian

caricature. What we love, in *any* relationship, is not a mirror image of ourselves. If it is, the only result can be alienation, because this is not a genuine other.

The defining features of love and forgiveness as examples of positive recognition are precisely this inequality or lack of same-ness in combination with reciprocity as a key requirement. At first, this might seem paradoxical. In fact, however, it is here that we can see most clearly how recognition can function as a building-block for an ethics firmly rooted in ontology (in senses (a) and (c) as described in the Introduction). When we recognise the Other, we are not recognising her as a friend, a teacher, a marathon runner or whatever else she might be, but as the relevant sort of being that can be the subject to one's object and the object to one's subject. That the Other might not have the same status as the self, whether in terms of social standing or in terms of the relationship the self has with the Other in terms of inter-relationship power. One person, in a relation of love or forgiveness, or any other relationship of recognition, might hold all the cards or have the upper hand. Relationships of recognition do not have to be scrupulously fair: recognition as an ethical concept does not have this kind of content.

What recognition can do is to ensure a basic underlying respect, both given and demanded, in a confrontation as defined in Chapter Five as a purposive and transformative encounter with an Other or others, where 'purposive' and 'transformative' are understood extremely conservatively to include anything that might count as genuine social interaction.²⁶ An ethics which takes serious account of recognition as described in this work will also be able to take genuine account of the social self, which is not an unchanging, completely autonomous self that could ever exist without the social world in which it finds itself. Such a social self could be rooted in a monistic ontology which, far from preventing genuine intersubjectivity, could be a pre-condition for it. Finally, the study of love and forgiveness as promising examples of this kind of positive recognition could overcome a dichotomy which is often overlooked in these kinds of studies of inter-relations, ethics and the social world – that between epistemic and emotional relations between the self and the Other.

CONCLUSION

In examining what positive recognition might involve and giving two potential examples, this work has taken German Idealism in general, and the work of Hegel in particular, as a promising historical source of material and argument. Particularly as my purpose in this discussion goes a long way beyond commenting on the history of philosophy, this has involved a great deal of interpretation of the work of Hegel and other German Idealists, particularly Kant, with which other interpreters of these philosophers would disagree. Just as in the concept of the broken middle as discussed in the introduction, the taking of a position involves being in error in some way. The meta-philosophical question of how far one can take works and arguments from the history of philosophy and use them for purposes which the original authors never had in mind is a useful and interesting one, although not my concern here. Hegel did not want to create an ethics of recognition in the sense that I have been concerned with in this work. Whilst concerned with the ethical life and with what we now call intersubjectivity, he did not want to prescribe any ethics, even to the extremely limited extent that my discussion of recognition makes some suggestions about how to treat the Other.

Hegel's wide-ranging influence, however, certainly has included people who want to say something about how we ought to behave towards our fellow human beings. How could it be otherwise, when the legacy of German Idealism, of which Hegel, particularly in terms of political philosophy, is arguably the most dominant figure, has left an indelible mark on every part of the Continental tradition and quite a few parts of the analytical? The concepts which Hegel worked, often inherited by Kant, continue to shape the discussion today: autonomy, freedom, the boundaries of one's own self and how one might begin to relate to the Other. The questions to which recognition, conceived as positive and with a strong ethical dimension, is the answer, are live questions today, not ones that have been forgotten or resolved. How is my relationship with the Other rooted in the social world, and, in turn, what shapes that? How can we do our best to ensure that whatever conversation or exchange we are having (in the broadest sense of the word) is the right sort of conversation that will help us develop, ethically speaking? How can my approach to an Other that is shaped by

her, and my, particular situation take account of these situations so that we are not just talking at cross-purposes? To put it in the most basic terms possible, how can we make sure we are not simply talking and acting at cross-purposes? Positive recognition as I have outlined and introduced it in this work is one answer to these questions. As I have tried to make clear, recognition dictates the form of the discussion, not the content of the outcome.

Would it matter if we were talking at cross purposes? If recognitive relationships do not ensure that everyone is treated equally or morally correctly, then what is the point in tracing them out and painstakingly examining the conditions of possibility? These two questions or criticisms which come from opposite directions can be answered in broadly the same way. Recognition is intended as an ethical principle that functions on a meta-level, not one with the sort of content that would be required to ensure that it produce the 'right' ethical results. It only matters if we are talking at cross-purposes, interacting without recognition (which is perhaps more like talking to a brick wall or a mirror, depending if one is the master or the slave), if there is a background assumption that moral progress is a fundamental goal to aim at. This assumption is characteristic of German Idealism. Whilst the goal of Enlightenment thought was for the individual and for the whole of humanity to throw off the shackles of didactic authoritarianism in theory and in practice – to dare, in Kant's terms, to be wise – those who came after the Kant of the 1780s (including the later Kant) looked to use this new freedom of thought to consider how society as a whole could progress and fulfil a purpose that had always been there for it. At its most fundamental level, therefore, recognition is a phenomenon rooted in German Idealism.

It is the question of autonomy in particular, a central theme in this work, that brings these insights right up to the present day. As outlined in the Introduction, there are a variety of discussions in current metaphysics, epistemology, social philosophy and the philosophy of mind which have at their hearts the question of how far we are truly autonomous. To what extent can even our minds be regarded as social? Can groups bear ethical responsibility? How is the composition of things related to their identity? Discussions on the socially extended mind, on collective responsibility and on mereology in metaphysics all have autonomy and the boundaries of the subject as a central consideration. The very question of the difference between the autonomy of the self (or who controls or prescribes laws or norms of any particular type to the self) and the boundaries of the self is one that crosses boundaries between theoretical and practical philosophy (and perhaps into the social and natural sciences). The philosophical focus on the social self, then, is one which is at the forefront of a wide range of current research. Discussion of recognition as a potential answer to a number of these questions therefore opens up debate between sub-fields in philosophy that might not otherwise cross particularly often.

Not only boundaries between sub-fields are crossed; the answers to questions about autonomy and related concepts lead us, as I have argued throughout this work, to the theological dimension of the recognition discussion, an aspect of it which has been almost entirely ignored. Whether or not one accepts the basic theist thesis or wants to argue that there is ultimately only one monological entity which has divine character, concepts such as *metanoia* which emerge from theology prove vital if one wants to understand the social self. The breaking and remaking of the self is not something that can be accounted for particularly easily in the formal terms of theoretical or even practical philosophy – a distinction which neither Kant nor Hegel, nor the rest of the German Idealists or even many twentieth century critics would have accepted. The fundamental contribution that theology makes to this kind of philosophical discussion is to provide a way to see the self as something other than self-sufficient, in both theoretical and practical senses. Of course, the self can be non-self-sufficient without there being any kind of theological context to its existence, but it is the discipline of theology which, unlike analytical and even most Continental views of ethics and the self, allows us to transcend the view of the self as having clear boundaries and fundamentally being a law only unto itself (and having only itself as a law).

If the monistic ontology which grounds the concept of the social self and explains the necessity of seeing oneself and the Other as both subject and object simultaneously *is*, however, a divine one (as of course it is for Hegel), then theological considerations are crucial at all stages of the discussion. In this case, the concepts in this book such as *metanoia*, reconciliation and mediation will be a good starting-point for investigations in to the relationship between the social self and God. There is also the possibility of a transcendental argument here, as discussed in Chapter Three; if our world seems to work in this particular way and the social self seems to function as it does, and human inter-relations seem to work as they do, then we might conclude that ontology is monistic. It would then be for the theist to demonstrate conceptual problems with a non-theistic monistic unity or entity.

The arguments presented in this work offer a range of possibilities for future research in fairly diverse directions. One example of a potential direction is offered by the philosophy of emotion, a sub-field (often an interdisciplinary one crossing boundaries between psychology, neuroscience and philosophy) that tends not to be worked on and considered in combination with more traditional philosophical fields such as ethics or political theory. For example, questions about whether we are morally responsible for our emotions have generally focussed on theoretical concepts of what moral responsibility is and how it can be said to function other than considering, from a philosophical point of view, what an emotion is. My analysis of the social self's encounter or confrontation with the Other as transcending the boundary between the emotional and the

epistemic might offer a way into a fuller analysis of what role the emotions play in ethical interaction and for the moral agent.

A further research direction involves the issue I touched upon at the end of Chapter Six. Which relationships might be relevant as candidates for positive recognition, and which are not? Which encounters are transformative for us in the way I have outlined in this work, and which are not? If we do have some kind of responsibility to foster positive recognition, when are we obliged to do this? Ought we to concentrate on developing these kinds of relationships with those closest and most important to us, or on using the insights into the social self that recognition gives us to improve all our relationships with others, even those whom we come across quite casually? This reflects a somewhat understudied topic in ethics, that is, where we should concentrate our ethical efforts, assuming we are not adapting some kind of aggregating principle but rather aiming for an empirically convincing categorisation of the sorts of ethical relationships we have and the different responsibilities which this might place on us. This could be a topic for applied ethics.

Another, related possibility, which I have not touched on at all thus far, is the extent to which creating an environment for positive recognition and ethical progress in general might be a political goal, or a something incumbent on those who are involved in running communities and societies. This could be an interesting question for the political theorist as well as those working on moral philosophy. At the beginning of this conclusion, I characterised the main question to which positive recognition is an answer thus: how can we make sure we are not talking at cross-purposes? Relatedly, we can ask – whose responsibility is it to make sure we are not talking at cross-purposes? One answer could be ‘all of us’, but, on a picture of human interaction, including moral interaction, where (moral) selves are not fixed, changing or autonomous, to impose identical moral responsibilities on a broad group of people would seem to go against the grain. If we accept the basic German Idealist insight about societal and moral progress, a disproportionate burden will fall on those in positions of political power to create structures which keep the conversation going in a meaningful sense, and avoid people from always talking at cross-purposes. One way to start such an study would be to look at the relationship between recognition as characterised here and respect, including self-respect and the cognate phenomenon, self-esteem. Failure to recognise is not, on the individual level, an ethical failure, but, on the societal level, it might well be. Considering how such failure might be avoided is the key to seeing how recognition, in a practical sense, might be fostered.

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NOTES

Introduction

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2. M. Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
3. N. Fraser and A. Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2003). See also S. Thompson, 'Is Redistribution a Form of Recognition? Comments on the Fraser–Honneth Debate', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 8 (2005), pp. 85–102.
4. See also L. Disley, 'Giving an Account of Oneself amongst Others: Hegel, Judith Butler and Social Ontology', in N. Boyle and L. Disley (eds), *The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought*. Vol. 2, ed. J. Walker, *Historical, Social and Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 312–30.
5. W. V. Quine, 'On What There Is', *The Review of Metaphysics*, 2:5 (September 1948), pp. 21–38, on p. 28.
6. T. Hofweber, 'Logic and Ontology', in E. N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2013), at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/logic-ontology> [accessed 01.10.14].
7. A. J. P. Kenny, 'Wittgenstein on Mind and Metaphysics' in R. Egidi (ed.), *Wittgenstein: Mind and Language* (Dordrecht: Springer, 1995), pp. 37–46, on p. 42.
8. See L. Disley, 'General Introduction: The Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries', in N. Boyle and L. Disley (eds), *The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought*. Vol. 1, ed. K. Ameriks, *Philosophy and Natural Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 29–31.
9. J. D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), p. 24.
10. See Chapter 2, pp. 43–65.
11. See Chapter 2, pp. 43–65.
12. See Chapter 3, pp. 67–92.
13. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
14. G. W. F. Hegel, 'Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts', *Werke in 20 Bänden* [hereafter GPR], ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 7, pp. 24–5.
15. K. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Vol. 2, *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath*, 5th edn (London: Routledge, 1966), p. 41.

16. See W. A. Kaufmann, 'The Hegel Myth and Its Method', *Philosophical Review*, 60 (1951), pp. 459–86, on p. 469.
17. R. Stern, 'Hegel's *Doppelsatz*: a Neutral Reading', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 44:2 (2006), pp. 235–66, on p. 236.
18. S. Lumsden, 'The Rise of the Non-Metaphysical Hegel', *Philosophy Compass*, 3:1 (2008), pp. 51–65.
19. C. Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
20. I am taking the 'Myth of the Given' to mean the view that we can know things about our perceptual experiences independently of and prior to the conceptual apparatus which we use for perceiving those objects. I capitalize the words as they are being used in this specific sense: see W. Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Further discussion of the Myth of the Given as relevant to Hegel studies can be found in Chapter 2.
21. Lumsden, 'The Rise of the Non-Metaphysical Hegel', p. 52.
22. Lumsden, 'The Rise of the Non-Metaphysical Hegel', p. 54. See also, K. Hartmann, 'Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View', in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1972), pp. 101–24.
23. I am using the word 'metaphysics' here with regard to Hegel in fairly ordinary sense to denote questions about 'what there is', as discussed earlier in this Introduction. There has been much discussion about Hegel as a critic of metaphysics; see, for example, S. Houlgate, *Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and B. Longuenesse, *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). However, it is clear and quite uncontroversial that Hegel did indeed make metaphysical claims in the sense of 'what there is'.
24. Longuenesse, *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*, also focuses mainly on Hegel's *Logic*. For a brief discussion of the roles of Hegel's various works as relevant to this work, See Chapter 1, pp. 19–41.
25. See Taylor, *Hegel*, p. 110, and Chapter 2 of this work.
26. See Chapter 3, pp. 67–92.
27. See M. Theunissen, 'The Repressed Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Right', in C. Drucilla M. Rosenfeld et al. (eds), *Hegel and Legal Theory* (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 3–63, and E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969). I discuss these arguments in detail in Chapter 3.
28. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
29. See Chapter 4, pp. 93–109.
30. See Chapter 2, pp. 43–65.
31. V. Brümmer, 'Atonement and Reconciliation', *Religious Studies*, 28 (1992), pp. 435–52, on p. 435. See also C. Schemberg, *Achieving 'At-one-ment': Storytelling and the Concept of Self in Ian McEwan's The Child in Time, Black Dogs, Enduring Love and Atonement* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004).
32. Brümmer, 'Atonement and Reconciliation' provides a useful summary of contemporary positions.
33. See, for example, S. L. Porter, 'Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution', *Faith and Philosophy*, 21:2 (2004), pp. 228–41; and A. McGrath, 'The Moral Theory of the Atonement: An Historical and Theological Critique', *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 38 (1985), pp. 205–20.
34. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
35. See Chapter 1, pp. 19–41.

36. P. Redding, 'The Relevance of Hegel's 'Absolute Spirit' to Social Normativity', in H. Ikaheimo and A. Laitinen (eds), *Recognition and Social Ontology* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 211–38, on p. 228.
37. Redding, 'The Relevance of Hegel's 'Absolute Spirit' to Social Normativity', p. 228.
38. Redding, 'The Relevance of Hegel's 'Absolute Spirit' to Social Normativity', p. 229.
39. See, for example, T. Walden, *The Great Meaning of the Word Metanoia: An Undeveloped Chapter in the Life of Christ* (New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1896), p. 24.
40. Walden, *The Great Meaning of the Word Metanoia*, p. 24.
41. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
42. 'Metanoia', Merriam-Webster Online, at <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/metanoia> [accessed 23 August 2013].
43. See V. Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976).
44. C. Davis and P. A. Riches, 'Metanoia: The Theological Praxis of Revolution', in C. Davis et al (eds), *Theology and The Political: The New Debate* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 22–51.
45. G. Rose, *The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
46. V. Lloyd, 'On the Uses of Gillian Rose', *Heythrop Journal*, 48 (2007), pp. 697–706, on p. 699.
47. See Chapter 6, pp. 131–148.
48. R. D. Williams, 'Between Politics and Metaphysics: Reflections in the Wake of Gillian Rose', *Modern Theology*, 11:1 (1995), pp. 3–22, on p. 10.
49. J. Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 51.
50. J. Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), p. 9.

1 The Social Self and the Master–Slave Dialectic

1. M. Hollis, *The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
2. See Chapter 2, pp. 43–65.
3. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
4. W. Kaufmann, *Hegel, A Re-Interpretation* (Notre Dame: IN University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 24.
5. J. Stewart, 'The Architectonic of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 55:4 (1995), pp. 747–76.
6. Stewart, 'The Architectonic of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*', p. 748.
7. G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, ed. F. Nicolini and O. Poggeler (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1959), section 14.
8. G. W. F. Hegel, 'Phenomenologie des Geistes', *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 3, section 20.
9. One could also say 'cultural lines' in terms of philosophy – of course, the question is one of philosophical traditions rather than geography *per se*.
10. L. B. Puntel, *Darstellung, Methode und Struktur: Untersuchungen zur Einheit der systematischen Philosophie G. W. F. Hegels* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1973).
11. F. Escaraffel, 'Des mouvements parallèles dans la *Phénoménologie d'Esprit*', *L'arc*, 38 (1969), pp. 93–105.
12. G. Kimmmerle, *Sein und Selbst: Untersuchung zur kategorialen Einheit von Vernunft und Geist in Hegels Phenomenologie des Geistes* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1978).

13. Merold Westphal's work (M. Westphal, *History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979)) forms a notable geographical exception, and of course there are many others. Nevertheless, the general rule holds true.
14. J. A. Leighton, 'Hegel's Conception of God', *The Philosophical Review*, 5:6 (1896), pp. 601–18, on p. 606.
15. R. B. Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 5–6.
16. See Introduction, pp. 1–18.
17. Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, p. 14.
18. A. Abizadeh, 'Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity', *American Political Science Review*, 99:1 (2005), pp. 45–60.
19. H. M. Raven, 'Has Hegel Anything to Say to Feminists?', in P. Jagentowicz-Mills (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), pp. 225–52.
20. As I have alluded to above, the question of unity (or lack thereof) within a single work is generally raised with respect to the *Phenomenology*. It certainly seems to be the case that there is rather less of a problem in this regard with, for example, the *Philosophy of Right*.
21. Stewart, 'The Architectonic of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*', p. 750.
22. R. B. Pippin, 'What is the Question for Which Hegel's 'Theory of Recognition' is the Answer?', *The European Journal of Philosophy*, 8:2 (2000), pp. 155–72.
23. Pippin, 'What is the Question for Which Hegel's 'Theory of Recognition' is the Answer?', p. 155.
24. See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of this thesis.
25. E. Tugendhat, *Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979).
26. I am thinking of critics such as P. Redding, *Hegel's Hermeneutics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) and M. Rosen, *Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
27. I may well encounter desires that do not originate with me that nevertheless motivate me. The difference is that they do not motivate me as desires. My mother's desire that I become a doctor might motivate me to do so, but this is out of a desire to please her, not out of a desire that becomes a proxy desire in the sense described in the later section. This subtle distinction is nevertheless important.
28. Redding, *Hegel's Hermeneutics*, pp. 121–2.
29. R. Sinnerbrink, 'Recognitive Freedom: Hegel and the Problem of Recognition', in J. Rundell et al. (eds), *Contemporary Perspectives in Critical and Social Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 271–95, on p. 284.
30. Sinnerbrink, 'Recognitive Freedom', p. 284.
31. G. W. F. Hegel, 'Phenomenologie des Geistes', *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1969–71), vol. 3, section 167.
32. Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
33. Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, p. 57.
34. G. A. Kelly, 'Notes on Hegel's Lordship and Bondage', in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel, a Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 189–218.
35. A. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit assembled by Raymond Queneau*, ed. A. Bloom, trans. J. H. Nichols (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

36. This is not the main criticism of the internal reading of the master-slave dialectic. The main concern regards the impossibility of intersubjectivity on the internal reading. Since I am arguing that the world and the Absolute are intersubjectively constructed, this obviously rules out the internal reading for my account.
37. See Chapter 4, pp. 93–109
38. I have deliberately borrowed Thomas Nagel's term, as it expresses well the perspective-less view which I am describing here.
39. See Chapter 3, pp. 67–92, and Introduction, 'Recognition and Reconciliation', pp. 1–18
40. See e.g. J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. H. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 243.
41. S. de Beauvoir, *Letters to Sartre* (New York: Arcade, 1992).
42. Kojève's lectures were held between 1933–1939 in Paris, and Jean Hyppolite's translation of the *Phenomenology* appeared at the end of this time. The lectures did not appear in printed form until 1947. Neither Sartre nor Beauvoir had attended the lectures, but Beauvoir read the printed version. The latter philosopher read the *Phenomenology* in 1940.
43. R. R. Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), p. 372.
44. M. Yar, 'Recognition and the Politics of Human(e) Desire', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 18 (2001), pp. 57–76, on p. 58.
45. Humanly useful, here, can be seen as a combination of ethical and epistemological usefulness and goes back to my original description (in the Introduction) of Hegel's project as an elucidation of the preconditions of a life that is human in sense of allowing for constructive intersubjectivity.
46. N. Bauer, *Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, and Feminism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 107.
47. See F. Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997), Erste Abhandlung.
48. Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, Zweite Abhandlung.
49. Sartre did, of course, write substantially on ethics: his *Cahiers pour une morale* were published posthumously.
50. S. Gardner, 'Sartre, Schelling and Onto-theology', *Religious Studies*, 42:3 (2006), pp. 247–71, on p. 265.
51. See Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, paras 13–14.
52. See Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, paras 13–14.
53. Gardner, 'Sartre, Schelling and Onto-Theology', p 262.
54. Gardner, 'Sartre, Schelling and Onto-Theology', p 262.
55. In fact, Hegel (as Beauvoir recognises) seems to exclude women altogether from the process of recognition in the sense that is important for self-consciousness: See S. de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. H. M. Parshley (London: Random House, 1993).
56. J. McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
57. See Chapter 2, pp. 43–65, and Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
58. R. Goldthorpe, *Sartre: Literature and Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 82.
59. For a fuller discussion of transcendental arguments in contemporary social philosophy, See Chapter 2, pp. 43–65.
60. See Introduction, pp. 1–18
61. H. Ikaheimo and A. Laitinen (eds) *Recognition and Social Ontology* (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

62. A. Honneth, *Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2010).
63. M. Gilbert, 'Who's to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and its Implications for Group Members', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 30:1 (2006), pp. 94–114.
64. Gilbert, 'Who's to Blame?', p. 104.
65. Gilbert, 'Who's to Blame?', p. 100.
66. See J. Feinberg, 'Collective Responsibility', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 65 (1968), pp. 674–88.
67. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
68. J. Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself*, p. 136.
69. See Chapter 4, pp. 93–109.
70. S. Kierkegaard, *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life*, trans. A. Hannay (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), p. 549.
71. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.

2 The Self of Self-Consciousness: Ethical Concepts, Metaphysical Frameworks

1. Q. Cassam, *Self and World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 1.
2. See the next section on concept/intuition versions of self-consciousness.
3. E. Tugendhat, *Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung*.
4. Evans (G. Evans, *Varieties of Reference*, ed. J. McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982)), McDowell (J. McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996)) and Strawson (P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Methuen, 1966)) all argue for concept versions of self-consciousness – the self is thought of as a particular type of thing rather than experienced as a particular type of thing. Cassam argues for an intuition version, as discussed below.
5. Tugendhat refers to these models as having an epistemological orientation rather than as 'reflexive' theories. For the sake of simplicity, I have called those models which Tugendhat is attacking 'reflexive', as this is the core of his objection.
6. By 'modern' I mean anything from Descartes onwards, as this entire period is the subject of Tugendhat's criticisms. I think later accounts of self-consciousness certainly answer some of his concerns, so the situation now is not exactly what it was in the 1970s, but his general comments about reflexivity still constitute a challenge to be answered.
7. Tugendhat, *Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung*, p. 1. (translation LD).
8. Tugendhat, *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, trans. Paul Stern (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), p. ix.
9. See e.g. M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1994), p. 227.
10. Of course, Heidegger's concern is with Dasein rather than the self – nevertheless, there are parts of *Sein und Zeit* that can be construed as constituting an account of self-consciousness.
11. M. Ayers, *Locke* (2 vols) (London: Routledge, 1991), vol. 2, p. 285.
12. S. Shoemaker, 'Personal Identity, a Materialist Account' in S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, *Personal Identity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 102, quoted in Q. Cassam, *Self and World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
13. Cassam, *Self and World*, p. 4. Perhaps we could also say that someone looking at a brain scan would be introspectively self-aware, if the self is seen to be the brain.

14. Cassam's discussion is of concept and intuition versions of materialist accounts of self-consciousness, but I think the distinction can be applied to a wide range of accounts of the phenomenon.
15. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 105–6.
16. Cassam, *Self and World*, p. 9.
17. J. McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 102–3.
18. McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 104.
19. R. Bübner, 'Bildung and Second Nature', in N. Smith (ed.), *Reading McDowell on Mind and World* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 209–16 on p. 209.
20. McDowell, *Mind and World* p. 84. Rampant platonism (McDowell uses the lower case as this position is seen as only loosely connected with Plato himself) is the idea of the space of reasons as a structure constituted independently of anything specifically human or natural (see McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 77n).
21. G. W. F. Hegel, 'Phenomenologie des Geistes', *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 3 [hereafter PhG], section 189, original emphasis.
22. PhG, section 178.
23. McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 4.
24. See McDowell, *Mind and World*, p. 5.
25. Chapter 3, pp. 67–92.
26. See Chapter 4, pp. 93–109.
27. It should be noted that Cassam does not say that an I, for self-consciousness, should accompany all my representations, merely that the self must be conscious of itself as the subject of *different* representations.
28. B. Longuenesse, *Kant on the Human Standpoint* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
29. Many of these points are to be found in her earlier work, B. Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, trans. C. Wolfe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
30. A. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. J. Anderson (London: Polity Press, 1995), p. 179.
31. See e.g. N. Fraser, 'Rethinking Recognition', *New Left Review*, 3 (2000), pp. 107–20. And, for the dialogue, N. Fraser and A. Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2003).
32. C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in A. Heble et al. (eds), *New Contexts of Canadian Criticism* (Ontario: Broadview Press, 1994), pp. 98–131, on p. 99.
33. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', pp. 98–9, on p. 99.
34. S. Thompson, *The Political Theory of Recognition: a Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 160.
35. A. Shanks, *Hegel's Political Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
36. Shanks, *Hegel's Political Theology*, p. 35.
37. Shanks, *Hegel's Political Theology*, p. 36.
38. See Introduction, pp. 1–18.
39. C. Griswold, *Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 68.
40. For a fuller discussion of forgiveness as involving the offender standing in a particular relation to the offence, see Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.

41. J. Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006, 2nd ed.).
42. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
43. J. Milbank, *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon* (London: Routledge, 2003).
44. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29
45. J. Milbank, 'Forgiveness and Incarnation', in J. D. Caputo et al (eds), *Questioning God* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 92–128, on p. 92.
46. S.v. 'Gḥufrān', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005).
47. M. Abu-Nimer and I. Nasser, 'Forgiveness in the Arab and Islamic Contexts', *Journal of Religious Ethics*, 41.3 (2013), pp. 474–94, on p. 477.
48. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
49. I discuss the relationship between the philosophy of emotion, forgiveness and recognition in the Introduction (pp. 1–18), Chapter 5 (pp. 111–29) and Chapter 6 (pp. 131–48).
50. I. Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
51. See Chapter 4 of this work on the notion of confrontation (pp. 93–109)

3 Intersubjectivity, Monistic Ontology and the Social World

1. B. Waldenfels, 'Levinas and the Face of the Other', in S. Critchley and R. Bernasconi (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 63–81.
2. E. Levinas, *Entre-Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*, trans. M. B. Smith and B. Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 3–27
3. E. Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).
4. R. Bernasconi, 'Hegel and Levinas: the Possibility of Forgiveness and Reconciliation', in C. Katz (ed.), *Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Volume II: Levinas and the History of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 49–68, on p. 52.
5. See Introduction, pp. 1–18.
6. See Introduction, pp. 1–18.
7. On Kojève's lectures and their wide-ranging influence, see the previous chapter (pp. 43–65).
8. See Introduction, pp. 1–18.
9. J. Derrida, 'Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas', in C. Katz (ed.), *Levinas: Levinas, Phenomenology and His Critics. Volume I: Levinas, Phenomenology and His Critics* (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 88–174, on pp. 101–02
10. E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 56
11. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 58
12. For a fuller account of this relationship, See Chapter 4, pp. 93–109.
13. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
14. See e.g. A. Goldman, 'Interpretation Psychologized', *Mind and Language*, 4 (1989), pp. 161–85.
15. D. H. Ingvar and L. Philipson, 'Distribution of the Cerebral Blood Flow in the Dominant Hemisphere during Motor Ideation and Motor Performance', *Annals of Neurology*, 2:3 (1977), pp. 230–37.

16. A. Wood, 'Fichte's Intersubjective I', *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 49:1 (2006), pp. 62–79, on p. 66.
17. R. Jansen, 'Jurassic Technology? Sustaining Presumptions of Intersubjectivity in a Disruptive Environment', *Theory and Society*, 37:2 (2008), pp. 127–159.
18. See B. Longuenesse, *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 8.
19. S. Gardner, 'Sartre, Intersubjectivity and German Idealism', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 43:3 (2005), pp. 325–51.
20. Gardner, 'Sartre, Intersubjectivity and German Idealism', p. 326.
21. Gardner, 'Sartre, Intersubjectivity and German Idealism', p. 326.
22. Gardner refers to 'mild naturalism' in the case of Sartre, which is related to the discussion which grew out of McDowell's discussion of Hegel.
23. See the Introduction to this work for my own definition.
24. See next section.
25. See J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. H. Barnes (New York, Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 619.
26. Introduction to Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. ix.
27. *Being and Nothingness*, paragraph 239. I will argue in chapter four that this is not a correct assessment of Hegel, and have included it here as an illumination of Sartre's view of intersubjectivity.
28. See Gardner, 'Sartre, Intersubjectivity, and German Idealism', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 43:3 (2005), pp. 325–51, on p. 329.
29. See e.g. R. B. Pippin, *The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
30. Their accounts differ in their detail, but ultimately they are making the same broad metaphysical point.
31. See M. Theunissen, 'The Repressed Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Right' in C. Drucilla, M. Rosenfeld et al. (eds), *Hegel and Legal Theory* (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 3–63.
32. A. Honneth, *Kampf um Anerkennung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994).
33. See J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. F. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), p. 299.
34. See Theunissen, 'The Repressed Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Right', pp. 3–63.
35. Honneth, *Kampf um Anerkennung*.
36. Theunissen, 'The Repressed Intersubjectivity in Hegel's Philosophy of Right', pp. 3–63.
37. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.
38. The discussion of Antigone, especially section 457–9, is relevant to the aims of this work in particular because the model of the brother-sister relationship is often seen as a potential candidate for positive recognition.
39. See Sophocles, *The Theban Plays*, trans E. V. Rieu (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1947).
40. G. W. F. Hegel, 'Phänomenologie des Geistes', *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 3 [hereafter PhG], section 469–470.
41. PhG, section 471, original emphasis.
42. See P. Jagentowicz-Mills, 'Hegel's Antigone', in P. Jagentowicz-Mills (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), pp. 59–88.

43. See P. Redding, 'Hegel, Idealism and God: Philosophy as the Self-Correcting Appropriation of the Norms of Life and Thought', *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy* 3:2 (2007), pp. 16–31, on p. 28.
44. See Redding, 'Hegel, Idealism and God', p. 28.
45. See Redding, 'Hegel, Idealism and God', pp. 16–31, on p. 28.
46. Jagentowicz-Mills, 'Hegel's Antigone', p. 69.
47. I am using the term 'anagnorisis' in the sense in which Aristotle, in his *Poetics*, develops the term (see Aristotle, *Poetics*: 1447a13).
48. It is also worth pointing out that Hegel shares the distaste for what Hume called 'enthusiasm' with regard to religion and Kant called 'Schwärmerei' – that is, a kind of over-emotional style.
49. G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. A. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 292 (section 270).
50. C. Irwin, 'God, Otherness and Community: Some Reflections on Hegel and Levinas', *The European Legacy* 12:6 (2007), pp. 663–78.
51. Irwin, 'God, Otherness and Community', p. 663.
52. M. Levine, *Pantheism: A Non-Theistic Concept of Divinity* (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 3.
53. Levine, *Pantheism: A Non-Theistic Concept of Divinity*, p. 30.
54. E. Steinhart, 'Pantheism and Current Ontology', *Religious Studies* 40 (2004), pp. 63–80, on p. 63n.
55. J. A. Leighton, 'Hegel's Conception of God', *The Philosophical Review*, 5:6 (1896), pp. 601–18, on p. 606. I understand Leighton as referring to Geist with his use of the word 'spirit', even though it is not capitalised as is the convention in more modern Hegel scholarship.
56. Leighton, 'Hegel's Conception of God', p. 601.
57. Pippin's work (R. B. Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)) is particularly useful in this regard, given that he makes the *Phenomenology* the centre of his analysis, whereas Hartmann (Hartmann, 'Hegel – a non-metaphysical view' in A. MacIntyre (ed.), *Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1972), pp. 101–24) focuses more on the Logic.
58. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen Über die Philosophie der Religion*, 2 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), section 47; translation by Liz Disley.
59. See Leighton, 'Hegel's Conception of God', p. 615.
60. R.-P. Horstmann, 'Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit as an Argument for a Monistic Ontology', *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 49:1 (2006), pp. 103–18, on p. 104.
61. Horstmann, 'Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit as an Argument for a Monistic Ontology', p. 104.
62. Horstmann, 'Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit as an Argument for a Monistic Ontology', p. 110.
63. Horstmann, 'Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit as an Argument for a Monistic Ontology', p. 110.
64. Horstmann, 'Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit as an Argument for a Monistic Ontology', p. 110.
65. Horstmann, 'Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit as an Argument for a Monistic Ontology', p. 110.

4 Ambiguity and the Ontologically Split Self

1. See Chapter 3, pp. 67–92. I use the term ‘undesirable’ not in a moral sense – the status of objecthood is undesirable from the point of view of the conscious being.
2. T. Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). In the opening paragraphs of his work, Nagel delineates a scale of objectivity and subjectivity, with objectivity being greater the less it relies on the specifics of the individual’s make-up and position in the world. The ‘view from nowhere’, if it exists, would be the most extreme possible end of the objectivity spectrum – a view that did not depend at all on these individual aspects of character and perception. Indeed, in the opening words of the book, Nagel remarks on the psychological impulse to seek a view from nowhere.
3. N. Bauer, *Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy and Feminism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) p. 89, emphasis mine. Bauer sees this formulation as coming from Hegel through Sartre and Beauvoir.
4. The sense in which fully developed self-consciousness is ‘objective’ self-certainty can be explained with reference to the way Hegel’s idealism can be described as ‘objective’ in contrast to what we would today call the subjective idealism of Berkeley – the contrast is between one perceiver (subjective) and multiple perceivers who are ultimately part of one substance (objective).
5. G. W. F. Hegel, ‘Phenomenologie des Geistes,’ *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 3 [hereafter PhG], section 174.
6. PhG, section 186.
7. A. Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel; leçons sur la Phénoménologie de l’esprit, professées de 1933 à 1939 à l’École des Hautes-Études* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947).
8. Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* certainly seems to see the master/slave dialectic as working on the everyday level of adult interaction.
9. PhG, section 186, emphasis mine.
10. PhG, section 181.
11. G. W. F. Hegel, ‘Phenomenologie des Geistes,’ *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 3 [hereafter PhG], section 175.
12. PhG, section 191.
13. PhG, section 192.
14. G. W. F. Hegel, ‘Phenomenologie des Geistes,’ *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 3 [hereafter PhG], section 177.
15. PhG, section 176, emphasis mine.
16. PhG, section 177.
17. PhG, section 177.
18. PhG, section 177.
19. Henceforth I will borrow Cassam’s terminology and also refer to this proposition as ‘the epistemological premise’.
20. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), A107.
21. See Introduction, pp. 1–18
22. J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. H. Barnes (New York, Philosophical Library, 1956) p. 243.

23. R.R. Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), p. 373.
24. I have deliberately borrowed Thomas Nagel's term, as it expresses well the perspective-less view which I am describing here.
25. M. Heinz, 'Love and Recognition in Fichte and the Alternative Position of Simone de Beauvoir', in N. Boyle and L. Disley (eds), *The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought*, vol. 2, ed. J. Walker, *Historical, Social and Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 277–99, on p. 279.
26. Heinz, 'Love and Recognition in Fichte and the Alternative Position of Simone de Beauvoir', p. 295.
27. As Lundgren-Gothlin points out (E. Lundgren-Gothlin, *Sex and Existence: Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex* (London: Athlone Press, 1986)), Beauvoir's account of Hegel sees him as excluding women from the process of true, mutual recognition, and thus is this sense from self-consciousness. The consequences of Beauvoir's Hegel interpretation for feminist theory are not my primary concern here, and the 'human' as aspect of the 'life that is fully human' should in this chapter be interpreted as applying to both men and women.
28. S. de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (London: Jonathan Cape, 2009), p. 72.
29. Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, p. 7.
30. See Chapter 6, pp. 131–148.
31. L. Disley, 'Giving an account of oneself amongst others: Hegel, Judith Butler and Social Ontology', in N. Boyle and L. Disley (eds), *The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought*. Vol. 2 ed. J. Walker, *Historical, Social and Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 620–1.
32. See Chapter 3, pp. 67–92.
33. I discuss the somewhat opaque status of the master-slave dialectic in Chapter 1 (pp. 19–41).

5 Forgiveness: Confrontation, Metanoia and the Freedom of the Other

1. Chapter 3, p. 67–92
2. See Chapter 1, pp. 19–41.
3. See Chapter 1, pp. 19–41, and Chapter 4, pp. 93–109.
4. See Chapter 6, pp. 131–148.
5. See Chapter 6. 'Love as Ethical Partnership and as *Caritas*', pp. 141–2.
6. See Chapter 2, pp. 43–65.
7. I. Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, ed. J. B. Schneewind, trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 27:689 (Vigilantius).
8. F. Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, Zweite Abhandlung (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997).
9. J. Butler, *Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel* (London: W. Botham, 1726), Sermon IX: 'Upon Resentment and Forgiveness of Injuries'.
10. See K. Moran, 'For Community's Sake: A Self-Respecting Kantian Account of Forgiveness', in S. Bachin et al (eds), *Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), vol. 3, pp. 419–30.
11. Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 27:687 (Vigilantius).
12. Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, 27:690.

13. See e.g. the 1797 *Metaphysics of Morals*, section VII, in I. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, ed. M. J. Gregory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 521.
14. I. Kant, *Streit der Fakultäten* (1798), trans. M. J. Gregory and R. Anchor as *Conflict of the Faculties* in I. Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed. A. W. Wood and G. di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 233–328.
15. D. Sussman, 'Kantian Forgiveness', *Kant-Studien*, 96 (2005), pp. 86–107, on p. 106 and p. 104.
16. See e.g. K. R. Westphal, *Hegel's Epistemological Realism* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), pp. 149–53.
17. A. Singer, 'Aesthetic Community: Recognition as an Other Sense of *Sensus Communis*', in *Boundary 2*, 24: 1 (1997), pp. 205–36, on p. 230.
18. See Chapter 4.
19. It is interesting to note that the theme of forgiveness does not play a role in Sophocles' *Antigone*, apart from in the sense that it is absent. It is Creon's refusal to forgive Polynices that creates the initial tragic situation, and Antigone also refuses to forgive her sister Ismene who seeks redemption for her failure to help with the burial by saying that she should be punished along with her sister. Equally, Creon's realisation of his mistake does not bring with it a desire to be forgiven.
20. G. W. F. Hegel, 'Phenomenologie des Geistes', *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 3 [hereafter PhG], section 667, emphasis mine.
21. Singer, 'Aesthetic Community', pp. 230–1.
22. PhG, section 670.
23. See Chapter 5, 'Kant on Forgiveness', p. 125.
24. C. A. Speight, 'Butler and Hegel on Forgiveness and Agency', *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 43.2 (2005), pp. 299–316, on p. 299.
25. Speight, 'Butler and Hegel on Forgiveness and Agency', p. 300.

6 Love: Ethical Partnership and the Self in the Other

1. P. Wake, *Tragedy in Hegel's Early Theological Writings* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2014), p. 1.
2. R. Kroner, 'Hegel's Philosophical Development' in G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. by T. M. Knox with an introduction and fragments trans. by R. Kroner (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 8.
3. See Chapter 2, pp. 43–65.
4. See R. Kroner, 'Hegel's Philosophical Development', in G. W. F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. by T. M. Knox with an introduction and fragments trans. by R. Kroner (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 8–12.
5. G. W. F. Hegel, 'Fragment on Love', *Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox, with introduction and fragments trans. R. Kroner (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1948) [hereafter FL], 305, emphasis mine.
6. See Chapter 3, pp. 67–92
7. FL, p. 9
8. PhG, p. 536
9. GPR, section 158z.
10. GPR, section 158z.

11. 'Natural' here seems to mean something like Harry Frankfurt's first order desires – a simple unqualified want, one could even say an animalistic desire. Frankfurt argues that being a person involves having first-order and second-order desires. (See H. G. Frankfurt, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 68:1 (1971), pp. 5–20).
12. See Frankfurt, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', pp. 5–20.
13. D. Duquette, 'The Political Significance of Hegel's Concept of Recognition', *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, 29 (1994), pp. 38–54.
14. I am thinking here particularly of Kojève's influential interpretation (A. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit assembled by Raymond Queneau*, ed. A. Bloom, trans. J. H. Nichols (New York: Basic Books, 1969))
15. Compare G. W. F. Hegel, 'Phenomenologie des Geistes', *Werke in 20 Bänden*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main 1969–71), vol. 3, section 149.
16. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29
17. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29
18. A. M. Jagger, 'Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology', *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 32: 2 (1989), pp. 151–76.
19. S. Schachter and J. Singer, 'Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State', *Psychological Review*, 69:5 (1962), pp. 379–99, on p. 379, and Jagger, 'Love and Knowledge', p. 155.
20. Jagger, 'Love and Knowledge', p. 156.
21. Jagger, 'Love and Knowledge', p. 157
22. I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, in I. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, ed. M. J. Gregory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 46
23. P. S. Anderson, *Re-visioning Gender in Philosophy of Religion: Reason, Love and Epistemic Locatedness* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), p. 53.
24. Jagger, 'Love and Knowledge', p. 159
25. R. Williams, 'Between Politics and Metaphysics: Reflections in the Wake of Gillian Rose', *Modern Theology*, 11:1 (1995), pp. 3–22, on p. 11, original emphasis.
26. See Chapter 5, pp. 111–29.

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